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ABSTRACT 
What Is “Meta-” for? : 
A Peircean Critique of the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor 
by 
JIANG Yicun 
Doctor of Philosophy 
My thesis aims to anatomize the cognitive theory of metaphor and suggests a Peircean 
semiotic perspective on metaphor study. As metaphorical essentialists, 
Lakoff/Johnson tend to universalize a limited number of conceptual metaphors and, 
by doing this, they overlook the dynamic relation between metaphorical tenor and 
vehicle. Such notion of metaphor is not compatible with the polysemous nature of the 
sign. The diversity and multivalency of metaphorical vehicle, in particular, cast serious 
doubts on the hypothesis of “conceptual metaphors” which, being meta-metaphorical 
constructs, can tell us nothing but a dry and empty formula “A is B”. Consequently, 
Lakoff/Johnson’s notion of conceptual metaphor is very much a Chomskyan 
postulation. Also problematic is the expedient experientialism or embodied philosophy 
they have put forward as a middle course between objectivism and subjectivism. What 
is missing from their framework is a structural space for dynamic interpretation on the 
part of metaphor users. In contrast, cognitive linguists may find in Peirce’s theory of 
the sign a sound solution to their theoretical impasse. As a logician, Peirce sees 
metaphor as the realization of iconic reasoning at the language level. His exposition 
on iconicity and iconic reasoning has laid a solid foundation upon which may be 
erected a fresh epistemology of metaphor fit for the contemporary study of language 
and mind. Broadly speaking, metaphor in Peirce can be examined from roughly two 
perspectives. Macroscopically, metaphor is an icon in general as opposed to index and 
symbol, whereas, microscopically, it is a subdivided hypoicon on the third level as 
opposed to image and diagram. Besides, Peirce also emphasized the subjective nature 
of metaphor. Semioticians after Peirce have further developed his theory on metaphor. 
For example, through his concept of “arbitrary iconicity”, Ersu Ding stresses the 
arbitrary nature of metaphorization and tries to shift our attention away from 
Lakoff/Johnson’s abstract epistemological Gestalt to the specific cultural contexts in 
which metaphors occur. Umberto Eco, on the other hand, sees interpretation of signs 
as an open-ended process that involves knowledge of all kinds. Encyclopedic 
knowledge thus serves as unlimited source for metaphorical association. For Eco, the 
meaning of a metaphor should be interpreted in the cultural framework based on a 
specific cultural community. Both Ding’s and Eco’s ideas are in line with Peirce’s 
theoretical framework where the meaning of a metaphor depends on an interpreter in 
a particular socio-historical context. They all realize that we should go beyond the 
ontology of metaphorical expressions to acquire a dynamic perspective on metaphor 
interpretation. To overcome the need for presupposing an omnipotent subject capable 
of knowing the metaphor-in-itself, we turn to Habermas’s theory of communicative 
action in which the meaning of metaphor is intersubjectively established through 
 
 
negotiation and communication. Moreover, we should not overlook the dynamic 
tension between metaphor and ideology. Aphoristically, we can say that nothing is a 
metaphor unless it is interpreted as a metaphor, and we need to reconnect metaphors 
with the specific cultural and ideological contexts in which they appear. 
Keywords: metaphorical essentialism; conceptual metaphor; experientialism; 
Peircean epistemology of metaphor; iconic reasoning; arbitrary iconicity; 
intersubjectivity; encyclopedic knowledge; rhizome; dynamic interpretation; ideology 
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Introduction 
As the title suggests, the present study is based on a philosophical reflection of an 
everlasting topic: metaphor. If we review the literature of metaphor study in the past few 
decades, we witness a spate of theses and monographs on this topic from scholars 
adhering to different theoretical positions, including the cognitive theory of metaphor 
which has abandoned the earlier socio-historical perspective and dominated much of our 
contemporary discussions of metaphor since the publication of Metaphors We Live by. 
My addition to the already innumerable publications, therefore, calls for an explanation. 
Through the years, Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive approach has stimulated hundreds of 
papers and books. However, not all these responses are positive. Major critiques on the 
cognitive theory can be found in Keller (1998, 1999), Haser (2005), and Ding (2007, 
2008, 2010, 2015a, 2015b). And with a reexamination of the cognitive theory, several 
questions may naturally arise: 
 Is Lakoff/Johnson’s categorization of metaphors sound enough to live up to its 
ambitious intellectual undertaking in the first place? 
 Why should conceptual metaphors have priority and superiority over ordinary 
metaphors? 
 Are conceptual metaphors empirical or metaphysical? 
 Is the semiotic movement between tenor and vehicle bidirectional or 
unidirectional as the cross-domain mapping theory suggests? 
 Why should the interpretation of a metaphor stop at the threshold of conceptual 
cross-domain mapping? 
These queries lead us to make further exploration on this topic. In its third issue of 2008, 
the scholarly journal Foreign Language and Literature Studies published an article 
written by the eminent Chinese scholar, Ersu Ding, entitled “What is ‘meta-’ for?” in 
which he elaborates the meta-metaphorical or meta-linguistic nature of Lakoff/Johnson’s 
conceptual metaphor theory and suggests a cultural semiotic perspective on metaphor 
study. Shedding new lights on controversial issues, Ding’s arguments in that paper are 
both insightful and illuminating, from which the present study finds great inspiration.  
Borrowing his unique and profound title, the present research is, therefore, an 
attempt to snowball this great intellectual effort. In fact, the pun in the title of my thesis 
2 
 
naturally stimulates two queries in readers’ mind: “Why should one use meta-
metaphorical constructs to understand and interpret metaphor?”, and “What is the actual 
process of metaphor formation?” With serious scrutiny, the present study finds out that, 
in cognitive theory of metaphor, Lakoff/Johnson tend to universalize a limited number 
of conceptual metaphors and, by doing this, they overlook the dynamic relation between 
metaphorical tenor and vehicle. Lakoff/Johnson can therefore be seen as metaphorical 
essentialists, and such view of metaphor is not compatible with the polysemous nature 
of the sign. The diversity and multivalency of metaphorical vehicle, in particular, cast 
serious doubts on the hypothesis of “conceptual metaphors” which, being meta-
metaphorical constructs, can tell us nothing but a dry and empty formula “A is B”. 
Consequently, Lakoff/Johnson’s notion of conceptual metaphor is very much a 
Chomskyan postulation. Also problematic is the expedient experientialism or embodied 
philosophy they have put forward as a middle course between objectivism and 
subjectivism. What is missing from their framework is a structural space for dynamic 
interpretation on the part of metaphor users. In contrast, cognitive linguists may find in 
Peirce’s theory of the sign a sound solution to their theoretical impasse. As a logician, 
Peirce sees metaphor as the realization of iconic reasoning at the language level. His 
exposition on iconicity and iconic reasoning has laid a solid foundation upon which may 
be erected a fresh epistemology of metaphor fit for the contemporary study of language 
and mind. 
Put briefly, the present study attempts to answer the following three important 
questions on metaphor: 
 What is the main problem in Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor and 
how should we evaluate the theory? 
 What is metaphor? 
 What is the real process of metaphor interpretation? 
Of all the previous studies on metaphor, very few could provide satisfactory answers to 
the above questions. Thus, the current state of research on metaphor calls for a detailed 
anatomy of the cognitive theory which hopefully can redress some of the problems that 
are besetting us today. For this reason, the present dissertation is not another empirical 
study that tries to prove the correctness of any existing theory. It is, rather, one of 
refutation and reconstruction. What makes my critique different from all previous studies 
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is that it will be conducted, as my subtitle suggests, within the framework of Peircean 
semiotic tradition which subsumes the theories of Umberto Eco and Ersu Ding. 
There are altogether three chapters in the present essay. Chapter one aims to 
provide a thorough critique of Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor, 
through questioning what “meta-” is for in the cognitive theory. The first section of this 
chapter provides a general review of the genealogy of the western theory of metaphor, 
with an effort to draw a coordinate of the cognitive theory in the global picture of the 
western tradition. The second section is a brief review of the development of the 
cognitive theory of metaphor. The third section puts forward six most salient and 
controversial features of the cognitive theory of metaphor based on a serious scrutiny of 
it from the perspective of Peircean semiotics. Section four points out that Lakoff/Johnson 
confused concept with meaning, and concept with metaphor. By centralizing the 
conceptual metaphors in the formation of metaphor, Lakoff/Johnson have overlooked the 
vivid metaphorical associations that metaphor users attempt to embody in a specific 
context. Section five gives a thorough discussion on the essentialism in Lakoff/Johnson’s 
cognitive theory of metaphor. Section six attempts to argue that Lakoff/Johnson’s 
cognitive theory of metaphor resembles Chomsky’s logic and that their notion of 
conceptual metaphors is very much a Chomskyan postulation. Section seven anatomizes 
the most important philosophy underpinning the cognitive theory of metaphor, i.e., 
experientialism, and points out several deficiencies in this philosophy.  
In chapter two, I attempt to establish a sound epistemology of metaphor through 
the perspective of the Peircean semiotic tradition. In the first section of this chapter, I 
hold that the epistemology of metaphor is an unfinished project. In this section, I choose 
three eras in the western history that can be considered as being crucial for establishing 
a sound epistemology of metaphor, and explore the reasons of their respective failure. In 
the search for a better philosophical solution we then turn to the Peircean philosophy of 
the sign. In other words, in the second section, I attempt to find answers to the question 
hinted in the title: what is metaphor. For this purpose, I try to establish an epistemology 
of metaphor in the Peircean semiotic tradition in light of his phenomenological analysis 
of the sign, with a special concentration on his trichotomous division of signs into index, 
icon, and symbol. Section three aims to demonstrate the operation of the Peircean 
abduction in the formation and interpretation of metaphor through a detailed criticism of 
an important conceptual metaphor or orientational metaphor, MORE IS UP.  
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In chapter three, I propose that our efforts should not stop at exploring Peirce’s 
thought on metaphor but should incorporate insights from scholars of the same tradition, 
like Umberto Eco and Ersu Ding, so as to obtain an integrated framework for metaphor 
interpretation. In this chapter, I emphasize the importance of a cultural space for dynamic 
interpretation of metaphor on the part of metaphor users, and also introduce the theory 
of intersubjective communication from Habermas as a philosophical solution for 
interpersonal understanding of metaphorical meaning. Structurally, this chapter includes 
five sections. The first section aims to discuss the subjective nature of metaphor from the 
perspective of Peircean semiotics. In the second section, I elaborate on Ersu Ding’s 
theory of metaphor with a special concentration on his concept of “arbitrary iconicity”. 
The third section attempts to elucidate Umberto Eco’s metaphorology through the 
relation between metaphor and culture and Eco’s key concept of encyclopedia. The 
fourth section discusses the relation between metaphor and intersubjectivity through a 
theory of intersubjective communication in Habermas as opposed to Lakoff/Johnson’s 
experientialism or embodied philosophy in the cognitive theory of metaphor. Finally, the 
fifth section examines the relation between metaphor and ideology. 
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Chapter One: The Impasse of Metaphorical Essentialism 
1.1 Genealogy of Western Theories of Metaphor  
Theories do not come out of thin air. The western discourse of metaphor has a long 
history of theoretical development that dates back to Aristotle, during which period quite 
a number of thinkers have made crucial contributions that have laid a solid foundation 
for the contemporary theories of metaphor. Thus, before we explore deeper into the 
central topic of the thesis, we shall have a quick glimpse at the genealogy of western 
theories of metaphor, through which a coordinate frame for the following explorations 
may also be delimited. 
Scholars of the western world usually attribute “the discovery of metaphor” 
(Danesi 2004: 10) to the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BC) who coined the word 
“metapherein”, with “meta” signifying “beyond” and “pherein” “to carry” (Aristotle 
1952a: 1457 ff.). The English word “metaphor” then derives itself from the Greek 
“metapherein” (Danesi 2004: 10). In addition to the “discovery of metaphor”, Aristotle 
also put forward very influential ideas on figurative language in which metaphor 
“occupies a central position” (Hanks and Giora 2012: 17). The Greek master’s exposition 
on metaphor can be found in two of his well-known works, the Poetics and the Rhetoric. 
In the Poetics, he famously gives a rather broad definition of metaphor, in which he finds 
out that the loftiness of metaphor helps poetry to avoid being banal and worn-out (Hanks 
and Giora 2012: 18). In addition to this, Aristotle also provides a possible way of 
classifying different kinds of metaphorical expressions. For him, “Metaphor is the 
application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species 
to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion.” (Hanks and Giora 
2012: 19) In other words, Aristotle divides metaphor into four types: three kinds of 
transference plus one proportional kind. And he found the proportional kind of metaphor 
to be the most charming one (Hanks and Giora 2012: 25). It is safe to say that Aristotle’s 
notion of metaphor in the Rhetoric is consistent with his idea in the Poetics. In the 
Rhetoric, Aristotle makes it quite clear that metaphor is not a mere linguistic adornment; 
rather, it has a certain purpose of persuasive speaking, i.e., a function to persuade others. 
What he truly holds dear in metaphor is the possible effect it makes either in poems or in 
daily language and what advantage we may take from using metaphor. What is insightful 
for the contemporary study of metaphor is its cognitive function in the form of rhetoric 
learning. With the burgeoning of the cognitive science that attaches great importance to 
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the study of metaphor, much “significance” and “value” of Aristotle’s classic notion of 
metaphor might be discovered by emerging researches. 
From a glimpse of Aristotle’s conception of metaphor presented above, we know 
that the map drawn by the Greek philosopher for metaphor study is quite vague and 
unclear, and his proposed classification of metaphors together with his mention of 
metaphor’s great value in both poetry and prose are not enough for subsequent scholars 
to form a convincing epistemology of metaphor. Based on his understanding of metaphor, 
there emerges two different frameworks of metaphor interpretation: the poetic 
interpretation that emphasizes metaphor’s role in literary creation and aesthetics, and the 
rhetoric interpretation that places importance on metaphor’s role in promoting effective 
communication, but neither of the two theoretical directions can provide adequate 
answers for the fundamental question of what metaphor is and how it works. This 
explains why metaphor after Aristotle has been misunderstood or misinterpreted for 
centuries by many very influential scholars: they have gone too far on Aristotle’s road of 
rhetoric interpretation of metaphor.  
Regardless of its possible negative impact, Aristotle’s rhetoric interpretation of 
metaphor was developed by many subsequent thinkers. Famous rhetoric teachers of the 
Roman age, like Cicero and Quintilian, adopted and followed many of the Aristotelean 
principles and notions on metaphor. The latter is another important scholar in the western 
academic history who made important remarks on metaphor, and held a similar view to 
that of Aristotle in that figurative expressions are to improve effective communication 
(Hanks and Giora 2012: 2). By seeing the communicative function of figurative language 
as its first and foremost mission, he went much further on the road of rhetoric 
interpretation of metaphor than his predecessors. In Institutes of Oratory, Quintilian 
discusses the import of tropes for orators, and believes that metaphor is a species of trope. 
For Quintilian, one function of metaphor is to add significance, and the other is for 
ornament or embellishment. Different from Aristotle’s notion of metaphor that was later 
known as comparison theory of metaphor, Quintilian views metaphor as a simple 
substitution of one item by another. That Quintilian sees metaphorization as a process of 
decorative substitution further entrenched the rhetoric view of metaphor (Danesi 2004: 
13). As contended by Danesi (2004), both views of Aristotle and Quintilian can be 
categorized into the rhetorical theory of metaphor, which are “useless for understanding 
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semantic system in their origin” (Danesi 2004: 14) because they are never unyoked of 
the literalist view of meaning. 
For whatever reason, after Aristotle and Quintilian, the western academia 
witnessed a period in which metaphor was either neglected or “condemned as a defect of 
human reasoning” by philosophers (Leezenberg 2001: 1; Danesi 2004: 10). We may call 
that period “the dark age for metaphor”, in the most part of which “metaphor was 
delegated to rhetoric and literary theory, while literal language was seen as a norm or 
standard for ‘serious’ language usage, and as an ideal for rational argument”. Most of the 
philosophers, such as the British thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), in that long period 
considered metaphor as a defect of human reasoning and thus should be avoided. Another 
British scholar, John Locke (1632-1704), held the same view of metaphor as Hobbes. 
They both believe that metaphor is incompatible with serious thought, and follow the old 
commandment “Thou shalt not commit metaphor.” (Black 1955: 273) The following 
remark by Max Black vividly depicts how philosophers of that time regarded and treated 
metaphor: “To draw attention to a philosopher’s metaphors is to belittle him—like 
praising a logician for his beautiful handwriting. Addiction to metaphor is held to be 
illicit, on the principle that whereof one can speak only metaphorically, thereof one ought 
not to speak at all.” (Black 1955: 273; cf. Hanks and Giora 2012: 49) From a typical 
remark on metaphor by Locke (1975: 34), we know that Black (1955) was not at all 
exaggerating: 
If we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, 
besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words 
eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the 
passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats: and 
therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and 
popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or 
instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot 
be thought a great fault, either of language or person that makes use of them. 
Hanks and Giora (2012) contended that most of the philosophers in this period made a 
category mistake with respect to metaphor. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
some contemporary scholars attribute the fifteen hundred years of silence on the part of 
philosophical discussion of metaphor to Aristotle’s literalist view of meaning and his 
interpretation of metaphor as a proportion (Danesi 2004: 12-13). According to Danesi 
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(2004), the Aristotelean conception of metaphor has had a very negative influence for 
metaphor study in the western world.  
Throughout the medieval period, St. Thomas Aquinas seems to be an exception. 
We may have a better understanding of his idea on the issue of metaphor through the 
following argument (quoted in Davis and Hersh 1986: 250): 
It is befitting Holy Scripture to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of 
comparisons with material things. For God provides for everything according to the 
capacity of its nature. Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through 
sensible things, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy 
Scripture spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things. 
According to Danesi (2004), St. Thomas was among a very few scholars of his time who 
can break free of the literalist view of meaning and admit that spiritual truths are 
obtainable “by means of comparison with material things”. By claiming that the “likeness 
of material things” may illuminate spiritual truths, St. Thomas implies the vital role of 
metaphor in human cognition, and thus indicates that metaphor is not only relative with 
serious thinking but also a fundamental way of obtaining truth. St. Thomas’s observation 
was not given due attention until, four hundred years later, Giambattista Vico published 
his revolutionary magnum opus in the year 1725, i.e., the Scienza Nuova (New Science), 
in which he tries to bring metaphor back to the limelight. Unlike other thinkers in the age 
of European Enlightenment, such as Locke, Wilkins and Leibniz, Vico emphasizes the 
significance and ubiquitous nature of poetic logic (abductive reasoning) in people’s 
everyday thinking. Vico is probably the first scholar in premodern times who advocated 
the fundamental function of metaphor in human reasoning and thus tried to establish an 
epistemology of metaphor different from the secular understanding of metaphor as mere 
rhetoric. Illuminating and revolutionary as it is, Vico’s conception of metaphor was, 
however, largely neglected by mainstream philosophers of Vico’s time, such as Gottfried 
Leibniz (1646-1716) and the aforementioned John Locke, and those of the immediately 
succeeding era, like Hegel (1770-1831) and even John Mill (1806-1873). Perhaps, 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was an exception, who tended to see metaphor and 
figurative language in general as evidence of how the human mind manages to 
understand strange things. Of course, metaphor was not a main focus of study for Kant 
and we thus cannot expect a full discussion on this topic from this great figure in modern 
German philosophy. 
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Perhaps, it would be hard for Vico to imagine that a major advocate of his theory 
of metaphor would come from the other side of the Atlantic nearly 100 years after his 
death. The American philosopher and semiotician, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), 
is a very important and special figure in the history of American philosophy. We may 
acquire a general idea about this figure from Bertrand Russell’s remark on his scholarship: 
“The work of Peirce is voluminous and fragmentary. Besides, he was often struggling 
with difficult problems and novel suggestions. It is therefore not easy to obtain a clear 
view of his position. It is, however, beyond doubt that he was one of the most original 
minds of the later nineteenth century, and certainly the greatest American thinker ever.” 
(Russell 1959: 276) Indeed, Peirce belongs to those philosophers who can always think 
ahead. Apropos of metaphor, few scholars of his time had the philosophical vision as 
Peirce who believed that metaphor plays a significant role in human thought and 
cognition. In fact, Peirce based his understanding of metaphor on his unique perspective 
on logic. Echoing Vico’s notion of poetic logic, the American thinker saw abductive 
reasoning as essential to our understanding of the outside world. According to Peirce, 
abductive reasoning can be subdivided into two kinds: iconic reasoning and indexical 
reasoning, and metaphorical thinking is considered as one mode of iconic reasoning. In 
other words, iconic reasoning is the underlying logic of metaphor. More importantly, he 
also initiated a unique way of understanding metaphor from a semiotic perspective. To 
be more specific, his insightful division of signs into index, icon, and symbol, followed 
by a subdivision of iconic signs into image, diagram, and metaphor, have provided us 
with a rather fresh perspective to examine metaphor: a semiotic view. However, Peirce’s 
idea on metaphor drew little attention from scholars before 1980s, and still not much 
afterwards. We will have much more discussion on metaphor in Peirce in the following 
chapters. 
As a contemporary of Peirce, the German philosopher F. Nietzsche (1844-1900) 
engaged in substantial discussions on metaphor in his analytical framework of perception 
and conception. In fact, Nietzsche (1979) held very similar notions to Vico and Peirce 
on the issue of metaphor, who contended that metaphor is the “greatest flaw” (Danesi 
2004: 15) of human beings. For Nietzsche, the drive towards the production of metaphor 
is both fundamental and indispensable (Nietzsche 1979: 88). The drive behind 
metaphorical and metonymical transference is quite in line with Vico’s poetic logic and 
Peirce’s abductive reasoning. For Nietzsche, as long as human beings have the ability to 
desire and dream, the drive for metaphor will never die. Besides, he also had a very 
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special perspective making a distinction between metaphor and concept, which will be 
elaborated in the following section of this chapter.  
As argued by Danesi (2004: 16), the modern interest in metaphor “as a trace to 
the nature of human cognition, rather than as a mere figure of speech”, is sparked neither 
by ideas of Peirce and Nietzsche, or a reappraisal of Vico’s work, but by “the pivotal 
works of the early experimental psychologists in the latter part of the nineteenth century”, 
and among them are scientists like Gustav Fechner and Wilhelm Wundt, who first carried 
out experiments on how people process metaphor (Danesi 2004: 16; cf. Wundt 1901). 
Through collecting and analyzing data, Karl Buhler made a fascinating conclusion that 
metaphorical thinking “produced an effective retrieval form of memory” (Danesi 2004: 
16). Then, the first half of the 20th century witnessed a Gestalt movement in the field of 
psychology, during which metaphor became a major focus of research (Wertheimer 
1923). Findings of the empirical studies conducted in this period proved, for the first 
time, the cognitive function of metaphor. 
Despite the massive efforts by experimental psychologists, the British theorist, I. 
A. Richards, is considered as the real scholar who “most kindled a broad scientific 
interest in metaphor” (Danesi 2004: 16). As an advocate of the Peircean theory of the 
sign, Richards collaborated with Ogden on a semiotic triangle or reference triangle quite 
similar to Peirce’s semiotic triad. The main focus of Richards’ research was the study of 
meaning, and he set forth the contextual theory of the sign. Similar to Peirce’s notion of 
metaphor, Richards (1938: 48-49) recognized the metaphorical nature of our thinking: 
Thinking is radically metaphoric. Linkage by analogy is its constituent law or 
principle, its casual nexus, since meaning only arises through the causal contexts by 
which a sign stands for (takes the place of) an instance of a sort. To think of anything 
is to take it as of a sort… and that “as” brings in (openly or in disguise) the analogy, 
the parallel, the metaphoric grapple or gerund or grasp or draw by which the mind 
takes hold. It takes no hold if there is nothing for it to haul from, for its thinking is 
the haul, the attraction of likes. 
Through depicting the “linkage by analogy” as the “constituent law or principle” of our 
thinking, the above quote clearly demonstrates the operation of sign-mediated human 
thinking. Such position is quite in line with Vico and Peirce. In The Philosophy of 
Rhetoric, Richards (1936) expresses his idea that metaphor can create new meaning. His 
further exposition on the dynamic relation between different parts of a metaphor laid a 
foundation for what was later known as the interaction theory of metaphor. Richards 
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(1936) also introduced the terms of “tenor” and “vehicle” for the two interacting items 
of metaphor, which, afterwards, are well-accepted and employed by many scholars. 
Contemporary researchers also use “target” to replace “tenor” and “source” to replace 
“vehicle”, which is merely a matter of terminology. For the sake of consistency, I adopt 
Richards’ version, i.e., “tenor” and “vehicle”, during the development of the present 
thesis. 
After Richards, the American scholar, Max Black, also put forward very 
influential notions on the interaction theory of metaphor. In fact, he not only developed 
the interactionist theory to describe metaphorical thinking as a common reasoning of our 
mind, but also put forward a very influential classification of metaphor theories. Through 
a meta-analysis, Black (1962) divided the western theories of metaphor into three types: 
the substitution view, the comparison view, and the interaction view. This typological 
classification is so inclusive that it may subsume nearly all theoretical traditions on 
metaphor study in the history of western thought. According to this division, Aristotle’s 
conception of proportional metaphor has been considered by many (Hanks and Giora 
2012) as the origin of the comparison theory of metaphor. The German scholar Nöth 
(1990: 129) had a rather insightful comment on the relation between the three types of 
theories on the basis of Black’s division: 
Each of these theories alone can probably illuminate only one side of metaphor. Thus, 
with respect to the definitional criteria for metaphor in the narrow sense, the 
substitution and comparison theories must be seen as complementary. Both theories 
describe metaphor primarily from a paradigmatic point of view. The interaction 
theory proposed by Black (1962) and earlier by Richards (1936), on the other hand, 
explains metaphor primarily from syntagmatic point of view as the resolution of a 
semantic tension between the metaphoric expression and its context. But even the 
syntagmatic structure of metaphor necessarily presupposes a paradigmatic 
dimension, so that the two aspects are again complementary. 
As a dualistic theory (Nöth 1990), the comparison theory of metaphor emphasizes the 
relation between the tenor and the vehicle, and thus highlights the comparison between 
the two parts and the similarity as the outcome of the comparison. The substitution theory 
stresses the transference from one to another, and thus highlights the replacing movement 
in the process of metaphorization. Todorov (1972) criticized such theoretical perspective 
for failing to realize that substitution occurs only on the part of the signifieds while the 
signifiers “remained constant”. Different from the above two theories, the interaction 
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theory lays stress on the context in which metaphors appear. As an interactionist, 
Umberto Eco (1984, 2014) advocates that the study of metaphor should be based on the 
cultural context they appear in and users’ interpretation in the context, and his 
metaphorology may also represent one type of interaction theory of metaphor. Since the 
three types of theories highlight different aspects of metaphor and are mutually 
complementary, it is usually not easy to figure out, in real situations, which one of the 
three categories a theory of metaphor should be classified into. For instance, it is quite 
difficult to classify the cognitive theory of metaphor into anyone of them. 
From the 1960s to 1970s, the prevalence of Chomskyan linguistics suppressed 
the development of the cognitive trend in both linguistics and psychology as championed 
by Black and Gestalt psychologists (Danesi 2004), for Chomsky typically saw metaphor 
as a mere deviation from the fundamental linguistic rules he held dear. Then, in the late 
years of 1970s, as the transformational generative grammar began to be questioned by 
many linguists and psychologists, metaphor began to draw great attention of many 
scholars and thus finally came to the central part of the academic stage. A pivotal study 
in this period was conducted by a group of psychologists headed by Howard Pollio in the 
year 1977, the finding of which showed that metaphor pervades our ordinary speech and 
it should no longer be seen as a deviation or mere rhetoric decoration (Pollio et al. 1977). 
This empirical study became a turning point in the mainstream discourse of metaphor in 
the western academia, after which metaphor has been studied extensively. It is worth 
pointing out that, in addition to verbal metaphors that have drawn much of the researchers’ 
attention, other modes of metaphor or deviations of standard metaphor such as visual 
metaphors have also been explored in the same period, and this trend becomes more 
popular in the digital age with the burgeoning of researches in multimodality (Kennedy 
1982; cf. Nöth 1990). Of course, among the many ambitious approaches that purport to 
treat metaphor from different perspectives, the most famous and influential one is 
Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor to be anatomized in the immediately 
succeeding sections of this chapter. 
1.2 Cognitive Theory of Metaphor through the Years. 
Anyone who intends to talk about the contemporary theories of metaphor will 
find it difficult to bypass Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor. Major 
arguments and core ideas of the cognitive theory can be found in Lakoff/Johnson (1980), 
even though Lakoff (1987) further elaborates his theory of categorization and 
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philosophical grounding (internal realism and embodied philosophy). Taking a 
psychological point of view and partially influenced by Max Blake’s theory on domains 
(although this is not acknowledged by the authors themselves), Lakoff/Johnson (1980) 
criticize the traditional theories of metaphor (especially the comparison theory) by 
drawing a distinction between their cognitive approach and traditional ones. From their 
cognitive perspective, metaphor is a matter of conceptualization rather than rhetoric and 
our ordinary conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical (Lakoff/Johnson 1980). 
They also criticize traditional views on the distinction between literal and figurative 
languages. In this way, they hope to draw researchers’ attention away from everyday 
language so as to concentrate on the role of metaphorical concepts in our overall 
conceptual system. Like Chomsky, although they may not appreciate such comparison, 
Lakoff/Johnson (1980) also discuss the surface expressions and root concepts of 
metaphor as well as their cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system. For them, the 
choices of metaphorical expressions we make are not random; rather, “they are 
determined by a set of fundamental metaphors or ‘conceptual metaphors’ that lie deep in 
our collective unconscious” (Ding 2015a: 9). In other words, conceptual metaphors are 
deemed as a pre-existing schema underlying ordinary metaphorical expressions. More 
specifically, our everyday metaphors are organized by an idealized cognitive model 
called gestalt (Lakoff 1987). 
Lakoff/Johnson reiterate their cognitive theory of metaphor in a new edition of 
Metaphors we live by published in 2003. Except for adding some empirical evidence in 
the afterward, the original content of the book remains unchanged in the new version. In 
a more recent paper, Lakoff (2008) lists 18 results from the old theory (17 from 
Metaphors We Live by and one from “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor”) that he 
thinks have stood the test of time. In recent years, Lakoff/Johnson have relied heavily on 
the development of neuro science. However, not all scholars agree with him. Powell 
(1987), for example, points out that the cognitive theory of metaphor goes to unnecessary 
lengths to emphasize the ways in which ordinary language metaphors may enter into 
entailment (or truth-conditional) relationships which are based on propositional content, 
and that it does not take the subjective basis of meaning into account. Powell (1987) 
argues that the cognitive theory is only partially different from the traditional Anglo-
American theories on metaphor in that it still adopts an objective scientific methodology.  
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As the cognitive theory grows more “metaphysical” in its research, the number 
of its critics has increased. In fact, some cognitive linguists themselves (Gibbs and 
O’Brien 1990; Gibbs and Colston 1995; Gibbs 1996) have also recognized the necessity 
to prove the psychological reality of conceptual metaphor through launching related 
empirical studies, but the existing research findings are far less than satisfactory. Gibbs 
and his colleagues (1990, 1996) have carried out numerous experiments to support the 
idea that conceptual metaphors are the underlying motivation for the understanding of 
idioms. Their study is sharply challenged by Keysar and Bly (1999), who argue that 
idioms cannot be used to prove the existence of conceptual metaphors. Dews and Winner 
(1999) and Giora and Fein (1999) refute the cognitive idea that abstract concepts are 
understood in terms of concrete ones by holding the point that the processing of literal 
meaning and non-literal meaning are dependent on salience. Glucksberg and McGlone 
(1999) point out that interpreting metaphor through the mapping between two domains 
is inadequate and lacks empirical evidence. Shen (1999) and Titone and Connine (1999) 
further track down some contradictory linguistic data that could not be explained by the 
cognitive model of cross-domain mapping. While Lakoff/Johnson (2003) believe there 
are at least seven types of evidence derived from various empirical methods, none of 
them seems to give an adequate answer to the questions and problems mentioned above. 
The first decade of the present century in particular has witnessed an intensive 
critical reflection on the cognitive theory of metaphor. Haser (2005) has challenged 
cognitive semantics by refuting its major claims concerning metaphor, metonymy, and 
the experiential philosophy. In fact, Haser’s (2005) study is the first of its kind that 
presents detailed and systemic responses to Lakoff/Johnson’s philosophical claims in 
their cognitive theory of metaphor. As is averred by Haser (2005), McCawley’s 
comments that Lakoff/Johnson (1980) is “well-argued” and “maintains a high standard 
of precision” should be “taken with a grain of salt” (Haser 2005: 54). By proposing a 
new perspective on the distinction between metaphor and metonymy and providing an 
account of metaphorical transfer that does not rely on the notion of conceptual metaphor, 
this study reveals many weak points and contradictions in the cognitive theory that could 
not justify themselves. Haser (2005) further points out a number of contradictory 
statements throughout Lakoff/Johnson (1980). Through analyzing the rhetorical 
strategies in Lakoff/Johnson’s arguments, Haser (2005) observes many tactics that are 
contended by them as being “unfair”, such as belittling Lewis’s philosophical position 
on objectivism and Rakova’s (2002) criticism of the cognitivist approach. Another 
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strategy of Lakoff/Johnson, as is contended by Haser (2005: 63), is that they 
“superimpose part of their own theory onto scholars” who probably do not adhere to their 
cognitive theory of metaphor. Lakoff/Johnson’s way of arguing is considered as 
“assailing the strawman” by Haser (2005), for not only do they fail to provide any 
quotations from the proposed theorists (homonym theorists), but also they avoid 
mentioning any single representative of the putative theories such as the abstraction 
theory and homonym theory of metaphor. Through explaining the cognitive theory’s 
relationship to some earlier theories, Haser (2005) also pinpoints how Lakoff/Johnson 
“tend to distort important insights from other scholars” (Haser 2005). Another focus of 
Haser’s criticism is on Lakoff/Johnson’s arguments on objectivism. As is argued by 
Haser (2005), the cognitive theory of metaphor has become “unpalatable to quite a few 
scholars working in adjacent fields” (Haser 2005: 9). Moreover, Haser (2005) also 
pointed out that Lakoff/Johnson failed to account for the partiality of metaphorical 
transference from the source domain to the target domain, whereas they assign the undue 
responsibility of resolving this problem to the abstraction theorists of metaphor whose 
theoretical framework does not concern the hypothesized conceptual metaphors and thus 
will never be puzzled by such an issue. Haser (2005) attributes this to Lakoff/Johnson’s 
strategy of evading the issue they are unable to tackle. Evidently, Haser’s (2005) study 
may be seen as the loudest voice so far against the dominant cognitive myth of metaphor. 
Nevertheless, the philosophical challenges brought up by Haser (2005) also need to be 
examined, and there is a good possibility that Wittgenstein’s theory of family 
resemblance can serve as an effective remedy to the cognitive theory. 
A more recent critique of the cognitive theory of metaphor is found in Ding (2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010). Through the introduction of the metaphor theory of Qian Zhongshu, 
a late Chinese scholar, Ding (2007) contends that the cognitive theory of metaphor has 
neglected two vital characteristics of metaphor: vehicular diversity and vehicular 
multivalency. Using a theory of sign interpretation developed by Peirce, he gives a clear 
presentation of the associative structure of metaphor motivated by similarities between 
things or states of affairs which underlies the entire process of concept formation or 
semiosis. Ding’s study has thus provided a starting point for further inquiry into a 
dynamic cultural dimension of metaphor. 
Perhaps the most significant contribution of Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory is 
successfully drawing a worldwide attention on the import of metaphor in meaning and 
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mind. The title of their famous book Metaphors We Live by has become an object of 
imitation and quotation in the field of scholarship and beyond. Their effort of bringing 
metaphor under the limelight was rewarded by an academic school with quite a number 
of followers who are generally labeled as cognitive linguists. Zoltán Kövecses (2010: vii) 
enumerated the new developments in diverse areas of study related to the cognitive 
theory of metaphor. 
 the neural theory of metaphor 
 the theory of conceptual integration 
 metaphor in discourse 
 the relationship between embodiment and metaphor 
 the embeddedness of metaphor in cultural context 
 the nature of mappings 
 metaphor in gestures 
 the study of multimodal metaphor 
 metaphor identification  
 metaphor processing 
 the corpus linguistic study of metaphor 
 emotion metaphors 
 the theory of metonymy 
 metaphor in foreign language teaching 
 metaphor in the study of grammar 
 and others.  
This further proves that the impact of their theory is indeed rather enormous. It seems to 
be true for many of Lakoff/Johnson’s followers that the cognitive approach of metaphor 
study settles every problem and all they should do is to collect as many conceptual 
metaphors as they can. Put in another way, most of them take “conceptual metaphor” for 
granted and see the collection of “master tropes” or even the discovery of new “master 
tropes” as their common task. For them, to follow Lakoff/Johnson’s logic of 
metaphorical essentialism is self-evident and they never question it. They feel so secure 
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in their own bubble that they start to accept only information, whether it is true or not, 
that fits their opinions, instead of basing their opinions on the evidence out there.  
It should be pointed out that, although I have serious doubts on Lakoff/Johnson’s 
cognitive theory of metaphor especially in relation to their conceptual metaphor 
hypothesis, I am not at all an opponent of the cognitive enterprise. I am aware that 
cognitive scientists and psychologists, such as Glucksberg and McGlone, have achieved 
much, either independently or in collaboration, in exploring the psycho-linguistic 
relationship. Many findings of their researches are rather insightful (cf. Glucksberg and 
McGlone 1999) for exploring the relation between mind and language. I am, however, 
against their “cognitive view” of metaphor, which means that my critique will be 
confined to the original ideas and notions directly made by Lakoff/Johnson. Although 
the cognitive theory of metaphor is a very influential school in cognitive linguistics, it 
still is not the whole field. Therefore, it will be a misunderstanding to assume that, by 
criticizing the cognitive theory of metaphor, I am against all researches done by other 
cognitive linguists. And it will be equally a misunderstanding to assume that I deny all 
the advantages in the cognitive theory of metaphor. There are, of course, some 
advantages in their theory, but the emphasis of the present study is on the undesirable 
features of the theory and the corresponding negative effects it has caused in the 
contemporary study of metaphor. 
1.3 Through the Peircean Looking Glass 
Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]) assume that the core ideas in their cognitive approach are 
completely fresh, and they therefore make the following statement in the preface to 
Metaphors We Live by: 
Mark had found that most traditional philosophical views permit metaphor little, if 
any, role in understanding our world and ourselves. George had discovered linguistic 
evidence showing that metaphor is pervasive in everyday language and thought—
evidence that did not fit any contemporary Anglo-American theory of meaning 
within either linguistics or philosophy. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: ix) 
As a matter of fact, before Lakoff/Johnson, Max Black (1955: 273) had a similar 
misunderstanding in terms of previous philosophers’ views on metaphor, which might 
have misled Lakoff/Johnson in this respect: 
I should like to do something to dispel the mystery that invests the topic; but since 
philosophers (for all their notorious interest in language) have so neglected the 
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subject, I must get what help I can from the literary critics. They, at least, do not 
accept the commandment, ‘Thou shalt not commit metaphor’, or assume that 
metaphor is incompatible with serious thought. 
Echoing the discussion in the previous section of this chapter, such statements 
particularly refer to the “dark age of metaphor” before Vico rather than the whole period 
of western thought. From the brief theoretical history of metaphor study presented in 
Section One, we are able to have a glimpse of the intellectual environment for the 
emergence of Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor. Many positive attempts 
and explorations had been made by earlier theorists, including Max Black himself, for a 
better understanding of metaphor, but it was not a right time for developing a systematic 
theory. Nevertheless, the fact that a sound understanding of metaphor was suppressed for 
most of the time in history should not be used as an excuse for not showing due respects 
for those who deserved much more, such as Vico, Peirce, and Nietzsche. Therefore, by 
“misunderstanding”, I refer particularly to Lakoff/Johnson’s neglect of the semiotic 
tradition of metaphor championed by Vico and Peirce. In other words, I believe that the 
above arguments by Lakoff/Johnson and Black are not applicable to the American 
philosopher and semiotician, Charles S. Peirce, who views iconic reasoning essential to 
our understanding of the world. In fact, Peirce made it very clear a long time ago that our 
thinking is either indexical (metonymical) or iconic (metaphorical), which long predates 
what Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]: 6) have considered as their “most important claim”, 
i.e., “human thought processes are largely metaphorical”. 
If we take a holistic view of the western philosophy of language, as reflected in 
the historical review presented in the first section of this chapter, Lakoff/Johnson’s idea 
that metaphor is more than rhetoric becomes even less “innovative”. As Jäkel (1999) has 
pointed out, there is a long tradition in linguistics and philosophy anticipating the core 
ideas stated in the cognitive theory of metaphor. Names of the scholars on Jäkel’s list 
include Kant, Blumenberg, Weinrich, and Whorf. Haser (2005: 75) enriched this list by 
adding Goodman, Black, and Beardsley onto it: 
Quite a few scholars have put forward what Jäkel (1999) calls “forgotten 
contributions to the cognitive theory of metaphor.” Apart from Goodman, major 
proponents of accounts that are in some sense reminiscent of Lakoff/Johnson’s 
theory include Blake and Beardsley. That Lakoff/Johnson do not pay tribute to these 
scholars is all the more puzzling since Johnson (1981b) does contain a discussion of 
these theories. 
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From the citation of Goodman in Johnson (1981), we know that at least Mark Johnson 
was not unaware of Goodman’s notion that metaphor “permeates all discourses, ordinary 
and special” (Goodman 1968: 80). Haser (2005) even believes that Nelson Goodman’s 
notion of metaphor “anticipates Lakoff/Johnson’s (1980) conception of metaphors as 
ways of organizing and conceptualizing our experience, which presents the bedrock 
assumption of their approach” (Haser 2005: 77). 
In fact, as we have already pointed out in the first section, the “forgotten 
contributions to the cognitive theory of metaphor” could go further back in time to G. 
Vico, St. Thomas, and even Aristotle. Aristotle (1952b: 1410b) had already implied the 
cognitive function of metaphor from which we can “best get hold of something fresh”. 
For him, metaphor “permeates all kinds of discourses as a template for understanding 
life in its many details, complexities, and vicissitudes” (Danesi 2004: 11). 
Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]: 190) also acknowledge this, but they assert that this 
theoretical tradition “was never carried over into modern philosophical thought” 
(Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 190). This conclusion is, however, untenable. By 
contending that to metaphorize well “implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in 
dissimilars” (quoted in Ricoeur 1977: 23), Aristotle brings people’s attention to metaphor 
users’ manipulation over two seemingly unconnected entities, i.e., to make the dissimilar 
similar. In this process, the metaphor user’s mental association is considered 
indispensible. This capacity for creative association is further defined and reexamined 
by Vico (1948) in terms of poetic logic through which the competence of 
metaphorization plays a vital role in human cognitive activities. Viewing metaphor as a 
fundamental and primal instrument of thought (Leary 1990), Vico recovers the 
connection between verbal language and the senses. By doing this, he had put metaphor 
in the proper position of philosophy. The following remark by Danesi on the relationship 
between Vico’s conception of metaphor and Lakoff/Johnson’s conceptual metaphor 
theory (CMT) is essentially right: 
While much has been documented within CMT on the role of metaphor in language 
and thought, there is nothing in CMT that was not prefigured by Vico in his New 
Science. Moreover, CMT would be greatly enhanced as a theoretical enterprise if it 
were to seriously consider and adopt Vico’s notion of poetic logic. (Danesi 2004: 
25) 
Thus, the insights of all these philosophers and linguists on this topic have, to a great 
extent, lessened the originality of the cognitive approach. 
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In line with Vico, Peirce developed an effective method of meaning interpretation 
through his theory of the sign. Of all the Peircean semiotic propositions, his trichotomous 
division of signs into index, icon, and symbol seems to be the most useful and insightful 
to the study of metaphor whose formation and interpretation is based on iconic reasoning. 
Peirce referred to this trichotomy as “the most fundamental division of signs” (CP 2.275). 
For Peirce, metaphor is the result of making links between things or states of affairs on 
the basis of similarity. He defined this process as “iconic reasoning” which is one of the 
two forms of abduction, the other being indexical reasoning. Even after human beings 
have developed verbal language, they continue to reason iconically which results in 
metaphors. One prominent feature of iconic reasoning is that it is open-ended and 
heterogeneous and therefore no particular metaphorical pattern can be said to claim 
monopoly over the structuring of our thinking and behavior. Such a theoretical position 
is quite different from Lakoff/Johnson’s metaphor theory. 
For the most part of the 20th century, Peirce’s conception of metaphor was 
neglected by the mainstream academia. In the following chapters, we will elaborate the 
importance of Peirce’s semiotic theory in helping establish a sound epistemology of 
metaphor. What should be admitted here is that based on the existing publications and 
manuscripts of Peirce, one can make a quick conclusion that metaphor is not Peirce’s 
focus of exploration and he also cannot be called a theorist on metaphor study. This 
becomes a main reason many scholars have great doubts on whether there should be a 
“Peircean conception of metaphor”. Some scholars (Anderson 1984) added that Peirce 
realized the importance of metaphor in his late years, but, regrettably, had not got enough 
time to make a full discussion on it. Besides, his ideas on metaphor are scattered in his 
writings of different periods and this has contributed to the unsystematic feature of his 
notions on metaphor. 
Peircean scholars did publish several important articles on metaphor in the 1980s 
when the cognitive theory of metaphor began to draw people’s attention. However, 
dialogues between the aforementioned two schools were very few afterwards. In fact, 
many theorists take this phenomenon as being “odd”, as Danaher (1998: 171) argued in 
the following quote: 
Given that language is a cognitive system and that cognition is a semiotic system, it 
is odd that two prominent lines of research in contemporary linguistics, one an 
outgrowth of Peircean notions (Jakobson 1965, Andersen 1973…Anttila 1977and 
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1989, Haley 1988, and especially Shapiro 1983and 1991) and the other a self-
described cognitive theory (Langacker 1987, Lakoff/Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, 
Johnson 1987, Lakoff and Turner 1989, Gibbs 1994), take little notice of each other. 
Danaher (1998) saw some commonalities between the two traditions and believed that 
they could communicate. According to Haley (1999), one point of agreement between 
Peirce and Lakoff lies in that: “Metaphor is not an exclusively ‘literary’ or even linguistic 
phenomenon, but is instead a fundamentally conceptual or cognitive mechanism.” (Haley 
1999: 422) Thus, they hope to bring these two intellectual traditions together so that they 
can shed light on each other.  
While admitting the commonalties, these scholars argue, we should also see the great 
distinctions between the two schools. Different from Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory 
of metaphor, the Peircean conception of metaphor never attempts to conceptualize 
metaphorical expressions and never advocate metaphorical essentialism. This is, perhaps, 
the most evident distinction between the two schools. As a Peircean scholar, Haley (1999) 
was quite positive on the idea that the cognitive theory of metaphor could benefit from 
Peirce’s theory: “It is my thesis that the semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce offers 
just the conceptual footing Lakoff and Johnson are trying to reach.” (Haley 1999: 418) 
By saying this, Haley (1999) indicated that Peirce’s theory of the sign can provide a 
better way for Lakoff/Johnson to make further improvements and correction on their 
cognitive theory. However, Lakoff/Johnson and advocates of their school did not seem 
to follow Haley’s advice; rather, they turned to neuroscience to find evidence for proving 
“conceptual metaphors”. As argued by Haley (1999), Lakoff/Johnson had missed a 
goldmine by ignoring Peirce. 
Looked at from the angle of Peircean semiotics, the most salient and controversial 
features of Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor are as follows: 
 The demarcation between concept and meaning is rather vague in 
Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor. As a consequence, metaphorical 
meaning is often confused with metaphorical concepts. 
 Lakoff/Johnson presuppose a well-structured Gestalt which determines the 
formation of metaphors. In that sense, their conceptual metaphors are like Plato’s 
ideas which exist all by themselves and then are realized in different sets of 
metaphorical expressions. Both of them are theoretical assumptions that are yet 
to be justified. 
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 Lakoff/Johnson’s theory does not make any distinction between icons (metaphors) 
and symbols (lexical items) so that when they think they are discussing metaphors, 
they are actually talking about normal words and phrases that no longer require 
iconic reasoning. Their re-iconification of lexical items is a good exercise for 
linguists but does not reflect the real process of language use. 
 Lakoff/Johnson’s theory does not pay enough attention to the diversity of 
metaphorical vehicles which leads them to the controversial conclusion that we 
live by certain sets of conceptual metaphors. By taking the position of 
metaphorical essentialism and experiential determinism, the cognitive theory is 
incompatible with the polysemous nature of the sign and does not square with the 
fact of arbitrary iconicity. 
 By focusing on only a small number of ‘master tropes’, the explanatory power of 
the cognitive theory of metaphor becomes too limited. We are yet to be convinced 
that other metaphors are not equally important. 
 The nature of conceptual metaphor theory is incompatible with the essence of 
metaphorical thinking. To be more specific, what the theory holds valuable is 
exactly what real metaphorical thinking ceaselessly breaks through. 
We shall respectively refer to all of these features as this thesis develops in the subsequent 
parts. 
1.4 Master Tropes without Worlds 
Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor is based on their philosophical account 
of meaning which is more widely known as cognitive semantics. According to Rudi 
Keller (1999) who is also an advocate of Peircean semiotics, Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive 
theory of meaning is as problematic as the “objectivist semantics” they have fiercely 
criticized. The German linguist and semiotician thus pinpoints four major deficiencies of 
their theory, one of which concerning Lakoff/Johnson’s vague definition of their 
important term “concept” is stated as follows: 
Cognitive semantics’ concept of the concept ‘concept’ is either unclear or simply 
trivial. Certainly it is plausible to assume that the expression bird corresponds to the 
concept ‘bird’. However, it is implausible to assume that there is a concept ‘bye-bye’ 
which corresponds to the expression bye-bye—other than in the trivial sense that 
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there must be something going through the speaker’s mind when he says bye-bye, 
and that this something is a concept. (Keller 1999: 178) 
The problem Keller (1999) points out here might be attributed to Lakoff/Johnson’s 
failure in making a clear demarcation between meaning and concept. Their tendency of 
muddling the two terms began when they made great effort to interpret metaphor through 
their conceptual metaphors. Similar to Lakoff/Johnson, Leezenberg (2001), another 
theorist in metaphor study, also tends to dissolve the difference between the two terms 
by holding that “a concept is, rather than has, a meaning” (Leezenberg 2001: 252). Upon 
these arguments, some doubts and questions naturally arise. Terminologically, does 
concept equal meaning? Or, more specifically, are metaphorical concepts really identical 
to metaphorical meaning? Since Lakoff/Johnson (2003 [1980]) have not made any 
account of this, it is necessary for us to have a discussion on this topic so as to have a 
better look at the problem of their theory of meaning. The fact that people ask “What’s 
your meaning?” instead of “What’s your concept?” when they have difficulty in 
understanding others immediately serves as evidence that meaning and concepts are 
different things. The following notions by Keller (1999: 178-179) on meaning and 
concept can duly initiate our discussion on the demarcation between the two:  
1. Meanings are linguistic entities and concepts are cognitive entities. Meanings 
and concepts are not identical. 
2. Semantics’ central and primary concern are linguistic signs’ rules of use. The 
meaning of a conventional sign is its rule of use. 
3. Because of their meanings, some linguistic signs are capable of representing 
concepts. Others, also because of their meanings, are not. 
4. Concepts are dependent upon and grounded in language. They are formed, 
learned, and retained by means of the rules of the use of those expressions that 
denote them. Every concept can be expressed in language, but not every 
linguistic expression represents a concept. The concept ‘triangular table’ can be 
expressed, for example, with the words triangular table, while the word bye-bye 
expresses no concept at all. 
These notions by Keller (1999) pinpoint the difference between meaning and concept as 
well as a triadic relationship between meaning, concept, and the sign (linguistic signs). 
Despite all these important differences between the two, what should be pointed out here 
is that concept and meaning actually have distinct roles in the sign system. The process 
of conceptualization is also a process of symbolization, and concept formation is based 
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on people’s ability to make abstraction. For example, the concept “water” encompasses 
all sorts of waters such as seawater, rainwater, drinking water, and industrial water. The 
concept of “table” in our mind is a general designation of all the features and functions a 
table in the real world has, regardless of its specific material or places of origin. The 
concept “wood”, likewise, is the general abstraction of all things in wooden nature, 
regardless of the size or length, thickness, or color of the specific referent. However, if 
we describe somebody’s style of communication as being “wooden”, or saying “he is 
wooden in his communication”, the utterer is not using wood by its dictionary or literal 
meaning but its metaphorical meaning. In other words, metaphor helps to create new 
meaning and to form fresh concepts. 
Throughout their works, Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]) want to prove the 
centrality of conceptual metaphors, or master tropes, in the formation of metaphor. By 
doing this, what they have overlooked is vivid metaphorical associations that the 
metaphor users are trying to convey in a specific context. Consequently, the conceptual 
metaphors they have presented to us are abstract and empty concepts rather than 
diversified metaphorical expressions with real meaning in a real communicative situation. 
Thus, the hypothesized conceptual metaphors in cognitive theory of metaphor represents 
a type of reductionism in the field of metaphor study, for Lakoff/Johnson and their 
followers tend to reduce every metaphorical expression they encounter into a dry formula 
“A IS B”. Put briefly, they have collected a limited number of metaphorical concepts 
(conceptual metaphors) they abstracted from linguistic expressions, and believed that 
they had finally grasped the driving source for metaphor formation. In fact, those 
conceptual metaphors like ‘ARGUMENT IS WAR’ and ‘TIME IS MONEY’ are not at 
all the fundamental drive for metaphor; rather, they are inductive results from limited 
language materials done by linguists. According to Lakoff/Johnson, these conceptual 
metaphors are “metaphors we live by”, but, ironically, these empty concepts are not 
metaphor in themselves. Lakoff/Johnson have confused the term “concept” with not only 
metaphor but also the term “meaning”. What they have failed to realize is the distinction 
between metaphor and concept, and the demarcation between meaning and concept. 
They also did not realize that when we use a metaphor like “he is a snake” or “he is a 
dog”, we mean a specific physical or mental likeness between the man and the specific 
animal rather than referring to the empty concept “HUMAN BEINGS ARE ANIMALS” 
which is a meta-metaphorical construct. 
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Lakoff/Johnson’s failure in elaborating the true meaning of metaphor leads us to 
rethink the meaning of “meaning”. The word “meaning” can easily occur to everybody’s 
mind due to our simple belief that the outside world means something to us. In fact, the 
abstract and all-embracing nature of meaning makes it rather difficult to be accurately 
defined. Meanwhile, it is also an eternal topic over thousands of years, during which a 
large number of important scholars have accounted for it from various perspectives. The 
following quotation from The Routledge Companion to Semiotics is an explanatory 
definition of “meaning” made from a more general perspective of semiotics: 
‘Meaning’ is at issue whenever something can be said to be a culturally 
established sign of something else, whether linguistic as in the ‘The French 
word “neige” means snow’ or non-linguistic as in ‘A white flag means 
surrender’. Meaning generated in the use of signs may be intentional or non-
intentional (though some scholars would recognize only the intentional variety, 
thus emphasizing the production side). It may be literal (where the link between 
the sign and what the sign stands for is explicit and fully conventional) or 
figurative or indirect (where further inferencing is required, even though a 
degree of conventionality is often involved as well, as in the case of figures of 
speech and indirect speech acts). It may be seen as ‘timeless’ (sentence meaning 
and word meaning) or as occasion-specific (in which case Grice would use the 
term ‘utterer’s meaning’). (Cobley 2010: 263) 
This definition further demonstrates the inclusiveness of the word meaning. Different 
from some linguists and philosophers that understand meaning in a broader sense that 
covers both sense and reference (cf. Dummett 1976; Lyons 1977; Allan 1986), Peirce 
defines the term meaning in a narrower sense so as to exclude the aspect of reference. He 
views the traditional notions of meaning as being inadequate to account for how a sign 
(including language) actually works, and therefore develops the modern notion of 
meaning through a triadic relation of the sign. For Peirce, every meaning has a sign 
vehicle without which no signifying process is possible. He understands meaning as a 
mediating relation between a sign and its object, and introduces the encompassing term 
“interpretant” to represent and pinpoint the relationship. Meaning is, according to Peirce, 
by no means a stable one; rather, it is always renewable in the process of unlimited 
semiosis or endless series of interpretants (CP 1.339). Through understanding meaning 
as “proper significate effects of a sign” (CP 5.475), the Peircean account of meaning also 
purports to study meaning in relation to sign users (Nöth 1990). Thus, whether a meaning 
is expressed literally or metaphorically depends to a great extent on the sign users’ 
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purposes and intentions, and the production of metaphorical meanings also acquires a 
different logical process in users’ mind from that of literal meanings. In the Peircean 
framework, metaphor and meaning are very clearly distinguished. As is categorized by 
Peirce, metaphor is a type of iconic sign, while meaning is represented by the term 
“interpretant” in the semiotic triad. Despite the difference between the two, they are at 
the same time very closely related with each other: a theory of metaphor is usually 
underpinned by a philosophy of meaning or a theory of signification. Similarly, we may 
also get a fine demarcation between meaning and concepts in Peirce. Meaning is, for 
Peirce, usually open for interpretation while a concept usually contains one or more fixed 
meanings.  
Generally speaking, concepts are mental representations of things, events, ideas, 
or states of affairs. Keller (1999) understands them as cognitive entities in that the process 
of conceptualization plays a vital role in human cognition. The concept “tree”, for 
instance, is the generalization and abstraction of the trees in the real world, i.e., it stands 
for a type of plants. With such representational feature, a concept is, in fact, a sign in our 
conceptual system. With the development of human cognition, there are so many mental 
concepts which are symbolized in the sign system, especially the system of linguistic 
signs. Given the arbitrary nature of the sign, different language systems may have 
different sign vehicle for the same concept. For example, the word “tree” in English and 
the character “树” in Chinese represent the same concept “tree”. Looked at from the 
angle of Peircean semiotics, the most salient demarcation between meaning and concept 
seems to be that concepts are the Peircean symbols (CP 2.302) as opposed to indices and 
icons in his division of signs into three types, while meaning is the Peircean interpretant 
as opposed to representamen and object in the semiotic triad. In other words, the two 
terms are at different hierarchical levels in the sign system, thus, playing different roles 
in the signifying process: concept is a type of signs while meaning is an indispensable 
element of the sign. A sign has a meaning, i.e., its interpretant. You may express a 
meaning to others or to yourself (for example, meditation). A concept is communicable 
because it has a meaning. For a newly met concept like “signified” or “structural hole”, 
you may ask: “What’s the meaning of this concept?” You would know its meaning when 
you get the definition of the concept. Here, the meaning of the concept refers to its 
definition. Thus, as a kind of signs, a concept is effective through its meaning, and 
meaning, on the other hand, constitutes the major content of a concept. Put briefly, 
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meaning is mutable and open to interpretation and communication, whereas a concept is 
relatively more stable and closed once it is formed. In other words, a concept, especially 
those symbolized or lexicalized concepts in the sign system, is a fixed term with a 
relatively stable definition either produced in an individual mind or shared by members 
of a community. Another important distinction between meaning and concept lies in the 
fact that meaning is rooted in a context while concept is usually isolated and abstracted 
from that context. This difference may cause two different perspectives of study, one on 
the basis of meaning and the other in terms of concept. Lakoff/Johnson’s metaphor theory 
belongs to the latter. 
Such demarcation between meaning and concept can also be found in Nietzsche, 
one of Peirce’s contemporaries. Nietzsche (1979) insightfully divided human thought 
into two operable domains: perception and conception. The domain of perception 
consists of “impressions and sensations”, while the domain of conception consists of “the 
ideas that the mind makes from perception” (Danesi 2004: 15). In other words, percepts 
and concepts belong to different stages of human thought. Both percepts and concepts 
are signs and thus have meaning. This means that, although meaning and concept are 
both products of our mind, they are intrinsically different.  
As is discussed above, concept and meaning should not be deemed as being 
identical. Same is the case with the metaphorical meaning and concepts. People 
understand metaphor through its meaning, and they normally will not reduce it into an 
abstract concept like Lakoff/Johnson’s conceptual metaphors for the sake of 
“fundamental understanding”. Guided by a vague idea on meaning and concept, 
Lakoff/Johnson thus have laid undue emphasis on the metaphysical concepts reduced 
from ordinary metaphorical expressions. As a result, one prominent deficiency of their 
cognitive theory lies in their overconcentration on inducing abstract and empty 
metaphorical concepts rather than accounting for the real metaphors and contexts of 
concrete metaphorical expressions. As is criticized by Haser (2005: 2-3), “an accurate 
analysis of metaphors and metonymies should relate to linguistic expressions, rather than 
putative metaphorical or metonymical concepts.”  
Turning to a different frame of reference, metaphorical concepts proposed by 
Lakoff/Johnson as conceptual metaphors are, to some extent, close to Kant’s term 
“category”, which are nearly a priori. If we take a thorough look at those conceptual 
metaphors, we will find that Lakoff/Johnson pay much attention to the psychological or 
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cognitive aspect of metaphor formation while overlooking the much broader cultural-
historical parts. They deem their work as being successful once they have obtained 
abstract metaphorical concepts in a conceptual domain. As mentioned many times earlier, 
their great problem lies in that they have confused metaphor with concept. In fact, their 
tendency of muddling metaphor and metaphorical concept burgeons in their first chapter 
of Metaphors We Live by where they announce that “whenever in this book we speak of 
metaphors, such as ARGUMENT IS WAR, it should be understood that metaphor means 
metaphorical concept” (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 6). The fact is that a large number 
of the metaphorical concepts they propose as conceptual metaphors, such as MORE IS 
UP, LESS IS DOWN, and IDEAS ARE FOOD, are not metaphors at all. Furthermore, 
many conceptual metaphors like IDEAS ARE FOOD and MORE IS UP are even not 
meaningful expressions, nor do they reveal any fundamental truth. Even the supporting 
illustrations for conceptual metaphors provided by Lakoff/Johnson are not tenable, 
because most of them are actually lexical items rather than real metaphors in English 
language as is shown in the following quotation: 
TIME IS MONEY 
You’re wasting my time. 
This gadget will save you hours. 
I don’t have the time to give you. 
How do you spend your time these days? 
That flat tire cost me an hour. 
I’ve invested a lot of time in her. 
I don’t have enough time to spare for that. You’re running out of time. 
You need to budget your time. 
Put aside some time for ping pong. 
Is that worth your while? 
Do you have much time left? 
He’s living on borrowed time. 
You don’t use your time profitably. 
I lost a lot of time when I got sick. 
Thank you for your time. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 7-8) 
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In fact, verbs like “waste”, “save”, “spend”, “cost”, and “budget” all have a denotative 
or dictionary meaning relevant to time in modern English, thus, their collocation with 
“time” are actually literal rather than metaphorical. It is thus rather questionable to group 
these expressions under one conceptual metaphor “TIME IS MONEY”. As pointed out 
by Hanks and Giora (2012: 7), such created “headings” (conceptual metaphors) for 
ordinary metaphors cannot work in front of the infinite number of unpredictable 
metaphors: 
A very large number of linguistic metaphors (indeed, an infinite number, both actual 
and possible) fit into a comparatively small set of conceptual metaphors. However, 
there are many other linguistic metaphors that do not fit neatly under the heading of 
any particular conceptual metaphor, despite the best efforts, sometimes rather 
strained, of some metaphor theorists to create conceptual metaphors as headings for 
any number of linguistic metaphors. There are undoubtedly general principles at 
work – for example, the salient properties attributed to animals are often exploited 
metaphorically – but the idea that all linguistic metaphors are realizations of 
conceptual metaphors is a gross oversimplification. 
Hanks and Giora (2012) are essentially right when they use the word “oversimplification” 
to describe the operational feature of the cognitive approach. Conceptual metaphors are 
lifeless because they have been separated from real metaphorical thinking. In other words, 
by producing abstract metaphorical expressions, Lakoff/Johnson have dramatically 
reduced the connotative meaning of a metaphor in real communicating situations. As a 
result, they dissever the concepts from the world and the context they root in, and can 
only get rather dry and empty formulas. 
1.5 Metaphorical Essentialism in the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor 
Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]) and Lakoff (1987) have criticized what Putnam called 
“metaphysical realism”, arguing that a new realism which adopts the view of internal 
consistency should replace that of external reality. However, the internal realism they 
propose is also based on the acknowledgment of the ontological existence of a certain 
“reality-in-itself”. By viewing certain master tropes as fundamental and prerequisite 
schemas that shape human thought, Lakoff/Johnson presumes the ontological existence 
of some metaphorical concepts. In this sense, their cognitive theory seems to follow the 
Platonic line of ontological realism which holds the idea that concepts expressed in a 
language correspond to real states of things or affairs that exist independently of language. 
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The following statement, for instance, reveals Lakoff/Johnson’s metaphysical notion of 
conceptual metaphor: 
Metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are 
metaphors in a person’s conceptual system. Therefore, whenever in this book we 
speak of metaphors, such as ARGUMENT IS WAR, it should be understood that 
metaphor means metaphorical concept. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 6) 
By contending that “there are metaphors in a person’s conceptual system”, 
Lakoff/Johnson presuppose the ontological existence of a metaphorical concept 
“ARGUMENT IS WAR” in people’s conceptual system. On the other hand, they also 
attempt to equate “metaphor” with “conceptual metaphor”, which are very different 
things. In the “ARGUMENT IS WAR” metaphor, the meaning projection of “war” onto 
“argument” is considered to be fundamental for people to understand the word 
“argument”. In that sense, we can say that Lakoff/Johnson’s experientialist notion of 
metaphor is a kind of metaphorical essentialism. 
It is interesting to note that Lakoff (1987: 161), when criticizing what he calls 
“objectivism”, also gives his definition of essentialism as follows: 
ESSENTIALISM: Among the properties that things have, some are essential; that 
is, they are those properties that make the thing what it is, and without which it would 
not be that kind of thing. Other properties are accidental – that is, they are properties 
that things happen to have, not properties that capture the essence of the thing. 
He then described it as a “metaphysical assumption” accompanying the “objectivist 
metaphysics” he refuted. Ironically, what he had shown us in the conceptual metaphor 
theory is also an essentialist point of view. Such a metaphorical essentialism is, however, 
incompatible with the polysemous nature of the sign. For example, Lakoff/Johnson have 
postulated “LIFE IS A JOURNEY” as a master trope, but the fact is that life as a topic 
can be discussed in relation to numerous other vehicles such as book, stage, poetry, and 
wine among which no particular category has priority over others. We are yet to be 
convinced that “LIFE IS A JOURNEY” is a conceptual metaphor while “LIFE IS A 
BOOK” is not. Keller (1998) is right in contending that linguistic signs “are not a 
prerequisite for our communicative attempts; they are their (usually unintended) result” 
(Keller 1998: vii). Indeed, no particular sign is so fundamental to have the monopoly 
over our mind, and those “conceptual metaphors” are merely results rather than prior 
conditions of our communication. 
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At the most general level, Lakoff/Johnson’s metaphorical essentialism entails the 
following assumptions on this issue: 
 A well-structured Gestalt structures people’s thought and determines the 
formation of metaphor. 
 There exist universal categories with ordered hierarchies for one gestalt. 
 There is a coherent system under every conceptual metaphor. 
As pointed out earlier, Lakoff/Johnson’s theory of metaphor presupposes a well-
structured gestalt and such a pre-existing gestalt intrinsically requires universal 
categories with ordered hierarchies and a coherent system of signification under one 
conceptual metaphor. However, these assumptions are all problematic and deserve close 
scrutiny.  
As for the well-structured gestalt, Lakoff/Johnson argue that “our conceptual 
system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. (Lakoff/Johnson 
2003[1980]: 3)”. This is an obvious overstatement. Different from the Gestalt 
psychologists in 1950s and 1960s (Osgood and Suci 1953; Asch 1958; Werner and 
Kaplan 1963; Koen 1965), Lakoff/Johnson believe in a Gestalt with pre-existing 
concepts in people’s mind. They then further claim that these “concepts structure what 
we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people,” to the 
extent that they even “govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane 
details” (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 3). The use of the word “govern” reflects 
Lakoff/Johnson’s tendency of exaggerating the function of concepts and conceptual 
system in our cognitive system. After making these overstatements, Lakoff/Johnson 
focus their attention on metaphorical concepts and make it very clear in the following 
statement, and also many others, that some metaphors structure our mind: “Primarily on 
the basis of linguistic evidence, we have found that most of our ordinary conceptual 
system is metaphorical in nature. And we have found a way to begin to identify in detail 
just what the metaphors are that structure how we perceive, how we think, and what we 
do.” (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 4) This is actually where Lakoff/Johnson’s mistake 
begins. As acknowledged by them, most of their ideas on how people’s conceptual 
system is reflected in their language “derive in great part from the work of Edward Sapir, 
Benjamin Lee Whorf, and others who have worked in that tradition.” (Lakoff/Johnson 
2003[1980]: xi) The fact, however, is that linguists, in their thorough critique of the 
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Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, have shown convincingly that our concepts structure what we 
perceive and do so only to a minor extent. Lakoff/Johnson, on the other hand, go to an 
extreme and try to locate a small number of metaphorical concepts (such as 
ARGUMENT IS WAR, TIME IS MONEY, and MORE IS UP) that they claim structure 
what we perceive and do. The following is an example they use to show how the 
structuring happens: 
Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. 
Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an 
argument—attack, defense, counterattack, etc.—reflects this. It is in this sense that 
the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; it 
structures the actions we perform in arguing. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 4) 
In this exemplified case, Lakoff/Johnson consider the metaphorical concept, 
ARGUMENT IS WAR, as a primary metaphor or root analogy that govern the way 
people construe argument in the same culture. Such an assumption contradicts their own 
statement on the non-existence of general primary qualities in the world: 
As we are about to see, color is the tip of the iceberg. What Locke recognized as 
perceiver-dependence is a fully general phenomenon. Cognitive science and 
neuroscience suggest that the world as we know it contains no primary qualities in 
Locke’s sense, because the qualities of things as we can experience and comprehend 
them depend crucially on our neural makeup, our bodily interactions with them, and 
our purposes and interests. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 26) 
The above statement by Lakoff/Johnson is actually a very good point, although 
philosophers have been saying this all along. Contrary to this, the logic of 
Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory forces them to highlight some qualities such as the 
war-like qualities of argument as being more important and fundamental than other 
qualities in things or states of affair, hence the emphasis of primary qualities. They argue 
that conceptual metaphors such as ARGUMENT IS WAR structure the way we think 
and act. In actual situations, however, many of the things we do and perceive in arguing 
are also structured by many other objects or events than war. For this simple reason, the 
ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is not that important, at least no more important than 
other ordinary metaphors that have similar a cognitive function. The phrase “live by” in 
their book title, therefore, seems too sensational.  
Lakoff/Johnson’s subsequent statement about argument and dance further shows 
that they tend to define something on the basis of their own presupposition or imagination: 
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Imagine a culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are seen 
as performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing 
way. In such a culture, people would view arguments differently, experience them 
differently, carry them out differently, and talk about them differently. But we would 
probably not view them as arguing at all: they would simply be doing something 
different. It would seem strange even to call what they were doing “arguing.” 
Perhaps the most neutral way of describing this difference between their culture and 
ours would be to say that we have a discourse form structured in terms of battle and 
they have one structured in terms of dance. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 5). 
Once again, Lakoff/Johnson’s statement does not hold true. As is pointed out by Haser 
(2005) and Ding (2015a), dance can mean many different things, including those that are 
negative or undesirable. The notion of dance is, in fact, “a complex entity that consists 
of a large number of semantic components and any one of them or any combination of 
them could be selected as relevant to a particular situation of verbal communication” 
(Ding 2015a: 10). Likewise, people may view argument in various other ways like seeing 
it as a futile activity, and no culture is so limited as to view argument only from one 
single perspective. Thus, Lakoff/Johnson’s example provides the ground for an argument 
against their own hypothesis. 
Regarding the issue of categorization, Lakoff/Johnson have a tendency to collect 
concepts and expressions together so as to form a universal category. For instance, they 
categorize all the following expressions under one ‘universal’ category “ARGUMENT 
IS WAR”: 
To give some idea of what it could mean for a concept to be metaphorical and for 
such a concept to structure an everyday activity, let us start with the concept 
ARGUMENT and the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. This metaphor 
is reflected in our everyday language by a wide variety of expressions: 
ARGUMENT IS WAR  
Your claims are indefensible.  
He attacked every weak point in my argument.  
His criticisms were right on target.  
I demolished his argument.  
I’ve never won an argument with him.  
You disagree? Okay, shoot!  
If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out.  
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He shot down all of my arguments. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 4). 
There are, however, several problems with these examples in the above list. To be more 
specific, the first example could be about basketball, and so is the first half of the second 
example. The second half of the second example could be about shooting, while the third 
example could be about construction and so on. As is averred by Haser (2005: 11), 
“Lakoff/Johnson’s groupings of metaphorical expressions under metaphorical concepts 
are almost invariably disputable.” Even if all these expressions can be put into the same 
category as related to war, they are not reflections of a pre-existing category. Rather, 
“ARGUMENT IS WAR” is an abstraction of what these expressions have in common. 
It is therefore a meta-linguistic construction done by scholars. Let’s take the HUMAN 
IS ANIMAL metaphor as another example. When someone says “David Wong always 
wags his tail when his boss comes around”, will he or she have to go back to the HUMAN 
IS ANIMAL pattern to find the lower category HUMAN IS MAMMAL in order to 
understand the HUMAN IS DOG metaphor at the lowest level of the hierarchical system? 
There is no evidence that one particular way of linking things takes precedence over 
others or is in any way superior to them. This further explains the futility of the so-called 
universal categories.  
Back to the example of ARGUMENT IS WAR, what Lakoff/Johnson did not 
realize in this particular case is that argument might also be considered as a war in a 
verbal form, i.e., a sub-category of war. In fact, it is quite possible that argument is seen 
as a species of war. If the relation between argument and war is understood from this 
perspective, then we may look back again to Aristotle, for he had already made 
classification for this kind of metaphor: a transference from genus to species. According 
to the definition in dictionary, “A genus is a class of similar things, especially a group of 
animals or plants that includes several closely related species.” In other words, species is 
a sub-set of genus and a genus consists of several species. “A transference from genus to 
species” means to use a set to stands for its sub-set. In “I am defending my idea.”, 
defending linguistically is a species of defending. From this perspective, verbal war is a 
species of war, thus argument is a species of war. This explains why the metaphorical 
association between argument and war pervades different cultures. Of course, such view 
of categorization by Aristotle also gives a fatal refutation to those who still see 
ARGUMENT IS WAR as a conceptual metaphor. 
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Besides their tendency of universalization and oversimplification, 
Lakoff/Johnson’s problem also lies in their overlook of the arbitrary nature of human 
categorization. The process of categorization is based on similarities that we observe in 
things. As long as we can find similarities in objects, it will not be hard to categorize 
them. For instance, a wooden log and a brick have little to do with each other, but they 
can all be used to beat people. Thus, if it is necessary, we can put the two things in the 
category entitled “things which can be used to beat others”. In fact, many scholars have 
already noticed such feature of our categorizing process. Hayek (1956) compared the 
grouping of things and events with the naming of them, and stressed the arbitrariness of 
categorization: “It is anything but self-evident that things and events are grouped together 
in the same way as they are with the names that we impose upon them; much experience 
is latent in the inclusion of essentially different things under the same name.” (Hayek 
1956: 517) In line with Hayek, Keller (1998: 65) made a more detailed and insightful 
argument on making categories: 
The categories formed through our communicative practice survive according to the 
degree of their functional suitability within the respective culture. Logically, nothing 
would stop us from creating a category that includes all living things that lay edible 
eggs: chickens and other birds, sea urchins, ants, sturgeons and other fish. We could 
also create a category of all things that can be transported by bicycle. In our language, 
there are no words that generate these classifications. This is not because of the 
“ridiculousness” of such categories, but solely because there is evidently no 
recurring need for them in our form of life. Words and concepts are (in a certain 
sense) tools for communication and thought. Tools are a means of providing 
standard solutions for recurrent problems. Logically and technically, it is entirely 
possible that there be a tool for getting tennis balls out of milk bottles. It is solely 
because a solution to this problem is too infrequently required that no such 
instrument exists. If there were cultures with religions that worship egg-laying 
animals, or systems of transportation in which bicycles are important, the 
appropriate vocabulary and correspondent categories would have arisen in those 
cultures. From a logical perspective, the categories produced by a natural language 
often are rather confused and crazy. What counts in evolutionary processes is not 
logic, but utility. Linguistic evolution is ad hoc and shamelessly utilitarian. 
What Keller emphasizes here is that human categorization is culture-specific and subject 
to utilitarian considerations, and effective categories are established intersubjectively. In 
other words, there are no such things as absolute universal categories. As a matter of fact, 
Keller’s “functional suitability” may be illuminated with Peirce’s categorisation of signs 
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into index, icon, and symbol which does provide an effective typology for the cognitive 
approach to metaphor study. As we have mentioned earlier, Lakoff/Johnson do not make 
any distinction between icons (metaphors), and symbols (lexical items). Consequently, 
they often have to de-symbolize (or re-iconify) dead metaphorical expressions such as 
you are wasting my time and you need to budget your time in order to back up his 
conceptual metaphor TIME IS MONEY. These expressions, however, are actually 
lexical items and therefore symbols in the Peircean sense, that is, metaphors that have 
already been conventionalized or lexicalized in English language, and no one experiences 
any active metaphorical association in mind while using them. Their re-iconification of 
symbolic signs may be a good exercise for linguists but does not reflect the real process 
of language use. Thus, the Peircean trichotomy exposes how fuzzy the definition of 
metaphor is in Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor. 
      Furthermore, Lakoff/Johnson’s experientialism or embodied philosophy virtually 
presupposes an idea of universalism, especially when they have to account for the 
understandability between individual experiences, and they have the following to say 
concerning this basic question: 
What is innate about language is commonly equated with what is universal about 
language. But we have seen that much that is universal about language concerns 
universals of common experiences, which occur after birth. Those universals are due, 
not just to what we are born with, but also to universals of experience that depend 
on common environmental factors. They include universals of the conceptual poles 
of grammatical constructions, universals of spatial relations, and universals of 
metaphor. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 508) 
What kind of experiences should be seen as common ones, and what should be seen as 
uncommon ones? In fact, people who have quite different experiences and grow up in 
contrasting environments are still likely to understand each other. The point here is not 
whether those experiences, those grammatical constructions, and those metaphors are 
universal or not, but why understanding is still possible despite of those multi-aspects of 
distinctions we have between each other. 
Also problematic is the assumed coherent system of signification structured 
under one conceptual metaphor. For instance, for the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT 
IS WAR, Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]: 6) assumes a systematic projection from “war” 
to “argument”, as argued by them: “We saw in the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor that 
expressions from the vocabulary of war, e.g., attack a position, indefensible, strategy, 
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new line of attack, win, gain ground, etc., form a systematic way of talking about the 
battling aspects of arguing.” This is, however, not true. Words and expressions like 
“attack”, “win”, “indefensible”, “strategy”, and “gain ground” are not limited to the 
vocabulary of war and therefore cannot form a stable system in terms of war. The only 
possibility of them being systematic is that there is a pre-existing Gestalt of war in 
Lakoff/Johnson’s minds, in light of which they interpret these words and expressions. In 
fact, Lakoff/Johnson do discuss in detail the systematicity and the entailment relationship 
between metaphorical concepts and frequently mention what they call “coherent system”, 
as is stated in the following two paragraphs: 
The metaphorical concepts TIME IS MONEY, TIME IS A RESOURCE, and TIME 
IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY form a single system based on subcategorization, 
since in our society money is a limited resource and limited resources are valuable 
commodities. These subcategorization relationships characterize entailment 
relationships between the metaphors. TIME IS MONEY entails that TIME IS A 
LIMITED RESOURCE, which entails that TIME IS A VALUABLE 
COMMOUITY.  
We are adopting the practice of using the most specific Metaphorical concept, in this 
case TIME IS MONEY, to characterize the entire system. …This is an example of 
the way in which metaphorical entailments can characterize a coherent system of 
metaphorical concepts and a corresponding coherent system of metaphorical 
expressions for those concepts. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 9) 
What is being described here may seem coherent and systematic, but it is the result of 
contingent language choices. Concepts like “TIME IS MONEY”, “TIME IS A LIMITED 
RESOURCE”, and “TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY” do not construct a 
coherent system; rather, they are just expressions that Lakoff/Johnson collate under one 
heading, which can prove nothing but the fact that one can find some commonalities 
among a group of metaphors. Just as criticized by Haser (2005: 11), “The possibility of 
grouping a metaphorical expression under disparate metaphorical concepts creates 
insurmountable difficulties for Lakoff/Johnson’s approach.” In fact, the TIME IS 
MONEY metaphor held by Lakoff/Johnson are exclusive for other conceptions of time 
that might break the “coherence” of the system.  
One possible reason that might cause such a problematic approach lies in 
Lakoff/Johnson’s abandonment of a socio-historical perspective in their metaphor study. 
To take the TIME IS MONEY metaphor as an example, Hoover (2016) adopts historical 
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evidence from Geoffrey Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales to argue that seeing time as a 
valuable commodity predates viewing time as money. And his argument goes as follows: 
The metaphor clearly predates payment by the hour, however, as shown by the 
following comments by the Host from the introduction to The Man of Law’s Tale in 
Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales (ca. 1386):  
Lordynges, quod [said] he, I warne yow, al this route [company], 
The fourthe party of this day is gon. 
Now, for the love of God and of seint john, 
Leseth [lose] no tyme [time], as ferforth as [as far as] ye may. 
Lordynges, the tyme wasteth nyght and day, 
And steleth [steals] from us, what pryvely [privately] slepynge, 
And what thurgh necligence in oure wakynge, 
As dooth the streem that turneth nevere agayn, 
Descendynge fro the montaigne into playn. 
Wel kan [can] senec [Seneca] and many a philosophre 
Biwaillen tyme moore than gold in cofre; 
For–los of catel [possessions] may recovered be, 
But los of tyme shendeth [destroys] us, –quod [said] he. 
The Host’s invocation of Seneca suggests that the metaphor of TIME IS A 
VALUABLE COMMODITY / LIMITED RESOURCE is much older still, and it 
has always seemed to me that Lakoff/Johnson paid too little attention to the 
implications of their theory for language history. If they are right about how central 
our use of metaphor is in helping us understand the abstract with respect to the 
concrete, TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY / LIMITED RESOURCE 
presumably predates money. Unfortunately, the fact that the earliest records of 
language reflect hundreds of thousands of years of language use precludes anything 
resembling a proof of their theory. (Hoover 2016: 1-2) 
As well demonstrated in the above quotation of Hoover, since the expression of 
time as a valuable commodity long predates that of time as money, the “systematicity” 
and “coherent system” assumed by Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]: 7-10) becomes quite 
invalid. At the same time, Hoover (2016) also brought about an acute problem in 
Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor: their postulation of conceptual metaphor 
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is based on little consideration of language history and its evaluation. In fact, metaphors 
we use in real life situations throughout history do not form a systematic whole, but are 
separate or scattered episodes of our understanding of the world. Thus, systematicity has 
never been a precondition for the formation of metaphor. As has been argued in previous 
paragraphs, people can view things from various perspectives rather than from one angle. 
Back to the issue with the TIME IS MONEY metaphor, it is true that time is often 
compared with limited resources in terms of the relative short human lifespan. But from 
the angle of a person who is anxiously waiting for something to happen, or for a prisoner 
who pray every day to get out of the jail cell, time is viewed as being eternal. In such 
kind of situations, people usually find other things to do in order to “kill time”. It will be 
very difficult for Lakoff/Johnson to deny that anybody who can see time as money will 
also try to “kill time” in a certain life situation through playing computer games. Besides, 
the marking of time (for example the marking of festivals) also reveals people’s 
recognition of the endlessness of time: people mark time in order to be aware of the 
passing of it. All these show that Lakoff/Johnson merely emphasize one angle and deem 
this angle to be fundamental and a priori for others.  
Looked at from the Peircean perspective, Lakoff/Johnson’s metaphorical 
essentialism is partially caused by the logical confusion of using the inductive results 
achieved by earlier empiricist linguists as the starting point of their hypothetical 
deduction. For instance, they repeatedly highlight TIME IS MONEY as a systematic 
structure that subsumes a series of “related” metaphorical concepts such as TIME IS A 
LIMITED RESOURCE, while ignoring examples of “time is life”, “time is a snail”, or 
other possible metaphors. In this way, they turn the simple inductive result TIME IS 
MONEY into an a priori schema. And because they deduce from an inductive result, 
their hypothesis on metaphor becomes almost unfalsifiable. What they ignore is that 
metaphor is actually a result of iconic reasoning in which the same metaphorical meaning 
can be expressed through diverse vehicles. To convey the meaning of “John is tall” 
metaphorically, for example, one can choose vehicles such as tree, mountain, wire pole, 
giraffe, Yao Ming (the Chinese basketball player), or even a Titan, who all possess the 
semantic marker of ‘being tall’. Therefore, we may hear people say John is a cedar, John 
is as tall as an Alp, John is like a wire pole, John is a giraffe, John is a Yao Ming, John 
is a living Titan, etc. As such, the vehicles for expressing tallness can be living creatures, 
lifeless objects, or even imaginary figures. Clearly, no conceptual metaphor is needed. 
From this perspective, the conceptual metaphor theory is both unproductive and 
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unnecessary. Of course, different vehicles in the above examples may entail some other 
associative meanings besides “tallness”, but on the single issue of “John is tall”, all the 
above vehicles highlight the same metaphorical meaning “tallness” in a specific 
context and hide other semantic markers they may have respectively. 
Due to the unproductive meta-linguistic nature of conceptual metaphors, 
Lakoff/Johnson gradually lose their point on what their “meta-” is for. In fact, their logic 
in the cognitive theory often leads to puzzling conclusions. To take the conceptual 
metaphor “MORE IS BETTER” as an exemplary case, they frequently refer to this 
master trope and provide some “evidence,” many of which are lexical items (lexicalized 
metaphors) rather than real metaphors, to prove its ontological existence. If we think their 
argument through to the end, however, we would also come to the conclusion of “LESS 
IS BETTER” since “less” surpasses “more” in the English idiom less is more. Similarly, 
the Chinese traditional art of ink painting also holds the philosophy of “less is more” as 
its golden doctrine, in which “less” also surpasses “more”. This proves that MORE IS 
BETTER is not a universal concept that takes precedence over individual minds. There 
is a Chinese idiom saying when a thing is rare, it becomes precious ‘物以稀为贵’ /wu 
yi xi wei gui/ which also contradicts this conceptual metaphor that Lakoff/Johnson hold 
so dear. Since the two concepts “MORE IS BETTER” and “LESS IS BETTER” coexist 
and are equally important in both Chinese and English culture, we should not emphasize 
one concept while neglecting the other. Instead, whether more is better or less is better is 
determined by a particular mind in a specific situation, and making such abstraction as 
“MORE IS BETTER” a rather meaningless and unproductive labor. 
As stated above, conceptual metaphors in Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]) are 
results of their essentialist view rather than evidence of universal cognitive patterns. They 
are merely meta-linguistic abstractions that tell us nothing but a dry and empty formula 
“A IS B”. In this way, they divert people’s attention away from the cultural and socio-
historical contexts in which metaphors are rooted, and spend their time collecting abstract 
conceptual metaphors that are not very important. The following paragraph clearly shows 
how empty and meaningless those conceptual metaphors are (some are not even 
metaphors): “We saw in our discussion of the IDEAS ARE FOOD metaphor that, 
although the metaphor was based on similarities, the similarities themselves were not 
inherent but were based on other metaphors—in particular, THE MIND IS A 
CONTAINER, IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, and the CONDUIT metaphors.” 
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(Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 214) As elsewhere, “IDEAS ARE FOOD” is not a 
metaphor; rather, it is a meta-linguistic category constructed by Lakoff/Johnson. The 
same is true for “THE MIND IS A CONTAINER” and “IDEAS ARE OBJECTS”. 
Indeed, what makes the cognitive metaphor theory an efficient tool for abstracting meta-
linguistic categories is precisely what makes it less suited to found a productive theory 
of metaphor, less able to interpret the process of metaphorization, and less able to account 
for the factors and relations that constitute the metaphorical meaning. 
In a nutshell, conceptual metaphors are linguistic reconstructions whose number, 
if we let them develop in light of Lakoff/Johnson’s reasoning, might finally exceed 
ordinary metaphorical expressions we use in daily life. In this sense, what is the real 
significance of these meta-metaphorical constructs? 
1.6 Lakoff/Johnson’s Chomskyan Postulation 
Soaking in metaphorical essentialism, Lakoff/Johnson (2003 [1980]) believe that 
those abstract meta-metaphorical constructs — conceptual metaphors — they brought 
forth are fundamental and thus have the monopoly over the structuring of our thinking 
and behavior (cf. Ding 2010). Such metaphysical construction could find its resemblance 
in Chomsky’s transformational generative grammar where the metaphysical deep 
structure takes up the centre of syntactic study. What the present section wants to argue 
with ample evidence is that Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor resembles 
Chomsky’s logic and that their notion of conceptual metaphors is very much a 
Chomskyan postulation. Although both schools will not embrace such kind of 
comparison, they do have something in common. 
It should be pointed out that, theoretically speaking, Lakoff/Johnson’s embodied 
philosophy of language is drastically different from Chomsky’s linguistic rationalism. 
Perhaps, what they cannot accept is mostly Chomsky’s notion that meaning is naturally 
obtainable through the mastery of grammatical rules in syntax. They thus contrasted 
cognitive linguistics with Chomsky’s transformational generative grammar in a whole 
chapter of their Philosophy in the flesh (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 469-512), contending that 
their linguistic theory is based on empirical findings in cognitive science, while the 
Chomskyan linguistics merely on a priori philosophical assumptions. They question 
Chomsky’s approach of dealing with syntax as is revealed in the statement below: 
But from a Chomskyan perspective, “syntax” is constrained in such a way that 
semantic and pragmatic considerations in principle could not enter into “syntax.” 
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Chomsky’s philosophy requires that his notion of “syntax” take precedence over the 
distributional generalization criterion. Any distributional generalizations over 
syntactic elements that require the inclusion of semantics or pragmatics in the 
statement of the generalization cannot be part of “syntax,” since they are ruled out a 
priori by Chomsky’s philosophical assumptions. The question here is which is to 
take precedence, the distributional generalization criterion or Chomsky’s a priori 
philosophy. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 482) 
To be fair, this criticism hits the Chomskyan linguistics right on the head. Ironically, 
Lakoff/Johnson seem to be doing the same in their cognitive theory of metaphor: they 
give precedence to conceptual metaphors and examine how they are realized. In other 
words, the way they dealt with metaphor or semantics is quite similar to the way 
Chomsky dealt with syntax. As argued in the earlier sections, Lakoff/Johnson’s 
definition of conceptual metaphor is very close to Kant’s category which is a priori in 
nature. As a result, they have duplicated a Chomskyan postulation in their cognitive 
theory of metaphor. For this reason, although Lakoff/Johnson (1999) officially took 
Chomskyan linguistics as one of their targets of criticism, we can easily find several 
important features the two theories have in common: 
1. They are both closely related to the cognitive science. As is contended by 
Lakoff/Johnson, the generative grammar and the cognitive theory of metaphor 
are related to two generations of cognitive science respectively with the former 
the first generation and the latter the second. Chomsky also sees the study of 
human mind through language as an aspiration of his linguistic inquiry. 
2. They have a similar logic of universalizing a certain category they bring forth. 
Similar to the deep structure in Chomsky’s Universal Grammar, conceptual 
metaphors or master tropes for Lakoff/Johnson are also universal or near 
universal categories for metaphor users (Lakoff/Johnson 1999; Ding 2010). 
Metaphor users tend to perceive things in a unidirectional way manipulated by 
those conceptual metaphors. Take the conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP as an 
example. In Lakoff/Johnson’s logic, all people naturally believe that “more” 
means “up” due to their physical experience in life.  
3. Major criticisms against Chomskyan linguistics by former linguists are also 
applicable to Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor. Hinzen (2012: 636) 
summarized three “recent prominent and widespread criticisms” (cf. Tomasello 
2005; Tomasello 2008; Christiansen and Chater 2008; Evans and Levinson 2009; 
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Levinson and Evans 2010) on Chomsky’s universal grammar as follows: 
(i) UG has no coherent formulation and is indeed unnecessary (Tomasello, 
2005, 2008). 
(ii) UG is in conflict with biology: it cannot have evolved by standardly 
accepted Neo-Darwinian evolutionary principles (Christiansen and 
Chater, 2008). 
(iii) There are no linguistic universals: UG is refuted by abundant variation 
at all levels of linguistic organization, which lies at the heart of human 
faculty of language (Evans and Levinson, 2009; Levinson and Evans, 
2010). 
Interestingly, we can find in the conceptual metaphor theory nearly the same 
deficiencies. To some extent, we can safely replace the UG with “conceptual 
metaphor” in the statements above: 
a.   The CMT has no coherent formulation and is indeed unnecessary. 
b. The CMT is in conflict with biology. 
c.  There are no metaphorical universals: Conceptual metaphor is refuted by 
diverse variation of ordinary metaphorical expressions and unpredictable 
metaphorical creations, which lies at the heart of metaphor. Thus, there 
are no metaphorical universals. 
4. Chomsky distinguishes the deep structure from the surface structure in syntax. 
Lakoff/Johnson also see metaphorical expressions as surface level structures and 
metaphorical concepts as deep level structures. 
5. Both theories fail to provide sufficient evidence to justify themselves. 
Lakoff/Johnson adopted empirical findings in the neuroscience to prove that 
neuro inputs to the neural module which is deemed as instantiating Chomskyan 
“syntax” are indispensible, indicating that such an autonomous “syntax” is 
“physically impossible” (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 480). Similarly, cognitive 
linguists never seem to provide sufficient findings of empirical studies to justify 
“the existence of conceptual metaphors” (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 495). Empirical 
evidence could not justify the priority and monopoly of those “conceptual 
metaphors” over other ordinary ones. Furthermore, it is also quite untenable to 
take neural reflection and neural nodes as evidence for the existence of conceptual 
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metaphors. In fact, Lakoff/Johnson’s (1999: 507) evidence of neural “metaboly” 
and evolution cannot effectively refute the philosophy of innateness, for 
Chomsky did not imply that “innateness” is instantiated through people’s neural 
system.  
6. Similar to their criticism on the innateness in Chomskyan linguistics, the a priori 
assumption in Lakoff/Johnson’s (1999, 2003[1980]) conceptual metaphor theory 
is so “paramount” that it is taken for granted throughout their works and is not 
subjected to question (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 470). They also query Chomsky’s 
universal grammar and its underlying Cartesian reason and put forward 
experientialism based on Putnam’s internal realism. Epistemologically, however, 
they never explain how an individual’s experience can be apprehended by another 
mind; rather, they have left the question unsettled in their philosophical 
framework. Thus, Lakoff/Johnson’s theoretical framework also presupposes a 
“universal reason” or “near universal reason”, for experientialism is based on 
individuals’ bodily experience and cannot justify the transcendental conceptual 
metaphors. Those conceptual metaphors are very much like universal concepts. 
For example, the so-called orientational metaphors like MORE IS UP and LESS 
IS DOWN are explained as being based on “absolute” physical basis of all human 
beings. Thus, conceptual metaphors seem to be above individual bodily 
experiences, and are more like a pre-existing Gestalt. In other words, Lakoff’s 
hypothesis of species-specific master tropes are very similar to Chomsky’s 
hypothesis of universal grammar. Here, let us have a look at one of 
Lakoff/Johnson’s criticism on the Cartesian method of thinking in Chomsky’s 
linguistics: “The Method of Introspection. Just by reflecting on our own ideas and 
the operations of our own minds with care and rigor, we can come to understand 
the mind accurately and with certainty. No empirical study is necessary.” 
(Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 471) Ironically, we can find in Lakoff/Johnson’s 
metaphor theory almost the same logic. There is a universal grammar as an 
essence of language for Chomsky, and there is a conceptual metaphor as an 
essence of metaphor for Lakoff/Johnson. What is the big difference between the 
two? 
7. Lakoff/Johnson also criticized Chomsky for frequently making substantial 
changes on his theory. Then, how about the situation in their theory? The most 
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famous, also the most often adopted, conceptual metaphor, ARGUMENT IS 
WAR, is revised to “ARGUMENT IS STTRUGLE” in the second edition of 
Metaphors We Live by published in the year 2003. Since the difference between 
ARGUMENT IS WAR and ARGUMENT IS STRUGGLE is so evident, we have 
great doubts on the fundamentality and universality of their original concept 
“ARGUMENT IS WAR”. Why do they have to change it if it is so fundamental 
and important for other metaphors in their proposed “coherent” system of 
metaphorical concepts? Most importantly, who has the right to change it if it is 
really one of the metaphors we live by? In other words, without it, what shall we 
rely on? Besides, they also seem to have abandoned the term “experientialism” 
in their later writings and substituted it with “embodied philosophy” because the 
word “experientialism” never appeared in either Philosophy in the Flesh in 1999 
or the afterword of the second addition of Metaphors We Live by in 2003 (other 
parts of the book remain unchanged in the second edition). At least they did not 
mention a word on the inner relationship between “embodied philosophy” and 
the earlier concept “experientialism”. 
8. Lakoff/Johnson also point out that Chomskyan linguistics is in line with the 
assumptions of first-generation cognitive science, and the cognitive linguistics 
they have championed has become part of the second-generation cognitive 
science (Lakoff/Johnson 1999). However, what the second generation cognitive 
science can prove is still limited. 
9. Lakoff/Johnson have inverted the relationship of metaphorical expressions and 
his meta-metaphorical construct (conceptual metaphors), just as Chomsky has 
inverted the relation between surface structure and deep structure. And what he 
calls metaphorical thought exists only in the linguist’s mind. He believes that 
“metaphorical language is a reflection of metaphorical thought” just as Chomsky 
believes that language is a realization of universal grammar. Let us have a 
thorough look at Lakoff/Johnson’s inverted logic: 
The Love Is A Journey example reveals the fallacy in tenet I clearly. If 
metaphor were just a matter of words, then each different linguistic 
expression should be a different metaphor. Thus, each of the example 
sentences should be entirely different metaphors, with nothing in 
common among them. “Our relationship has hit a dead-end street” 
should be distinct from and unrelated to “Our relationship is spinning 
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its wheels,” which in turn should be different from and unrelated to 
“We’re going in different directions” and “Our relationship is at a 
crossroads,” and so on. But these are not simply distinct, different, and 
unrelated metaphorical expressions. They are all instances of a single 
conceptual metaphor, namely, Love Is A Journey, which is 
characterized by the conceptual cross-domain mapping stated in 
Chapter 5. There is one conceptual metaphor here, not dozens of 
unrelated linguistic expressions that happen to be used metaphorically. 
Metaphor is centrally a matter of thought, not just words. Metaphorical 
language is a reflection of metaphorical thought. Metaphorical thought, 
in the form of cross-domain mappings is primary; metaphorical 
language is secondary. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 123) 
In fact, the above statement is quite untenable and misleading. First of all, traditional 
metaphor theory already recognized similarity between two situations. Secondly, nobody 
denies that there are commonalities among certain metaphorical expressions. Thirdly, 
metaphorical expressions like “Our relationship has hit a dead-end street”, “Our 
relationship is spinning its wheels,” “We’re going in different directions”, and “Our 
relationship is at a crossroads,” are not instances of a pre-existing conceptual metaphor; 
rather the latter is the result of a generalization process. Metaphorical thought is 
definitely not the cross-domain mapping, for Glucksberg and McGlone (1999) had 
already proved that there is no such kind of love-journey mapping in our mind when we 
are using related metaphorical expressions. This proves that conceptual metaphor has no 
psychological basis.  
Virtually, when people are speaking or talking in their mother tongue, they 
seldom refer to the grammatical rules in the moment of uttering. Traditional grammarians’ 
work is to make observations on the existing language data, and few of them ever 
attempted, not even in the slightest effort, to claim the existence of a universal grammar 
in which daily utterances are rooted. To propose a universal grammar is, to some extent, 
shutting the door to language innovation, which again never existed in the mind of the 
traditional grammarians. The distinction between the traditional grammarian and 
Chomsky’s generative grammar lies in that the former adopted the method of pure 
induction, while the latter employed the former’s inductive results as his starting point 
of deduction. In other words, the latter initiated his deduction by dint of the former’s 
inductive results. People in a certain speech community can be rather alert or sensitive 
to non-grammatical expressions produced by children or foreigners, which means that 
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grammar has certain patterns based on which people can recognize and rectify the illegal 
ones in their language. There is, however, a different story in the case of metaphor. 
People hear or read much fewer “incorrect metaphors” than inaccurate plain sentences. 
Compared with daily language speakers, it is harder for metaphor users to be wrong. To 
take a step back, even if people hear someone producing an inappropriate metaphor, they 
can hardly replace it with an accurate one at once, for there are only appropriate or 
inappropriate metaphors rather than standard or nonstandard metaphors. Maybe the real 
reason lies in that metaphor is a language performance on a higher level. In other words, 
if Chomsky’s Universal Grammar has more or less acquired its superficial explanatory 
power by dint of several grammatical coincidences in different languages, then 
Lakoff/Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory is more likely to lose its universality and 
rationality due to the abductive and heterogeneous nature of metaphorization. 
1.7 Experientialism as a Middle Course 
In A Theory of Linguistic Signs, Rudi Keller (1998: 24) revisited Aristotle’s classification 
of three levels of observation “in considering signs, their relationship to the cognitive 
world and to the world of things”: 
(a) the linguistic level of signs (words, sentences); 
(b) the epistemological level of cognitive correlates (concepts, propositions, etc.); 
and 
(c) the ontological level of things, truth values, and facts. 
The following question arises with respect to Keller’s Aristotelian classification: Due to 
the arbitrary nature of the sign, how do people establish meaningful relationships 
between subjectivity and objectivity by the help of signs while avoiding relativism in 
signification at the same time? As a matter of fact, this is a key question for all modern 
philosophers in terms of how subjects obtain objectivity, in other words, the mediation 
between subjectivity and objectivity or mediation between idea and reality.  
Lakoff/Johnson also have to answer this important question in the cognitive 
theory of metaphor. But before putting forward their own idea on the mediation between 
idea and reality, Lakoff/Johnson criticized what they called two traditional views: 
objectivism and subjectivism. This section will illustrate that the extreme “objectivist 
view of meaning” they have fiercely argued against is a “dead horse” which only exists 
in their imagination, and that the subjectivism they also combat is actually where they 
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stand. As a target of criticism, they enumerated main ideas in the objectivist account of 
meaning and metaphor and explained why these ideas are untenable: 
By definition, there can be no such thing as a metaphorical concept or metaphorical 
meaning. Meanings are objective and specify conditions of objective truth. They are 
by definition ways of characterizing the world as it is or might be. Conditions of 
objective truth simply do not provide ways of viewing one thing in terms of another. 
Hence, objective meanings cannot be metaphorical.  
Since metaphor cannot be a matter of meaning, it can only be a matter of language. 
A metaphor, on the objectivist view, can at best give us an indirect way of talking 
about some objective meaning M’ by using the language that would be used literally 
to talk about some other objective meaning M, which is usually false in a blatant 
way.  
Again by definition, there can be no such thing as literal (conventional) metaphor. 
A sentence is used literally when M’ = M, that is, when the speaker's meaning is the 
objective meaning. Metaphors can only arise when M’ ≠ M. Thus, according to the 
objectivist definition, a literal metaphor is a contradiction in terms, and literal 
language cannot be metaphorical.  
Metaphor can contribute to understanding only by making us see objective 
similarities, that is, similarities between the objective meanings M and M’. These 
similarities must be based on shared inherent properties of objects—properties that 
the objects really have, in and of themselves. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 209) 
Of course, as a product of our mind, meaning cannot be absolutely objective. If the world 
is meaningful in any sense, it is meaningful for us humans. In fact, the concept of 
meaning itself is meaningless to the objective world. To put it differently, when we are 
talking about the meaning of a thing, an event, or a phenomenon, we refer to the meaning 
of it from the perspective of an individual, a group, or a community. In this sense, 
meaning does have a quite solid subjective basis, and there is not a “meaning-in-itself” 
in the world. In other words, it is not that things have a meaning, but we endow things 
with a meaning. Lakoff/Johnson’s problem lies in that, while making the above summary 
on the so-called “objective account of metaphor”, they never mention any name of 
scholars or any particular school that hold these ideas. It is thus not impossible that such 
kind of notions are also their assumptions. If this is true, it will be very much against the 
basic principle of academic research, for, unless they have evidence, it is quite 
inappropriate for them to randomly assume that such believes exist in other people’s 
mind. They saw Aristotle as the father of the “traditional theory” of metaphor 
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(Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 121), but we cannot find such accounts of metaphor in any of 
Aristotle’s works. In other words, when they criticize the “objective account of 
metaphor”, it is very likely that they are actually beating the air (Leezenberg 2001: 136-
137). 
What is more, Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 119) listed five basic “tenets” that they 
assume to be generated from the “objective account of metaphor” as demonstrated below: 
1. Metaphor is a matter of words, not thought. Metaphor occurs when a word is 
applied not to what it normally designates, but to something else. 
2. Metaphorical language is not part of ordinary conventional language. Instead, it 
is novel and typically arises in poetry, rhetorical attempts at persuasion, and 
scientific discovery. 
3. Metaphorical language is deviant. In metaphor, words are not used in their proper 
senses. 
4. Conventional metaphorical expressions in ordinary everyday language are ‘dead 
metaphors,’ that is, expressions that once were metaphorical, but have become 
frozen into literal expressions. 
5. Metaphors express similarities. That is, there are preexisting similarities between 
what words normally designate and what they designate when they are used 
metaphorically. 
As for tenet one, Lakoff/Johnson seem to think that if metaphor is a matter of words, it 
cannot be thought, but why not? According to their logic, if someone contends that 
metaphor is a linguistic expression, it is impossible for him or her to believe that it is also 
a kind of human thinking. Actually, being a linguistic expression and being an idea are 
not at all contradictory. It is thus very unconvincing to define those who see metaphor 
from a linguistic view as objectivists. There is also nothing wrong with the second and 
the fourth tenet either. There is indeed great difference between conventional language 
or lexical items and metaphor. Conventional language is the product of symbolization in 
the Peircean sense while metaphor is based on iconic thinking. Those that do not require 
iconic thinking have already been lexicalized or symbolized, that is, they have become 
dead. Tenet three is more like a position held by Chomsky who is not an objectivist. As 
for tenet five, we cannot deny that metaphor is based on similarity, for this is fundamental 
to metaphor. From the view of a receiver rather than a metaphor user, it does express 
similarity. Due to the contradiction between these tenets, we cannot believe that they, 
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actually, coexist in objectivists’ mind. Leezenberg’s (2001: 136-137) also realized the 
deficiency in the cognitive theory of metaphor and the following of his comment on this 
issue is essentially right:  
Much of its argument [viz. the argument of cognitive semantics] against ‘objective 
semantics’, however, is phrased in such sweeping terms as to be hardly worth taking 
seriously. Lakoff and Johnson often resort to straw man argumentation, and rarely 
explicitly ascribe specific doctrines to specific authors; worse, where they do, they 
seriously distort the views they criticize by numerous errors of a rather elementary 
nature. The ‘objectivist tradition’ they fulminate against is not ‘fundamentally 
misguided’ or ‘humanly irrelevant’ but simply nonexistent. 
As analyzed above, Lakoff/Johnson could not provide any reliable evidence for 
the existence of the objective account of metaphor they take as a target of criticism. To 
be more specific, by objectivism, they mainly refer to external realism (Lakoff/Johnson 
1999) as opposed to the internal realism championed by them. This can be inferred from 
the following argument: 
We will suggest, first, that human concepts are not just reflections of an external 
reality, but that they are crucially shaped by our bodies and brains, especially by our 
sensorimotor system. We will do so by looking at three kinds of concepts: color 
concepts, basic-level concepts, and spatial-relations concepts. After that, we will use 
studies of neural modeling to argue that certain human concepts and forms of 
conceptual reasoning make use of the sensorimotor system. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 
22-23) 
In fact, by the time Lakoff/Johnson’s Metaphors We Live by was first published in the 
year 1980, the metaphysical/external realism has long been forsaken by most 
philosophers (Haser 2005), let alone the late 1990s when their second collaborated book 
Philosophy in the Flesh came out. Roughly at the same time in 1980s, there was a fierce 
debate among western philosophers that has lasted even to the present day concerning 
the tension between deconstructionist anti-subject perspective and the philosophy of the 
subject (Habermas), during which nearly nobody holds the view of absolute objectivism 
or metaphysical realism. The debate has lasting influence for humanity scholars. It is, 
therefore, quite unlikely that Lakoff/Johnson have no knowledge about this influential 
academic event. Ignoring the latest development in western academia, they continued to 
criticize the disembodied reason generated from external or metaphysical realism: 
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…human reason and human concepts are mind-, brain-, and body-free and 
characterize objective, external reality. If these tenets are false, the whole worldview 
collapses. Suppose human concepts and human reason are body- and brain-
dependent. Suppose they are shaped as much by the body and brain as by reality. 
Then the body and brain are essential to our humanity. Moreover, our notion of what 
reality is changes. There is no reason whatever to believe that there is a disembodied 
reason or that the world comes neatly carved up into categories or that the categories 
of our mind are the categories of the world. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 22) 
As mentioned in previous paragraphs, most philosophers already abandoned the above 
criticized belief a long time ago, and very few people today think that human concepts 
are just reflections of an external reality. Furthermore, a transcendent reason is not 
necessarily a disembodied reason, but for Lakoff/Johnson (1999), they are identical. In 
fact, different from the disembodied reason, a transcendent reason is tenable if it is 
intersubjectively established. That categorization is a mind-based human behavior has 
become a common sense for many, therefore, no purely objective “categories of the 
world” can justify themselves. In other words, criticizing a certain “category-in-itself” 
equals beating a dead horse. 
Interestingly, Lakoff/Johnson often intermingle fairly “incompatible positions” 
(Haser 2005: 9). For instance, one of the pioneers of experientialist realism, as is stated 
in Johnson (1981), even returns to the objectivist stance (cf. Leezenberg 2001: 139-140). 
Haser (2005) also pointed out that “key proposals put forward by Lakoff/Johnson are 
reminiscent of theories developed by philosophers such as Putnam and Goodman, who 
at times are grouped along with objectivists” (Haser 2005: 10; cf. Haser 2005: 73). Unlike 
what is stated in Lakoff (1987: 122-123), Putnam borrows the term “objectivism” from 
Husserl’s work to refer to his metaphysical realism (cf. Haser 2005: 80; Conant 1990: 
xliv). Haser (2005) further argues that Lakoff/Johnson’s contention that their 
experientialist realism is different from any traditional western philosophy is quite 
untenable, and that their theory of meaning dates back to Plato. Haser (2005: 11) thus 
explains: “… Lakoff’s account of cognitive semantics is situated within a philosophical 
tradition inaugurated by Plato, who is incidentally one of the foremost objectivists. Due 
to conclusive arguments by Wittgenstein, among others, this line of thinking is almost 
completely discarded in contemporary philosophy.” Indeed, Lakoff/Johnson’s 
theoretical framework does lead them to the same conclusion as what is held by the 
objectivists (or metaphorical realists), since those conceptual metaphors are no less than 
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Plato’s ideas-in-themselves. In other words, we may see the conceptual metaphors as 
“concept-in-themselves”. Another example of Lakoff/Johnson’s objective view on 
metaphor can be found in their criticism on the objectivist similarity theory: 
Suppose metaphor necessarily expressed a preexisting similarity. Then the Marriage 
As Business Partnership metaphor would express a preexisting equal relationship. 
That is, marriage would inherently have to involve equality of the spouses. But the 
Marriage As Parent-Child Relationship metaphor also exists. It posits an unequal 
relationship. If metaphor expressed a preexisting similarity, then marriage would 
have to be inherently an unequal relationship. But the marriage relationship cannot 
be both inherently equal and inherently unequal. Since both metaphors exist, the 
similarity theory would require a contradiction! The mapping theory does not, since 
both mappings need not be simultaneously activated. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 127) 
In fact, marriage as a phenomenon is quite complicated. In certain aspects, the couple 
may be partners, in others they may be like a child and a parent. There is no contradiction 
when these different aspects are conveyed in metaphors. It seems that Lakoff/Johnson 
have a habit of inserting adjectives like “inherent” into other people’s views, as Haser 
(2005) has pointed out many times. What is revealed in the above argument is that they 
believe in inherent meaning in words or concepts, and argue that these inherent semantic 
features are necessarily transferred from metaphorical vehicle to metaphorical tenor. In 
the above example, they believe that equality is an inherent semantic feature of the 
concept “patterner”. This reveals their semantic objectivism. In fact, novel metaphors 
require a combination of an objective ground and a subjective view, while conventional 
metaphors are usually intersubjectively established constructions and are based on 
culture. The following comment by Haser (2005: 83) about Lakoff/Johnson’s criticism 
against the objectivism is essentially right: 
…Lakoff/Johnson’s reasoning rests on a tacit re-definition of truth. Instead of giving 
compelling counterarguments against objectivism, Lakoff/Johnson change the topic. 
The correct ways of impugning objectivism would be to show that the objectivist 
conception of truth is relative to conceptual systems. This is a far more complicated 
task than pointing out that different languages have different systems of metaphors 
– a task which has been tackled by philosophers such as Putnam (1978d [1977]) and 
Goodman (1978a). While Lakoff/Johnson’s contentions recall insights familiar from 
contemporary philosophy, the authors do not furnish the arguments that have 
motivated theorists to take an anti-objectivist stance. Instead, we are offered invalid 
arguments – if any – designed to lead to the same conclusions. 
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After refuting the so-called metaphysical objectivism or “the objective account 
of metaphor”, Lakoff/Johnson’s target of criticism turns to “subjectivism”. And they 
enumerated five tenets that they believe the subjectivist will hold: 
1. In most of our everyday practical activities we rely on our senses and develop 
intuitions we can trust. When important issues arise, regardless of what others 
may say, our own senses and intuitions are our best guides for action.  
2. The most important things in our lives are our feelings, aesthetic sensibilities, 
moral practices, and spiritual awareness. These are purely subjective. None of 
these is purely rational or objective.  
3. Art and poetry transcend rationality and objectivity and put us in touch with the 
more important reality of our feelings and intuitions. We gain this awareness 
through imagination rather than reason.  
4. The language of the imagination, especially metaphor, is necessary for 
expressing the unique and most personally significant aspects of our experience. 
In matters of personal understanding the ordinary agreed-upon meanings that 
words have will not do.  
5. Objectivity can be dangerous, because it misses what is most important and 
meaningful to individual people. Objectivity can be unfair, since it must ignore 
the most relevant realms of our experience in favor of the abstract, universal, 
and impersonal. For the same reason, objectivity can be inhuman. There are no 
objective and rational means for getting at our feelings, our aesthetic 
sensibilities, etc. Science is of no use when it comes to the most important things 
in our lives. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 188-189) 
In spite of some radical ideas, we may find many similarities between the subjectivism 
and the experientialism or the embodied philosophy held by Lakoff/Johnson. In fact, the 
cognitive theory of metaphor is a variant of subjectivist theory of meaning (Langacker 
1990). Although it tries to avoid the weak points of objectivists’ view, it still resorts to 
the false solutions of “subjectivist or conceptualist theories of meaning” (Langacker 1990: 
5; cf. Keller 1999: 178). Take color for example. Lakoff/Johnson criticized subjectivists 
for their failure in accounting for color, but their understanding of color is also based on 
individual’s bodily experience and thus excluded the cultural aspects of color. Such idea 
may be revealed from one of their remarks quoted below: 
Subjectivism in its various forms—radical relativism and social constructionism—
also fails to explain color, since color is created jointly by our biology and the world, 
not by our culture. This is not to say that color does not differ in its significance from 
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culture to culture. It clearly does. Rather, color is a function of the world and our 
biology interacting. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 25) 
Frankly speaking, to say that “color is a function of the world and our biology interacting” 
equals to saying nothing. Like subjectivists, Lakoff/Johnson do not recognize the role of 
culture in the formation of color. In fact, everything in human society is created by culture. 
The physical part of color is created jointly by our biology and the world, while the 
subjective part of color is defined by culture. One thing is clear: the naming of color is 
also arbitrary and different from culture to culture. 
In order to solve the problem concerning the mediation between subjectivity and 
objectivity, Lakoff/Johnson resorted to Putnam’s internal realism for a possible solution 
(Lakoff 1987; Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]). Employing the concept of experience as 
mediation between subjectivity and objectivity, they extended the internal realism and 
developed experientialism. In fact, terms like “embodied realism” or “embodied 
philosophy” are more frequently mentioned than experientialism by Lakoff/Johnson in 
their later works, especially after the publication of Philosophy in the Flesh in 1999. 
Perhaps, this is because that the term embodied philosophy is more inclusive than 
experientialism, and thus is applied to many more human activities concerning the 
relationship between the mind and the world.  
Traditional realists believe there is a direct connection between human 
consciousness and reality without a need of any linguistic mediation (Ding 2010). What 
makes Lakoff/Johnson’s embodied realism different from traditional realism is that they 
introduced experience or embodiment as a mediation between consciousness and reality, 
and thus a mediation between subject and object. The following statement shows the 
theoretical source of Lakoff/Johnson’s experientialism or embodied realism: 
The embodied realism we are developing here is not created out of nothing. It is 
anticipated by two of our greatest philosophers of the embodied mind, John Dewey 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Despite their wide differences of temperament and 
style, both Dewey and Merleau-Ponty believed that philosophy must be informed 
by the best scientific understanding available, and they each made extensive use of 
the empirical psychology, neuroscience, and physiology of their day. They both 
argued that mind and body are not separate metaphysical entities, that experience is 
embodied, not ethereal, and that when we use the words mind and body we are 
imposing bounded conceptual structures artificially on the ongoing integrated 
process that constitutes our experience. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 97) 
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Indeed, it is an artificial division to separate the mind from the body, but a useful one for 
our understanding for both. This also shows that a theory of experience is necessary. 
Furthermore, we may find their basic views on embodiment and embodied realism 
through the following statement: 
Realism is fundamentally about our success in functioning in the world. Someone 
who is ‘not realistic’ is someone who is ill-adapted, someone who is out of touch 
and out of harmony with the world. Realism is about being in touch with the world 
in ways that allow us to survive, to flourish, and to achieve our ends. But being in 
touch requires something that touches—a body. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 95) 
This remark is only partially right, because, of all our interactions with the world, direct 
bodily touch is only part of it. However, for Lakoff/Johnson, our interactions with 
realities in the world are exclusively based on direct body experience. Moreover, if you 
measure realism through success, then the realistic mind is bonded with subjective value, 
for virtually no one can objectively define success. 
Through introducing basic-level categorization, Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 30) 
believe that the experientialism or embodied realism is quite effective in solving the old 
problem in metaphysical realism: 
Though the facts of basic-level categorization do not fit metaphysical realism, they 
do provide us with the basis for embodied realism, which is an improvement over 
metaphysical realism in that it provides a link between our ideas and the world, at 
least at the level that matters most for our survival. The facts of basic-level 
categorization also remind us that our bodies contribute to our sense of what is real. 
There is only a slight improvement from the alleged metaphysical realism to 
Lakoff/Johnson’s embodied realism. In fact, even the so-called basic-level categories are 
subject to different interpretations in terms of their ideological implications. This means 
that they are less “universal” than Lakoff/Johnson think, and the aporia of the cognitive 
theory of metaphor lies right here. It tries to provide “a link between our ideas and the 
world”, and, in order to achieve that, it resolves to endless empirical studies similar with 
objectivism. However, the link provided in their theory is never reliable due to the 
utilitarian nature of human cognition (Keller 1998). Besides, direct bodily experience is 
only part of people’s understanding of the world. In other words, experientialism or 
embodied philosophy is not adequate for an effective mediation between ideas and reality, 
and thus is only an expedient solution. Regardless of these inherent problems in their 
theory, members of the cognitive school quickly turn to empirical studies: 
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What distinguishes the view of embodied realism we are proposing is the use we 
make of empirical evidence from recent cognitive neuroscience and embodied 
cognitive science. This empirical research makes it possible for us to explore in a 
suitably detailed way the workings of the embodied mind in its structuring of 
experience via neural cognition. It gives us ways to explain why we have the 
categories we do, why we have the concepts we have, and how our embodiment 
shapes our reasoning and the structure of understanding that forms the basis for what 
we take to be true. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 97-98) 
Productive and prevailing as they are, the fatal deficiency is still there. The fact that 
people’s views and ideas differ is proof that our reasoning and the structure of our 
understanding is not shaped by our embodiment. Thus, a further question might be asked: 
Since in the non-experientialist sense objectivity is unattainable, how to rise above 
individual bias? Lakoff/Johnson deem the embodiment to share some common features 
so that agreements should be reached such as language and culture. However, they still 
need to answer another question: whether embodiment is individual or universal? The 
same mistake may be found in their discussion on primary metaphors: “… primary 
metaphors make possible the extension of these embodied concepts into abstract 
theoretical domains. The primary metaphors are anything but arbitrary social constructs, 
since they are highly constrained both by the nature of our bodies and brains and by the 
reality of our daily interactions.” (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 96) As shown in this statement, 
Lakoff/Johnson believe that primary metaphors are highly restricted by bodily 
experience and thus only apply to individuals. In fact, the primary metaphors are social 
constructs, and they are also subject to different interpretations and vary from culture to 
culture. 
Due to its expedient nature of experientialism, Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory 
is thus not a promising theoretical enterprise. What makes their theory more unpromising 
is that it swings between subjectivism and objectivism without knowing why. This 
tendency is clearly revealed through their arguments against objectivism and 
subjectivism. For instance, while attacking the subjectivist positions, Lakoff/Johnson 
(2003[1980]: 224) ironically go back to the objectivist view that they have been 
criticizing: 
These subjectivist positions all hinge on one basic assumption, namely, that 
experience has no natural structure and that, therefore, there can be no natural 
external constraints upon meaning and truth. Our reply follows directly from our 
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account of how our conceptual system is grounded. We have argued that our 
experience is structured holistically in terms of experiential gestalts. These gestalts 
have structure that is not arbitrary. Instead, the dimensions that characterize the 
structure of the gestalts emerge naturally from our experience. 
If they believe that experience has natural structure and that there are “natural external 
constraints upon meaning and truth”, then the so-called non-arbitrary experiential 
gestalts are nearly a priori. Meanwhile, Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]) claim the centrality 
of a conceptual system in defining people’s everyday realities. By admitting this, they 
also imply another proposition: Not that our mind has manipulation over concepts, but 
instead, some concepts govern our mind. Therefore, those mind governing concepts for 
Lakoff/Johnson have, to some extent, taken the possession of their users. This kind of 
tendency is in every sense both objectivist and metaphysical. Based on this, 
Lakoff/Johnson make their famous claim that there are “metaphors we live by”. 
Interesting enough, the following remark of Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]: 221) has well 
explained why there is after all no metaphor that we live by: 
There is a good reason why our conceptual systems have inconsistent metaphors for 
a single concept. The reason is that there is no one metaphor that will do. Each one 
gives a certain comprehension of one aspect of the concept and hides others. To 
operate only in terms of a consistent set of metaphors is to hide many aspects of 
reality. Successful functioning in our daily lives seems to require a constant shifting 
of metaphors. The use of many metaphors that are inconsistent with one another 
seems necessary for us if we are to comprehend the details of our daily existence. 
As the name of experientialism suggests, Lakoff/Johnson have developed the 
concept of “experience” to seek a more direct relation between our subjective mind and 
the objective world. They refute, at least on the surface level, both the objectivist and the 
subjectivist points of view and attempted to develop a middle course. They attempt to 
rebuild the relation between objectivity and subjectivity through experience. According 
to Lakoff/Johnson, concepts developed from individual’s somatic experience are so 
fundamental that they have monopoly over other concepts and can even govern people’s 
mind. Therefore, orientational metaphors like “HAPPY IS UP” are good example for 
understanding Lakoff/Johnson’s definition of “experience”:  
HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN  
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I’m feeling up. That boosted my spirits. My spirits rose. You’re in high spirits. 
Thinking about her always gives me a lift. I’m feeling down. I’m depressed. He’s 
really low these days. I fell into a depression. My spirits sank. 
Physical basis: Drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, 
erect posture with a positive emotional state. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 15). 
Here, the concept of “HAPPY IS UP” is untenable and the problem of orientational 
metaphors is quite obvious. Firstly, being happy and being in high spirits are actually 
very different concepts. Secondly, being in erect position is not necessarily positive. For 
example, when one is feeling crazy and angry, the blood pressure is up. Likewise, 
drooping posture does not always mean sadness. When one lies down, it can mean that 
the person is feeling peaceful. In a fast-tempo society, having a good sleep (lying down) 
is a happy thing for many people. Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]) also admit in their 
“afterword” that the distinction between orientational/ontological and structural 
metaphors is artificial: they are all structural. In this way, the so-called 
orientational/ontological metaphors as conceptual metaphors are thus dragged down to 
the much lower position. 
Another problem with “experience” in the cognitive theory lies in that it cannot 
totally cover all the possible links between mind and reality. Needless to say, we do not 
have to physically experience everything in order to acquire certain knowledge on it, but 
how about situations that do not involve that kind of experience at all? After all, most of 
our imaginative constructs, metaphorical and metonymic, are not embodied. And just 
because a single person experiences something does not mean he can be guaranteed a 
correct knowledge about it. In other words, directly experiencing something does not 
equal correctness. If we admit, as acknowledged by Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]), that 
physical experience can only partially influence people’s metaphorical reasoning, then 
how can an embodied philosophy or experientialism be seen as a philosophy for the 
whole process of metaphorization? Such an inadequate view in experientialism has thus 
caused problems in its theory of language and meaning. Allen (2001: 288) also realized 
the deficiency in Lakoff/Johnson’s philosophy of language and made very insightful 
conclusion as follows: “…language [in the cognitive theory of metaphor] is constrained 
and informed by the relations that human beings (a) perceive in nature – particularly in 
relation to themselves; (b) have experience of in the world they inhabit; (c) conceive of 
in abstract and metaphysical domains.” In other words, language in the cognitive theory 
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of metaphor is very much constrained by direct bodily or physical experience, especially 
those that can be reflected in neural science. 
After serious scrutiny, the present study finds out that, for Lakoff/Johnson, neural 
structure means “embodied” or “embodiment”. By direct embodiment, Lakoff/Johnson 
mean the establishment of neural connections, which is championed and explored in 
Narayanan’s neural theory of metaphor. 
Narayanan’s neural theory of metaphor gives us an account of how primary 
metaphors are learned, an explanation of why we have the ones we have, and a neural 
mechanism for metaphorical inference. We have a system of primary metaphors 
simply because we have the bodies and brains we have and because we live in the 
world we live in, where intimacy does tend to correlate significantly with proximity, 
affection with warmth, and achieving purposes with reaching destinations. 
(Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 59) 
As can be expected, the embodied philosophy largely relies on the experimental 
researches concentrating on the physical neuro reflections of metaphorical thinking done 
by neuroscientists. Physically speaking, therefore, the term “embodied” conceived by 
Lakoff/Johnson strictly refers to the activations of some cognitive related neuros which 
is revealed in the following remark by Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 46-47): “The ‘associations’ 
made during the period of conflation are realized neurally in simultaneous activations 
that result in permanent neural connections being made across the neural networks that 
define conceptual domains. These connections form the anatomical basis of source-to-
target activations that constitute metaphorical entailments.” However, it is not new for 
us to know that there exist conceptual domains in mind through the operation of neuros, 
and that interactions between metaphorical tenor and vehicle will be finally realized 
biologically. It is true that, biologically, neural mechanism is in charge of most of our 
body and mind activities, but neural facts and reflections do not mean definitude, 
especially not when we are making discussions on the topic of meaning and metaphor. 
To put it differently, what Lakoff/Johnson have obtained from the “permanent” neural 
connections established and activated by metaphorical thinking is mere neural reflections 
rather than real information of metaphor. It shows how metaphorical thinking 
biologically works in our body and nothing more. Besides, Lakoff/Johnson also did not 
provide evidence to justify the permanence of these neural connections. Thus, what 
should be pointed out here is that, even if those connections stay permanently in people’s 
mind once established, it can only validate the existence of metaphorical thinking rather 
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than justifying the existence of conceptual metaphors. When we create new metaphors, 
novel connections related with them will also be established and when we use them they 
are activated. In other words, such kind of findings in neural science provide nothing 
new in our understanding of metaphor. However, Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 500) see the 
neural connections to be very crucial and even so fundamental that they may have 
monopoly over our competence in categorization: 
Because we are neural beings, we categorize. Because neural systems optimize, we 
extend categories radially, adding minimal extensions to the central category 
structures that we already have. Because children’s earliest categories are 
perceptual-motor categories, we all have a central category of bounded physical 
objects that is extended as we grow older. Neural optimization extends the central 
subcategory of bounded physical objects to a radial category on the basis of existing 
conceptual metaphors and other neurally based cognitive mechanisms. The result is 
a radial category centered around bounded physical objects (persons, places, and 
things) and extended from this simple center in many ways. 
Gradually, the experiential realism turns into neural determinism which considers the 
“permanent” neural connections an evidence for conceptual metaphors. 
Our enormous metaphoric conceptual system is thus built up by a process of neural 
selection. Certain neural connections between the activated source- and target-
domain networks are randomly established at first and then have their synaptic 
weights increased through their recurrent firing. The more times those connections 
are activated, the more the weights are increased, until permanent connections are 
forged. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 57) 
The so-called “neural selection” is actually a biological reflection of the socio-historical 
selection of metaphor (symbolization of metaphors). After all, Lakoff/Johnson cannot 
explain how these physical elements (materials) are transformed into ideas and thought 
in mind. Moreover, neural selection by Lakoff/Johnson only demonstrates the biological 
result rather than the real process of symbolization. As a physical process, it is objective. 
The neural system is only a sub-faculty of our cognitive system, which cannot determine 
our mind. In fact, it is not very illuminating to merely place an adjective (neural) before 
a noun, thus “selection” becomes “neural selection”, “connection” becomes “neural 
connection”, “learning” becomes “neural learning”. As mentioned before, 
Lakoff/Johnson are describing the process of metaphorization as a biological reflection 
of the mind, but the existence of neural connections for metaphor cannot solve the 
problem of experience in embodied philosophy. The question is whether the so-called 
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“permanent” connections (suppose they do exist) for individuals can be seen as universal 
for most members in a cultural community? What if people forge different connections. 
As known to all, neural structures are objective phenomena. This is to say, being 
embodied means establishing neural structures in our body, and Lakoff/Johnson had no 
other way in justifying the term embodiment. However, if they totally base their 
argument on the objective structure, they establish no difference from the objectivism 
they criticize.  
Based on the neural perspective, Lakoff/Johnson also believe that internal or 
embodied realism can bridge the gap opened by disembodied representational realism of 
Cartesian philosophy and thus have great advantage over the latter school of thought. 
The following is Lakoff/Johnson’s (1999: 90) criticism on disembodied reason: 
Obviously, we accept (1) and (2) and we believe that (2) applies to the three findings 
of cognitive science we are discussing on the basis of converging evidence. But 
those findings themselves contradict (3). The doctrine of disembodied reason has, 
unfortunately, been applied to yield an untenable version of scientific realism: 
disembodied scientific realism. The evidence we will be looking at concerns the 
embodiment of mind and, as we shall see, allows us to keep a scientific realism in 
an embodied form, one that is cognitively and neurally realistic: an embodied 
scientific realism. 
In fact, the same body does not guarantee the same results in all aspects. The so-called 
embodied scientific realism is virtually another form of objectivist view of meaning 
which is at odds with the internal realism or experientialism. However, to say that the 
human body is well structured within does not mean that we have to understand it as 
another form (embodied or internal) of realism. After all, the cognitive understanding of 
metaphor is merely one perspective of human understanding. 
At the epistemological level, “experience” in the cognitive theory does have so 
much in common with the term “practice” in the classical Marxist theory of meaning that 
we may call it an embodied “practice”. Classical Marxist theorists adopted the concept 
of “practice” as mediation between subjects and thing-in-itself. However, their 
introduction of practice as a mediating thirdness turned out to be only a procrastination 
of, rather than a real solution to, this crucial issue. In the end, the results of practice still 
need to be subjectively evaluated. The same thing is for experiential realism. Who is 
there to evaluate the objectivity of individual experience? In this sense, criticisms on the 
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issue of practice in classical Marxist theory of meaning are also applicable to the concept 
of experience in the cognitive theory of metaphor. 
To be more specific, people’s experiences differ. Your experience might be 
greatly different from mine, then how can we base our communication on each other’s 
limited experience? Here comes the crucial problem again: how can experientialists turn 
their individually acquired experience to be widely accepted knowledge? The idealized 
cognitive model (ICM) cannot solve this problem, neither can the presupposed gestalt. 
That’s why the cognitive theory of metaphor becomes a modified form of materialism 
and therefore is unable to move out of its impasse. Lakoff/Johnson’s philosophical failure 
shows that a tenable middle course is not easy to get, and their version of middle course 
still does not work. 
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Chapter Two: A Peircean Epistemology of Metaphor 
As argued in the previous section, the impasse of metaphorical essentialism calls for a 
more tenable philosophical interpretation of metaphor. Meanwhile, we also find out that 
the problem of metaphor is eventually a philosophical issue. We find that the 
epistemology of metaphor in Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory is quite untenable in that 
it cannot justify the existence of conceptual metaphors. Thus, in the searching for a better 
philosophical solution we turn to the Peircean philosophy of the sign. In this chapter, we 
attempt to find answers to the following question: what is metaphor. In other words, we 
question what “meta-” is for in the first chapter, and we are going to answer another 
question hinted in the title, i.e., what is metaphor.  
2.1 An Unfinished Enterprise 
The epistemology of metaphor is, in fact, an unfinished enterprise till today. In the 
present section, we choose three eras in the western history that can be considered as 
being crucial for establishing a sound epistemology of metaphor, and explore the reasons 
of their respective failure. The three periods are the Aristotelean era, Vico’s era, and the 
cognitive era. What makes this anatomy necessary and important is that the present 
studies of metaphor are paying too much attention to the issue of ontological 
determinations, and, in doing this, they have temporarily forgotten the baffling problem 
that besets us all along: there is still no consent on what on earth metaphor is. Proponents 
of the cognitive theory of metaphor, perhaps the most prevailing and dominant approach 
of metaphor study today, believe that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical and 
there are fundamental conceptual metaphors that govern our mind. Other scholars, like 
Keller (1999, 1998), Haser (2005), and Ding (2008, 2010) have cast serious doubts on 
the conceptual metaphor theory and the experientialist view. By going back to the 
aforementioned three eras, we can gain profound reflection on why the issue of metaphor 
is so complicated.  
I would like to begin this section with a discussion on Aristotle’s classical notion 
of metaphor, i.e., the Aristotelean era of metaphor. Before Aristotle, people confused 
metaphor with other types of figurative languages, and metaphor also did not stand out 
of the old rhetoric term “trope”. Aristotle’s emphasis on metaphor in the Poetics and the 
Rhetoric effectively drew people’s attention at that time so that they began to notice the 
metaphorical meaning that arises from making comparison between two different things. 
It is from this perspective that we say Aristotle discovered metaphor. Ever since the 
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“discovery of metaphor”, the Aristotelean conception of metaphor has been open for 
interpretation. In over two thousand years of development, Aristotle’s metaphor has been 
interpreted differently by various theorists of different positions without reaching a 
consent. Aristotle’s notion can be used as an instrument of interpretation, while it also 
becomes a target of criticism. It is like that in a thousand scholars there are a thousand 
versions of the Aristotelean metaphor. It seems that the Aristotelean conception of 
metaphor is so inclusive that it has generated the whole western discourse of metaphor, 
and hence the mother of entire western theories of metaphor. One reason for the 
inclusiveness of his theory of metaphor lies in his understanding of metaphor in its 
broadest sense, which is, perhaps, also the most influential and most frequently 
mentioned legacy of his conception of metaphor. Indeed, metaphor in Aristotle 
“permeates all kinds of discourses as a template for understanding life in its many details, 
complexities, and vicissitudes” (Danesi 2004: 11). In short, we have in Aristotle’s theory 
of metaphor a broad meaning for metaphor which even includes metonymy. 
Influential as it is, the Aristotelian conception of metaphor has also met great 
challenges in the last three decades. Gumpel (1984) made a comprehensive and fierce 
criticism on the Aristotelian tradition of metaphor, holding that “Aristotle’s principle was 
never free of problems” (Gumpel 1984: xi). The same scholar even put forward a non-
Aristotelian perspective of metaphor. Although Aristotle understood metaphor in its 
broadest sense, he also, at the same time, “ingrained the strictly rhetorical view of 
metaphor in Western philosophical thinking by affirming that, as knowledge-productive 
as it was, the most common function of metaphor in human life was to spruce up more 
basic literal ways of speaking and thinking” (Danesi 2004: 12). Danesi (2004: 13) defined 
such perspective by Aristotle as the “literalist view of meaning”, and this view point has 
been so influential that it has caused the philosophical ignorance or condemnation of 
metaphor in over two millennia. According to Danesi (2004), the Aristotelean conception 
of metaphor has had a rather negative influence on the western theory of metaphor.  
On the contrary, Hanks and Giora (2012) averred that such attribution to Aristotle 
is based on misunderstanding of his works. In order to correct those misunderstandings, 
Hanks and Giora (2012) enumerated Aristotle’s major contributions to modern research 
on metaphor:  
(1) Aristotle says that metaphors are common means of expression used by 
everybody in conversation (Rhet. Part 2). This is not a contradiction to his views in 
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Poetics (Part 22) that metaphors reveal the genius of the poet, since he (implicitly) 
distinguishes between poetic metaphors and metaphors that are suitable in prose and 
hence which derive from conversation (Rhet. Part 3); (2) Metaphors are related to 
perception and visual imaginary (Rhet. Part 2 and 10); (3) Metaphor has cognitive 
function and force. Metaphors, Aristotle says, bring about learning, because in order 
to understand a metaphor, the hearer has to find a relation between the metaphor and 
the thing which the metaphor refers to (Rhet. Part 10). (Hanks and Giora 2012: 18) 
Due to those varied interpretations, theorists of metaphor are now facing very tough 
questions: How to measure Aristotle’s conception of metaphor? and Can we get a sound 
epistemology of metaphor in Aristotle? A thorough scrutiny is needed in order for us to 
make a better judgement. 
As mentioned in chapter one, Aristotle viewed metaphor from two main 
perspectives: metaphors in everyday conversation and metaphors in poetry. He believed 
that metaphor can be used by everybody in ordinary language, for it helps to prevent the 
language from being mean. For Aristotle, metaphors are unusual expressions or strange 
(rare) words as opposed to “normal words”, as shown in the following statement: 
The perfection of style is to be clear without being mean. The clearest style is that 
that which uses only current or proper words; at the same time it is mean – witness 
the poetry of Cleophon and of Sthenelus. That diction, on the other hand, is lofty 
and raised above the commonplace which employs unusual words. By unusual, I 
mean strange (or rare) words, metaphorical, lengthened – anything, in short, that 
differs from the normal idiom. Yet a style wholly composed of such words is either 
a riddle or a jargon; a riddle, if it consists of metaphors; a jargon, if it consists strange 
(or rare) words. (Hanks and Giora 2012: 20) 
The word “riddle” used by Aristotle reminds us of the famous metaphorical riddle of 
Sphinx in which three life stages of human beings are metaphorized by morning, noon, 
and night of a day. Aristotle called such kind of metaphor “proportional metaphor”, and 
saw this kind as the most interesting one (Hanks and Giora 2012: 25). He thus regarded 
metaphor as a product of “proportional reasoning” (Danesi 2004: 12). Danesi (2004) uses 
the expression Old age is the evening of life to exemplify how a proportion is established 
in metaphorical thinking. As inferred by Danesi (2004), if A represents old age, B 
represents life, C represents evening, and D represents day, then the relationship in this 
metaphor can be reduced to “A is to B as C is to D”. Among the four items, the word 
“day” does not appear in the original expression. Thus, the more “logical” or reasonable 
version Old age of life is the evening of a day is transformed into Old age is the evening 
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of life which becomes more imaginative and literary. The connection of a person’s life 
span to the length of a day is utilized in many cultures, as revealed in the aforementioned 
story of Sphinx’s riddle. Clearly, proportional reasoning by Aristotle is based on 
recognizing the similarity between objects of different ratios. In other words, it is also 
developed from abductive reasoning. However, what Aristotle did not realize is that 
proportional metaphors only form a limited portion of metaphor. Although proportional 
reasoning is also based on a comparison between two things, it failed in depicting the 
real underlying logic of metaphor. This is perhaps the main reason that Aristotle failed 
in providing a sound epistemology of metaphor. In fact, Aristotle’s view of metaphor is 
quite pragmatic. He does not see metaphor as a mere linguistic decoration or 
embellishment; rather, he believes that it has a purpose of persuasion (Hanks and Giora 
2012) and thus performs a function of promoting effective communication. This is why, 
in the Rhetoric Book III, he focuses on the communicative function of metaphor, and 
sees metaphor as an effective style in speaking and writing. At the same time, he also 
emphasizes that metaphor should be “fitting”. Of all his expositions on metaphor, the 
rhetoric analysis seems to be at the central part, which also drew most attention of his 
successors. Neo-Aristotelean school still holds this tradition today. Aristotle also 
acknowledged, in the Rhetoric, metaphor’s role of providing “something fresh”: 
Now strange words simply puzzle us; ordinary words convey only what we know 
already; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh. When the 
poet calls “old age a withered stalk”, he conveys a new idea, a new fact, to us by 
means of the general notion of bloom, which is common to both things. (Hanks and 
Giora 2012: 25) 
In addition to his more appreciated rhetoric view of metaphor, Aristotle also 
elaborated the relation between metaphor and poetry. He believed that the command of 
metaphor is a gifted talent, and thus “the greatest thing by far” (Hanks and Giora 2012: 
21). Aristotle realized that metaphor helps poetry to avoid being banal and worn-out. 
Thus, his idea that the important function of metaphor lies in making lofty expression is 
consistent in his two perspectives. In other words, both metaphor in conversation and 
metaphor in poetry are significant in achieving the effect of being lofty and unusual. Such 
realization has laid a foundation for us to find out metaphor’s role in creating novel 
concepts and novel meaning. Moreover, in the Poetics, he contends that to make good 
metaphors is “the mark of genius” because it requires “an eye for resemblance” (Hanks 
and Giora 2012: 21). Many scholars argue that this remark is contradictory with his idea 
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of seeing metaphor as a common craft for all ordinary people. As argued by Hanks and 
Giora (2012), the contradiction is caused by his inconsistent views on metaphor. He 
observes that although everyone can use metaphor, the competence of using it well 
differs dramatically, especially in literary or poetic metaphors. Another conclusion he 
draws from this is that metaphor is the essence of poetry or the impulse of poetry, and 
there can be no poetry without metaphor. In fact, such perspective by Aristotle echoes a 
traditional view of the relation between metaphor and poetry in Chinese literary history, 
roughly at the same time of Aristotle. According to what is recorded in The Book of Rites 
(《礼记》 /li ji/), ancient Chinese scholars believed that “one cannot compose poems 
without knowing how to metaphorize” ‘不学博依, 不能安诗’ /bu xue bo yi, bu neng an 
shi/ (Cui 1997: 122). This is a piece of good evidence to show that western scholars and 
their eastern counterparts in Aristotle’s time have achieved a common understanding of 
metaphor, i.e., its indispensability in poetry. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that Aristotle’s classical notion of metaphor 
does have complicated effects on the western thought of metaphor as well as the 
development of metaphor theories afterwards. In fact, Danesi’s argument is not totally 
untenable, for, judging from Aristotle’s statements on metaphor, he does have a tendency 
of putting metaphor in the greater rhetoric background. However, due to the level of 
understanding of his time, Aristotle should not be blamed for not providing a sound 
epistemology of metaphor that may serve as a lighthouse for subsequent theorists. The 
point is that Aristotle has made lots of statements on metaphor, and many of them cannot 
fit into a coherent system. If we isolate his remarks from the socio-historical context of 
his time, we probably will get lost in his system. This explains why his idea has been 
interpreted so differently. Socio-historical conditions are another reason preventing 
Aristotle from having a much more thorough and profound understanding of metaphor. 
For the Aristotelean conception of metaphor as a whole, maybe our task today is not to 
refute it or make undue judgements from a twenty-first-century perspective, but to find 
out the exact socio-historical conditions under which those statements are made and why 
most of his successors, immediate or remote, tend to stress the rhetoric aspect of 
metaphor rather than other aspects. 
The second era of metaphor theory began with Giambattista Vico, and the reason 
we believe in a Vico’s era of metaphor lies not in its popularity at the time Vico lived, 
but in the revolutionary ideas it brings about for understanding and interpreting metaphor 
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and the profound influence it had on subsequent scholars, especially those after the 
twentieth century. The following comment on Vico made by his Italian compatriot 
Umberto Eco (1984: 107) can duly support our choice: 
An overview of the history of metaphorology and of its epistemic breaks, however 
brief, must not leave out Vico, not least because of the fact that La Scienzo Nuova 
(and its chapter “Della logica poetica”) seems to put into question the existence of a 
cultural network, of semantic fields and universes, and of a preestablished process 
of semiosis, which should precede (on the basis of the foregoing observations) the 
production and interpretation of metaphors. 
Over fifteen hundred years after “the discovery of metaphor” by Aristotle, people’s 
understanding of metaphor was still quite limited and confined to its rhetoric and literary 
functions. As discussed in the first chapter, most philosophers of this long period saw 
metaphor as defects of natural language, and some of them like Wilkins and Leibniz 
attempted to find ways to remedy the “defects” of metaphor (Hanks and Giora 2012: 3). 
Hanks and Giora (2012) contended that they have put metaphor in a wrong category. 
Such situation had not changed until the publication of Vico’s New Science. From the 
following remark, we may have a better understating of Vico’s contribution to the 
western theories of metaphor: 
Before Vico, metaphor was viewed as a manifestation of analogy - an inductive form 
of reasoning whereby it is assumed that if two or more entities are similar in one or 
more respects, then a probability exists that they will be similar in other respects. 
For Vico, on the other hand, metaphor was hardly a manifestation of analogical 
reasoning; rather, it revealed how humans go about creating analogies. Paradoxically, 
and significantly, metaphor is so fundamental to how we form abstractions, such as 
analogies, that it is impossible to talk about it without resorting to metaphor. (Danesi 
2004: 119) 
To a great extent, it is Vico who unyoked metaphor from being confined to poetic 
and rhetoric fields. He proposed to treat the study of humanities in a complete new way, 
which could be called a novel science of human beings or new science, to employ his 
own words. In doing this, Vico (1948) called for a paradigm shift in philosophy from the 
study of the world of nature to the study of the world of civil society: 
But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from 
ourselves, there shines the eternal and never-failing light of a truth beyond all 
question: that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its 
principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind. 
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Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers should have bent 
all their energies to the study of the world of nature, which, since God made it, He 
alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study of the world of nations 
or civil world, which, since men had made it, men could hope to know. This 
aberration was a consequence of that infirmity of the human mind, noted in the 
Axioms [236], by which, immersed and buried in the body, it naturally inclines to 
take notice of bodily things, and finds the effort to attend to itself too laborious; just 
as the bodily eye sees all objects outside itself but needs a mirror to see itself.” (Vico 
1948: 331) 
Through a careful study of the civil society with human beings as its central target, Vico 
(1948) found out that the metaphorizing ability of human beings has developed since the 
primitive time. By examining activities of the primitives, Vico discovered an important 
axiom of human cognition: “Because of the indefinite nature of the human mind, 
wherever it is lost in ignorance, man makes himself the measure of all things.” (Vico 
1948: 54) In other words, the outside world is metaphorized with reference to our body, 
as Vico (1948: 116) precisely argued in the following remark: 
It is noteworthy that in all languages the greater part of the expressions relating to 
inanimate things are formed by metaphor from the human body and its parts and 
from the human senses and passions. Thus, head for top or beginning; eyes for the 
looped heads of screws and for windows letting light into houses; mouth for any 
opening; lip for the rim of a vase or of anything else; the tooth of a plow, a rake, a 
saw, a comb; beard for rootlets; the mouth of a river; a neck of land; handful for a 
small number; heart for center (the Latins used umbilicus, “navel,” in this sense); 
foot for end; the flesh of fruits; a vein of water, rock or mineral; the blood of grapes 
for wine; the bowels of the earth. Heaven or the sea smiles; the wind whistles; the 
waves murmur; a body groans under a great weight. The farmers of Latium used to 
say the fields were thirsty, bore fruit, were swollen with grain; and our own rustics 
speak of plants making love, vines going mad, resinous trees weeping. Innumerable 
other examples could be collected from all languages. 
As shown above, we human beings have made of ourselves an entire world. In other 
words, we take ourselves as the rule of the universe. In this sense, Vico (1948) believes 
that the original human thinking is poetic, and our poetic logic underlies the whole 
semiotizing process or semiosis. Vico (1948: 116) believes that metaphor, as the result 
of poetic logic, is the most “luminous” and “necessary” type of tropes, and he has the 
following to say: 
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All the first tropes are corollaries of this poetic logic. The most luminous and 
therefore the most necessary and frequent is metaphor. It is most praised when it 
gives sense and passion to insensate things, in accordance with the metaphysics 
above discussed, by which the first poets attributed to bodies the being of animate 
substances, with capacities measured by their own, namely sense and passion, and 
in this way made fables of them. Thus every metaphor so formed is a fable in brief. 
This gives a basis for judging the time when metaphors made their appearance in the 
languages. All the metaphors conveyed by likenesses taken from bodies to signify 
the operations of abstract minds must date from times when philosophies were 
taking shape. The proof of this is that in every language the terms needed for the 
refined arts and recondite sciences are of rustic origin. 
Furthermore, Vico (1948: 132) observed that “in general metaphor makes up the great 
body of the language among all nations”. He thus explains: 
There must in the nature of human things be a mental language common to all 
nations, which uniformly grasps the substance of things feasible in human social life, 
and expresses it with as many diverse modifications as these same things may have 
diverse aspects. A proof of this is afforded by proverbs or maxims of vulgar wisdom, 
in which substantially the same meanings find as many diverse expressions as there 
are nations ancient and modern. (Vico 1948: 60) 
Here, the “mental language common to all nations” by Vico refers to the ubiquitous 
poetic logic that makes metaphor possible. Danesi (2004: 5) had made a rather 
illuminating remark on Vico’s poetic logic and its relation with metaphor: 
The faculty of the mind that guides our attempts to make sense of things was called 
poetic logic by the Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico in his landmark 
treatise of 1725, The New Science (Bergin and Fisch 1984). Vico described poetic 
logic as a universal form of imaginative thinking that allows us to understand the 
world on our own terms. He maintained, however, that it is not possible to study 
poetic logic directly, since the mind cannot study itself! Nevertheless, he suggested 
that we could certainly gain a good understanding of what it reveals about human 
thinking by studying one of its most imaginative products – metaphor. 
Microscopically, metaphor in Vico is structured in his “threefold form of memory, 
the harmonious working of memoria, fantasia, and ingegno” (Verene 1981: 174), in 
which metaphor is conceived as “imaginative universal” (Verene 1981: 173). Of the triad 
correlates, memoria refers to memory, fantasia includes “both the notions of 
‘imagination’ and ‘fantasy’” (Danesi 1995: 63), and ingegno refers to “ingenuity or 
invention” (Danesi 1995: 63). Vico (1948) further depicted the three different aspects of 
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memory in this way: “memory when it remembers things, imagination when it alters or 
imitates them and invention when it gives them a new turn or puts them into proper 
arrangement and relationship”. For these reasons the theological poets called Memory 
“the mother of the Muses”. In Vico’s framework, fantasia is the faculty – unique to the 
human species – that has made possible the mind’s ability to reflect on, and create, stimuli 
and forms not present in the immediate environment” (Danesi 1995: 63). Indeed, human 
beings are endowed with an ability of creating an imaginative space and telling a story 
about that created world, which, like a magnet, attracts people who believe it. Together, 
we make contracts with each other on a number of imagined concepts (like the belief of 
Utopia or communist society), legitimate them, and follow them. Such imagined 
concepts unify us together to make great achievements, hence the demonstration of 
imaginative power. Through this theory of imagination, Vico (1948) depicted how 
metaphor actually works in our mind. The following statement by Vico (1948: 66-67) 
further shows the necessity and importance of an imaginative universe for human 
cognition: 
These three axioms [XLVH-XLIX] give us the origin of the poetic characters that 
constitute the essence of the fables. The first of the three shows the natural 
inclination of the vulgar to invent them, and to invent them appropriately. The 
second shows that the first men, the children as it were of the human race, not being 
able to form intelligible class-concepts of things, had a natural need to create poetic 
characters, that is, imaginative class-concepts or universals, by reducing to them as 
to certain models or ideal portraits all the particular species which resembled them. 
Because of the resemblance, the ancient fables could not but be created appropriately. 
According to Verene (1981), the term ingegno in Vico refers to “the power to extend 
what is made to appear from sensation beyond the unit of its appearance and to have it 
enter into connection with all else that is made by the mind from sensation” (Verene 
1981: 167). The three features of memory “operate simultaneously, as human beings 
constantly attempt to make sense of the world and to code it in some durable cognitive 
fashion” (Danesi 1995: 63). In Vico’s framework, the concept fantasia cannot be 
separated from the other two features. 
The genius or ingegno required for finding what is common between things is 
possible only because of the primordial power of transference between particular 
and universal which is accomplished within fantasia, within the unit of the 
universale fantastico. Metaphor can be understood as likeness or similarity only if 
we ignore its role in relation to the is. To regard the constructive power of metaphor 
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as based on its analogical capacity is also to presuppose its primordial power to 
construct the is. (Verene 1981: 174) 
Besides, Vico and his followers (Verene 1981) also found inadequacy in the 
notion of likeness or similarity in the comparison theory of metaphor developed since 
Aristotle, and he based his conception of metaphor on identity: 
In a metaphor not deliberately formed as a logical proportionality, the two objects 
involved are no more like each other than is the subject like the predicate in the 
logical judgement. When we view a living metaphor as an object of analytic 
examination or employ is as a theoretical tool, it can be turned into an analogy, but 
the notion of analogy or similarity does not describe the nature of its being. (Verene 
1981: 174-175) 
In other words, Vico considers the meaning transference in metaphor as linked more to 
identity than to similarity. According to Verene (1981), Vico’s notion of metaphor has 
reversed the traditional understating of metaphor founded by Aristotle: “Vico’s 
conception of metaphor as based on identity and not on likeness between things reverses 
the understanding of metaphor which has developed since Aristotle. Metaphor conceived 
as the imaginative universal is also the touchstone between topics and tropes.” (Verene 
1981: 175) Although Vico’s conception of metaphor, with the notion of poetic logic in 
particular, is “singular in the histories of philosophy and psychology” (Danesi 2004: 26), 
it was antipathetic with the mainstream philosophy in both seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. In Vico’s time, computationism began to take hold of the philosophy (Danesi 
2004), which was incompatible with Vico’s idea of a “new science”. Although Vico’s 
theory of metaphor did not draw much attention of his contemporaries, it has been 
gaining more weight in the massive discussion on language and cognition since the 1980s 
(Verene 1981; Danesi 1995; Danesi 2004). The following quoted remark will therefore 
be agreed by many: “It is only in modern times, beginning with the etymological, 
rhetorical, historical analyses of Giambattista Vico, that many scholars have come to 
share the view that metaphor characterizes human thought and language in a truly 
fundamental way.” (Leary 1990: 3) Many cognitivists (Verene 1981) began to rethink 
the role of metaphor and they find in Vico great inspiration. We may further borrow 
Danesi’s (1995) comment on the situation of Vico’s academic enterprise today, “Vico’s 
plan for studying how human beings sense, think, learn, and know, remains virtually 
unknown to this day among ‘scientists of the mind’.” (Danesi 1995: 1) It is in this sense 
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that we may say today’s research on metaphor “has yet to catch up to Vico, since it still 
lacks the notion of poetic logic to guide its mode of inquiry” (Danesi 2004: 5). 
It was indeed a pity that Vico obtained little support from either his 
contemporaries or his immediate successors, but his illuminating notion of poetic logic 
and his theory of memory and imagination have laid a good foundation for us to get rid 
of the stereotyped framework for metaphor study. Vico studied the operation of human 
imagination and poetic logic, also the focal point of his new science, through 
investigating the semiotic artifacts to which the “primordial imagination” (Danesi 1995: 
16) give birth. As contended by Nöth (1990), the theme of metaphor “lies at the root of 
semiotics, both historically and analytically”. Semiotic subjects like arbitrariness, 
motivation, and iconicity are all very important topics in contemporary theories of 
metaphor. When Vico put forward a subversive idea on metaphor in the age of 
Enlightenment, he also made, in the meantime, a fresh exposition on the fundamental 
aspect of semiotics. Thus, Vico’s New Science may be credited as a source of origin for 
both semiotics and modern theories of metaphor, and its author the forefather of the 
aforementioned two fields. 
As mentioned earlier, the so-called “paradigm shift” in metaphor study from the 
late 1970s, with the burgeoning of the cognitive theory of metaphor in particular, failed 
in facilitating a sound epistemology of metaphor. It behooves us to retrace the path of the 
cognitive theory of metaphor back to its starting point so as to examine once again the 
directions once suggested at the chief crossroads. In other words, I try to mark the places 
where Lakoff/Johnson stood before the alternative paths they did not choose.  
The period from the late 1970s, probably 1977 (Pollio et al. 1977), to 2003, was 
indeed a golden age for metaphor study. I argue that the era ended in the year 2003, which 
marks the publication of the second edition of Metaphors We Live by, typically because, 
philosophically speaking, from this year on Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of 
metaphor cease to develop and, at the same time, metaphor study afterwards becomes 
rather diversified. I call this period “the cognitive era of metaphor” because the 
movement was initiated by numerous researches in cognitive psychology and cognitive 
science. Indeed, experiments conducted by cognitive psychologists in late 1970s were 
really helpful in demonstrating the pervasiveness of metaphor in human speech and 
thought (Pollio et al. 1977; Pollio and Burns 1977; Pollio and Smith 1979; Connor and 
Kogan 1980; Noppen and Hols 1990). After that, many more psychologists and linguists 
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began to relate metaphor with mind and cognition. Some even equate metaphor study 
with cognitive science, or deem the former as a sub-discipline of the latter. What these 
people forgot is that metaphor is not identical with cognition but rather an indispensable 
mechanism for realizing it. This is to say, solving problems in cognition does not mean 
a better understanding of metaphor. For most of the time since 1980s, metaphor is also 
used as a tool for solving problems in other fields, like psychology and neuro-science, 
while its own ontological and epistemological problems are left unsolved. In other words, 
the so-called paradigm shift in the late 1970s is, actually, an unfinished project in terms 
of building a sound epistemology of metaphor, and we still need another paradigm shift 
in order to achieve this goal.  
Moreover, although metaphor was a very popular target of study in 1980s, most 
of the scholars at that time did not realize that the cognitive psychological study of 
metaphor could be based on a much more profound phenomenological study of the sign. 
Lakoff/Johnson (1999) realized the need in philosophical establishment and co-authored 
a book entitled Philosophy in the Flesh, but their effort did not seem to make any 
difference. All they do in that book is to try to back up their former ideas on metaphor, 
i.e., experientialism and metaphorical essentialism in terms of conceptual metaphors. In 
their most famous and at the same time misleading book, Metaphors We Live by, they 
claim that conceptual metaphors are fundamental concepts we “live by”. However, after 
careful scrutiny, we come to the conclusion that conceptual metaphors are only 
meaningless meta-linguistic constructs, and Lakoff/Johnson’s interpretation of them 
reflects only one angle, among many others, that people take to conceptualize the outside 
world. In 1999, they put forward another new term to attract readers’ eyes: the embodied 
philosophy. However, I cannot find any difference between experientialism and the 
embodied philosophy. Strangely, Lakoff/Johnson also see no difference in the two terms, 
because they did not bother to replace the term experientialism with the new term 
“embodied philosophy”. Now that the cognitive aspect of metaphor has been explored 
extensively from nearly every possible way, the fundamental problem is still hanging 
there: what is metaphor and how did it originate, and why? The cognitive theory 
acknowledged the fundamental role of metaphor in human thinking, but did not explain 
why it is so fundamental. Lakoff/Johnson believe that conceptual metaphors are 
fundamental concepts in our mind and we thus cannot live without these concepts in 
mind. Such a theoretical position has recently been challenged by many scholars.  
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As I have only made a broad sketch of the cognitive theory of metaphor in the 
first chapter, the present section will focus on the three most glaring deficiencies in the 
theory: the theory of meaning it holds, the maximalist view it takes, and the conceptual 
metaphor as its staring point. To begin with, the theory of meaning Lakoff/Johnson held 
is as problematic as the objectivist view of meaning they have fiercely criticized. The 
German Scholar Rudi Keller (1999: 178) made a rather reasonable critique on this respect, 
which deserves a thorough look: 
(i) Cognitive semantics’ theory of meaning is insufficient. In communicating, the 
speaker uses linguistic expressions, among other things, to give the addressee to 
understand what he means and thinks. If the meaning of linguistic signs are 
something that is supposed to help the addressee ascertain what is going on in the 
speaker’s head, then meaning itself cannot be in the speaker’s head too. If a street 
sign is to be of any use, it must precede the destination to which it points. 
(ii) Cognitive semantics’ concept of the concept ‘concept’ is either unclear or simply 
trivial. Certainly it is plausible to assume that the expression bird corresponds to the 
concept ‘bird’. However, it is implausible to assume that there is a concept ‘bye bye 
which corresponds to the expression bye-bye – other than in the trivial sense that 
there must be something going through the speaker’s mind when he says bye-bye, 
and that this something is concept. 
(iii) The argumentative structure of cognitive semantics is circular. Cognitive 
structures are deduced from linguistic analyses and then used as explanations for the 
same linguistic analyses from which they have been deduced. 
(iv) Cognitive semantics cannot explain the generation and change of meaning. 
According to its theories, change in meaning would be the replacement of one 
concept by another. Why should a language community do such a thing, and who 
monitors the process? 
All the above four tenets are rather illuminating for today’s theorists of metaphor study, 
especially for Lakoff/Johnson and their followers. Keller (1999) then proposed in his 
paper a list of ideas for improvement, which were neglected by Lakoff/Johnson.  
Furthermore, the cognitive theory of metaphor received very serious criticism 
from cognitive psychologists like Glucksberg and McGlone (1999), who defined it as a 
maximalist view of metaphor as opposed their minimalist view. In their paper entitled 
“When love is not a journey: What metaphors mean”, Glucksberg and McGlone (1999: 
1544-1545) cast serious doubts on Lakoff/Johnson’s idea on conceptual mappings: 
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According to this minimalist view, a metaphor vehicle may have different 
interpretations depending on the metaphor topic and on other contextual constraints. 
For example, the metaphor A lifetime is a day can be interpreted in at least two ways, 
depending upon the kind of thing that the vehicle a day is taken to symbolize. A day 
can symbolize a rather short time span, and so the lifetime-day metaphor can be 
taken to mean that life is short. Alternatively, the vehicle a day can symbolize stages 
of existence, such that birth is morning, adulthood is high noon, old age is late 
afternoon, and death, night. This latter interpretation illustrates an alternative to our 
minimalist view, the maximally rich view proposed by Lakoff and his colleagues 
(e.g., Lakoff/Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Turner, 1989). According to 
this view, metaphors are understood via systematic mappings between topic and 
vehicle concept domains. These mappings are presumed to be part of the human 
conceptual system. Whenever a metaphor is used, people automatically access the 
relevant conceptual mappings in order to arrive at the correct interpretation. 
As argued above, the minimalist view seems to be a much more reasonable cognitive 
interpretation of metaphor than the cognitive theory. Moreover, Glucksberg and 
McGlone (1999: 1544-1545) further pinpointed the difference between their attributive 
categorization view and Lakoff/Johnson’s conceptual mapping view: 
How do the minimalist and maximalist views differ? First, our minimalist view does 
not assume that rich conceptual mappings between specific source and target 
domains are explicitly represented as part of our conceptual structure. Lakoff’s 
maximalist view posits the existence of thousands of such mappings. Second, the 
minimalist view assumes that people actively construct interpretations of utterances 
in discourse, while the maximalist view assumes that most interpretations are 
retrieved from semantic memory. Third, the knowledge sources for the two views 
differ substantially. In the minimalist view, conventional attributive categories, e.g., 
butchers, may be retrieved from semantic memory, but different metaphor topics 
produce different and often novel instantiations of these categories. Furthermore, for 
novel metaphor vehicles people can construct novel attributive categories (cf. 
Barsalou, 1983, on construction of novel functional categories). For example, during 
the 1992 election campaign in the United States, George Bush could assert (with 
utter confidence that he would be understood) that an opposing candidate was doing 
a Clinton. From Lakoff’s point of view, such expressions could only be understood 
if there were a relevant and accessible conceptual metaphor in semantic memory. 
Glucksberg and McGlone’s study did not stop at mere theoretical criticism, it was also 
based on relevant experiments they have conducted. In order to test Lakoff/Johnson’s 
hypothesis on the abstract correspondences between the source domain and the target 
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domain in LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, Glucksberg and McGlone (1999: 1546) 
designed an experiment to collect interpretations of the three love-journey related 
metaphors, during which 12 undergraduates were asked to interpret and paraphrase each 
of the metaphors. The metaphorical expressions tested are: Our love is a bumpy 
rollercoaster ride; Our love is a journey to the bottom of the sea; and Our love has 
become a filing cabinet. The interpretations that they obtained for each of the 
metaphorical expressions are shown in the following Table: 
Table 1 Three love metaphors and their interpretations: 
A. Our love is a bumpy rollercoaster ride.  
1. We have our good days and bad days.  
2. Although we might have highs and lows in the relationship, we’re having fun 
while it lasts.  
3. Our love varies a great deal, from extremes of joy and happiness to extremes of 
pain and sad- ness.  
4. We have some really troublesome times, but they are countered by some terrific 
times.  
5. We have good times and bad times together.  
6. We are in a mood elevator that won’t let us out on any floor.  
7. Our love is full of ups and downs.  
8. Our love is exciting, and not very stable.  
9. Our love is full of fights and bad times, but accompanied with frequent high, 
exhilarating times.  
10. There are good times and times [sic] in our relationship.  
11. Our love has its ups and downs but is always exciting.  
12. Our love determines whether life at the moment is up or down.  
B. Our love is a voyage to the bottom of the sea.  
1. Our relationship is not going to work – it’s going to kill us both.  
2. Our love presents new and exciting opportunities for us to discover ourselves and 
each other.  
3. Our love is constantly revealing the hidden delights of an uncharted, unpredictable 
world.  
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4. Through our love, our deepest emotional natures have been revealed and 
understood.  
5. Our love is mysterious and dangerous.  
6. We're drowning in each other’s problems.  
7. We share experiences together that we have never had before.  
8. Our love is exciting and dangerous.  
9. Our love is a series of discoveries of the unknown.  
10. Our love is dangerous and disastrous for us both.  
11. We don’t know where our love is headed.  
12. We don’t talk enough. We are always silent when we’re together.  
C. Our love is a filing cabinet.  
1. Our love is too organized and staid; we have no spontaneity or originality.  
2. Our love is open for everyone to see - there are no secrets between us.  
3. Our love is orderly and able to be taken out or put away as desired.  
4. Our love holds many memories.  
5. Our love contains a lot of emotions.  
6. We make love like accountants; we’re just going through the motions.  
7. We save all of our experiences together in our memory.  
8. Our love is very organized and proper.  
9. Our love is very straightforward and organized - we plan how much time to spend 
together, what to do, etc.  
10. Our actions are perfunctory.  
11. Our love contains everything that is important in our lives.  
12. Our love is bland and business-like. (Glucksberg and McGlone 1999: 1547) 
Evidently, the “journey-specific references are not explicitly present in the 
interpretations, nor is such material even implied” (Glucksberg and McGlone 1999: 
1547). This finding proves that, at least for this specific metaphor, the abstract 
correspondence between two domains are unnecessary, and “the journey-mappings are 
not required for interpretation” (Glucksberg and McGlone 1999: 1547). According to 
Lakoff/Johnson, the cross-domain mapping is indispensable because it not only depicts 
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the process of metaphorization but also creates similarities. The following remark by 
them can showcase their idea on cross-domain mapping concerning the conceptual 
metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY: 
There are at least four arguments against the hypothesis that metaphor expresses 
literal similarity instead of being a cross-domain mapping. The first is the simplest. 
In many cases, there is just no preexisting similarity there. For example, there is no 
preexisting similarity between the inherent (skeletal) concept of love and the concept 
of a journey. However, the conventional Love Is A Journey metaphor creates a 
fleshed out Love Is A Journey concept, which of course has similarities to journeys-
exactly the similarities expressed in the mapping, since the mapping creates the 
similarities. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 126) 
In fact, similarities do exist between love and journey. For example, they both last for a 
certain period of time. A word is an encyclopedia that contains so many semantic markers 
that it can be related to almost anything, which also serves as the unlimited source for 
metaphorical association. Therefore, metaphor users do not need a mediated cognitive 
mechanism like cross-domain mapping. As shown above, the empirical study by 
Glucksberg and McGlone (1999) also demonstrated the meaninglessness and uselessness 
of the cross-domain mapping theory in the cognitive theory of metaphor, showing that 
the so-called cognitive mechanism behind metaphor is only Lakoff/Johnson’s untenable 
assumption. Again, such empirical results were overlooked by Lakoff/Johnson, and their 
followers continue to elaborate the “working” of such an unreal “mechanism”.  
Last but not least, the existence of vehicular diversity and multivalency in 
metaphor “raises serious doubts about ‘conceptual metaphor’ as a plausible or efficient 
metalinguistic tool for studying metaphor” (Ding 2010: 95). Ding made the following 
remark on conceptual metaphor after refuting the “ARGUMENT IS WAR” metaphor: 
The conclusion to be drawn here is that all the lexical items cited by Lakoff/Johnson 
as instances of the conceptual metaphor “ARUGUMENT IS WAR” can actually be 
ascribed to many alternative conceptual metaphors. Given that the most words and 
expressions in a language can be analyzed into innumerous semantic markers, the 
number of potential metaphorical concepts that can be posited on the basis of 
similarity is almost unlimited. This makes our effort of trying to understand the 
metaphorical meaning of words and expressions through conceptual metaphors 
cognitively unrealistic and implausible. (Ding 2010: 100) 
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Ding further argued that “conceptual metaphors are rather unnecessary to our 
interpretation of figurative language despite their huge popularity with many 
contemporary scholars” (Ding 2010: 100). As suggested by Ding (2010), Lakoff/Johnson 
need to abandon the conceptual metaphor theory so as to understand what metaphor 
really is. 
As shown above, Lakoff/Johnson seem to live in their own bubble, just as what 
Plato had accused the materialists of doing in Sophistes (quoted in Jämsä 2001: 495): 
The materialists pull everything down from the sky and out of the invisible world 
onto the earth as if they wanted to clench rocks and oak trees in their fists. They 
grasp them, and stubbornly maintain that the only objects that exists are those that 
are tangible and comprehensive. They believe that the physical existence of an 
object is existence itself, and look down smugly on other people – those who 
acknowledge another area of existence separate from the physical. But they are 
totally unwilling to listen to another point of view. 
Different from the materialists criticized by Plato, Lakoff/Johnson intend to raise every 
conceptual metaphor to the sky and believe that conceptual metaphors championed by 
them are the only fundamental concepts in our mind. In fact, those seemingly “mountains 
of evidence” claimed by Lakoff/Johnson (2003: 251) are all well-selected in favor of 
their own points of view, while “a considerable number of critical voices” (Glucksberg 
and McGlone 1999; Keller 1999; Murphy 1996; Murphy 1997; McGlone 2001; 
Leezenberg 2001; Rakova 2002; Haser 2005; Ding 2008; Ding 2010) are filtered out. 
Such selective sort of defense is, in fact, self-defeating. As concluded by McGlone (2001: 
105), Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor “has not fared well theoretically 
and empirically”. 
Although Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor is considered by many 
as “a paradigm shift in understanding language and meaning” (Hanks and Giora, 2012: 
1), their experientialism or embodied philosophy, which is still deeply rooted in the 
philosophy of the subject, did not provide a tenable answer for the enduring problem of 
metaphor left by Aristotle. In the development of their theory, Lakoff/Johnson were 
endowed with several opportunities to make a better choice for their theory of metaphor, 
and hence chances to establish a sound epistemology of metaphor fit for the 
contemporary study of language and mind. However, we have observed that every time 
when they stood at the crossroad for better alternatives, they adhered to their 
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metaphorical essentialism and experientialism, and, unfortunately, did not get out of its 
theoretical impasse.  
2.2 Metaphor in Peircean Semiotics 
In their preface to Metaphors We Live by, Lakoff/Johnson (2003 [1980]) contend that 
“most traditional philosophical views permit metaphor little, if any, role in understanding 
our world and ourselves” (Lakoff/Johnson 2003 [1980]: ix). The “most” here certainly 
should not include the theory of American philosopher and semiotician, Charles S. Peirce, 
who views iconic reasoning essential to our understanding of the world. In fact, Peirce is 
among a very few scholars of his time who believe that metaphor plays a significant role 
in human thought and cognition. He made it very clear a long time ago that our thinking 
is either indexical (metonymical) or iconic (metaphorical). Echoing Vico’s notion of 
“poetic logic” (Vico 1948; Danesi 2004; Ding 2010), this very idea long predates what 
Lakoff/Johnson have considered as their “most important claim”, i.e., “human thought 
processes are largely metaphorical” (Lakoff/Johnson 2003 [1980]: 6). Despite its 
importance, Peirce’s conception of metaphor as a theoretical tradition has been either 
neglected or misunderstood due to the lack of a thorough discussion on this topic in his 
writings. In this context, therefore, the present section aims to elaborate an epistemology 
of metaphor in the Peircean semiotic tradition that subsumes the respective theory of 
Umberto Eco and Ersu Ding. 
2.2.1 From Phaneron to Metaphor 
With the burgeoning of cognitive science and cognitive linguistics, metaphor has become 
an important object of study with the purpose of answering the question of how people 
perceive the outside world through reasoning. Looked at from the process of 
metaphorization, the study of metaphor is more a semiotic in the Piercean sense than a 
linguistic undertaking. As is observed by Anderson (1984), metaphor plays a very 
interesting role in Peirce’s semiotic framework. On the one hand, Peirce is quite aware 
of the significance of metaphor, while, on the other hand, he does not give a full account 
of it. Some scholars have serious doubts on whether there is a Peircean conception of 
metaphor due to his infrequent employment of the word “metaphor” in his writings 
(Haley 1988; Hausman 1996; Sørensen 2007). However, few of them have focused on 
the underlying logic depicted by the semiotic pioneer that makes metaphors possible. In 
fact, Peirce’s exposition on iconicity and iconic reasoning has laid a solid foundation 
upon which may be erected a fresh epistemology of metaphor fit for the contemporary 
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study of language and mind. In this sense, it is not just of historical interest (Anderson 
1984) but also of unique theoretical value to investigate Peirce’s perspective on metaphor. 
As Haley has put it, Peircean semiotics can provide a potentially efficient tool for 
metaphor study, and the following remark by Haley (1988: 6) is essentially right: 
Though Peirce apparently wrote precious little about metaphor per se, the field of 
metaphor furnishes an especially rich domain in which to prospect with Peirce’s 
tools, for perhaps no other aspect of language and of creative literature arouses such 
interest in meaning and such controversy over the prerogatives of interpretation as 
does poetic metaphor. 
Therefore, one important aim of this section is to synthesize those brief remarks on 
metaphor which appear in different parts of Peirce’s writings so that a coherent system 
may be constructed. 
Since the concept of metaphor in Peirce is rather complicated and not always 
altogether explicit, a step by step explanation seems to be not only useful but also 
necessary. Broadly speaking, metaphor in Peirce can be examined from two perspectives. 
Macroscopically, metaphor is an icon in general as opposed to index and symbol, 
whereas, microscopically, it is a subdivided hypoicon on the third level as opposed to 
image and diagram. Both perspectives indicate that metaphor in Peirce is by no means 
an isolated term; rather, it is deeply rooted in Peirce’s phenomenology and thus 
constitutes part of the whole theory of cognition and signification. For the sake of 
theoretical systematicity, our explanation shall begin with his triadic division of 
phenomena. 
Peirce coined the word phaneron to refer to “all that is present to the mind in any 
sense or in any way whatsoever, regardless of whether it be fact or figment” (CP 8.213). 
In the science of Phaneroscopy that Peirce developed, phaneron is the focal point of study: 
Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the 
collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite 
regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, 
and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having 
entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind 
are present at all times and to all minds. So far as I have developed this science of 
phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron. (CP 1.284) 
In this way, Peirce incorporates into his phenomenology “all that can be possibly 
perceived or thought” (Gorlee 1987: 45). He then examined the phaneron and sorted out 
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“its elements according to the complexity of their structure” (CP 8.213), before he 
reached the three basic categories. According to Pierce, phenomena or phaneron can be 
divided into three systematically related categories: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, 
and each of them reflects one mode of human experience (Gorlee 1987). We may find 
more information on Peirce’s initial idea on categorical analysis from the following 
remarks by Johansen (1993: 66): “The origin of Peirce’s categorical analysis was his 
study of Kant (cf. Murphey 1961: 55-97), and to a great extent his own division of the 
categories into Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness is an attempt to reduce Kant’s 
twelve categories.” According to Peirce’s definition, Firstness is “the mode of being of 
that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else” (CP 8.328). 
It is a possibility or potential, “a mere quality of feeling” (CP 5.71), an internal character 
of object in itself (CP 5.469), and hence a monadic element of the world. One example 
for the nature of Firstness is our passive consciousness of the fragrance of a flower 
without any recognition or analysis. Secondness is “the mode of being of that which is 
such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third” (CP 8.328). Contrasting 
with Firstness, Secondness is dyadic, the actual, and “the conception of being relative to, 
the conception of reaction with, something else” (CP 6.32). It characterizes individual 
things and facts, and can be exemplified by force and resistance (Johansen 1993). 
Thirdness is “the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and 
third into relation to each other” (CP 8.328). It is the idea of being a “Medium” (CP 5.66) 
between a Second and its First, i.e., a “Representation as an element of the Phenomenon” 
(CP 5.66). What makes this division so fundamental is that it serves as an elemental 
principle for developing other trichotomies in Peircean semiotics. The initial application 
of the principle appears in “On a New List of Categories” (CP 1.545-1.559; Hoopes 1991: 
23-33), where Peirce first proposes, in place of Aristotle’s ten categories and Kant’s 
twelve, a novel list of three essential elements: Quality, Relation, and Representation 
(Fisch 1978; Hoopes 1991). In later writings, he modified this triadic list into “Quality, 
Reaction, and Mediation” (CP 4.3) for the purpose of accuracy. Peirce considered his 
new list of the fundamental categories of thought as “the gift I make to the world” 
(Hoopes 1991: 23) and “my one contribution to philosophy” (CP 8.213). The list shows 
how Peirce classifies the elements of thought and consciousness according to the 
complexity of their “formal structure” (CP 8.213). To be more specific, the embodiment 
of phaneron is either a quality, or concretely a quale; a reaction, or concretely a relate; 
or a mediation, or concretely representation (Johansen 1993). As a reflection in the mind, 
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the quale becomes a feeling, the relate turns into a sense of fact, and the representation a 
conception. The following table summarized by Johansen (1993: 68) clearly 
demonstrates Peirce’s idea on the three perspectives of studying elements of human 
experience: 
 Firstness           Secondness Thirdness 
1) Qualities 
2) Subjects 
3) Mind 
Quality 
Quale 
Feeling 
(immediate 
consciousness) 
Reaction 
Relate 
Sense of fact 
Mediation 
Representation 
Conception 
(Mind strictly) 
Table 1. 
For Peirce, the embodiment of various human experience becomes human thought, and 
he believes that signs are representative vehicle of our thoughts and “all thought is in 
signs” (CP 5.253). Peirce thus explains: “Finally, no present actual thought (which is 
mere feeling) has any meaning, any intellectual value; for this lies not in what is actually 
thought, but in what this thought may be connected with in representation by subsequent 
thoughts; so that the meaning of a thought is altogether something virtual.” (CP 5.289)  
Such phenomenological categorization is closely related to his well-known 
semiotic triad: representamen, object, and interpretant. As is pointed out by Peirce, an 
embodying quality (CP 1.551), or a quale, “refers to a ground” (CP 1.557), i.e., the 
ground of a sign; an embodiment of reaction, or a relate, “refers to ground and correlate” 
(CP 1.557), the correlate being the object of a sign; an embodying mediation, or a 
representation, “refers to ground, object, and interpretant” (CP 1.557). Thus, the monadic, 
dyadic, and triadic relationship of the sign is clearly shown. The term ground here 
deserves more of our attention. This concept is defined by Peirce as “a pure abstraction, 
reference to which constitutes a quality or general attribute” (CP 1.551). Although 
“ground” is not included in the semiotic triad, it is still very helpful for us to understand 
the triadic relationship of signification. According to Peirce, a representamen stands for 
its object, not in all respects, but in reference to a ground (CP 2.228). As an abstracted 
quality connecting a representamen to its object, the ground signifies the inherent 
characters or properties of the sign. However, due to its overlapping function with 
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interpretant in terms of mediating the sign and its object, the term plays no role in Piece’s 
later writings after “On a New List of Categories”. Indeed, the concept of interpretant 
signifies both internal and imputed qualities in the sign, and thus subsumes the concept 
of ground. The initial prominence but sudden disappearance of the term “ground” in 
Peirce’s writings also demonstrates the evolution of Peirce’s general concept of the sign 
from a four-term structure (representamen, ground, object, and interpretant) to the 
semiotic triad. What should be emphasized is the distinction between two kinds of sign-
object relations made by Peirce according to different mediating qualities: 
A quality may have a special determination which prevents its being prescinded 
from reference to a correlate. Hence there are two kinds of relation. 
First. That of relates whose reference to a ground is a prescindible or internal quality. 
Second. That of relates whose reference to a ground is an unprescindible or relative 
quality. (CP 1.558) 
The criterion of classification here is whether the mediating quality can be prescinded 
from the sign and its object, i.e., whether the quality is inherent in them or not. Since the 
prescindible qualities are common inherent characters shared by the sign and its object, 
they are perceivable regardless of the sign-object relationship. The unprescindible 
qualities, on the other hand, are only perceivable if the relationship is established. 
Meanwhile, Peirce realizes that the “unprescindible or relative quality” (CP 1.558) also 
consists of two situations: the quality based on facts perceived by sign users and the 
imputed quality arbitrarily attributed by sign users. In other words, there are altogether 
three instead of two types of sign-object relations: a relation mediated by similarity, a 
relation based on contiguity, and a relation founded on conventionality (Johansen 1993). 
In light of the three relations, Peirce puts forwards his trichotomous division of signs into 
icon (likeness), index, and symbol: 
It follows that there are three kinds of representations. 
First. Those whose relation to their objects is a mere community in some quality, 
and these representations may be termed likenesses. 
Second. Those whose relation to their objects consists in a correspondence in fact, 
and these may be termed indices or signs. 
Third. Those the ground of whose relation to their objects is an imputed character, 
which are the same as general signs, and these may be termed symbols. (CP 1.558) 
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Thus, for Peirce, an iconic relationship between sign and object is founded on their 
inherent qualities, i.e., likeness or similarity; an indexical relationship between sign and 
object is mediated by their contiguity or proximity; a symbolized relationship between 
sign and object is based on convention or conventionality. In later writings, this 
trichotomous division is frequently emphasized by Peirce who also considers it as “the 
most fundamental [division of signs]” (CP 2.275). In the following frequently quoted 
remark, Peirce further defines this trichotomy: 
There are three kinds of signs which are all indispensable in all reasoning; the first 
is the diagrammatic sign or icon, which exhibits a similarity or analogy to the subject 
of discourse; the second is the index, which like a pronoun demonstrative or relative, 
forces the attention to the particular object intended without describing it; the third 
(or symbol) is the general name or description which signifies its object by means 
of an association of ideas or habitual connection between the name and the character 
signified. (CP 1.369; cf. CP 2.247–249; cf. CP 4.447–448) 
Echoing the first sign-object relation, an icon represents its object by virtue of similar 
inherent qualities they share. For Peirce, icon “is very perfect in respect to signification” 
(NE 4: 242), for it brings “its interpreter face to face with the very character of signified” 
(NE 4: 242), and therefore is “mathematical sign par excellence” (NE 4: 242). A pure 
icon in Peirce refers to one’s immediate knowledge about characters in a sensible object 
(CP 4.447). It only exists in consciousness and thus conveys “no positive or factual 
information” (CP 4.447). Even an idea, for instance, cannot be a pure icon unless it is 
construed in the sense of a possibility (CP 2.276). Put in another way, a pure icon merely 
implies “something there” in the denotatum, be it real or figmentary, and no 
communication is included. With the embodiment of a certain quality, an actual 
functioning sign is, however, never pure (Johansen 1993). In actual situations, an 
embodied sign is often a mixture of iconic, indexical (indicative), and symbolic elements 
(CP 2.302). Peirce argues this point as follows: “One sign frequently involves all three 
modes of representation; and if the iconic element is altogether predominant in a sign, it 
will answer most purposes to call it an icon” (MS 491: 3). In other words, a sign is an 
icon simply because similarity in it is more predominant than contiguity and convention; 
a sign is an index simply because contiguity in it is more predominant than similarity and 
convention; a sign is a symbol simply because convention in it is more predominant than 
similarity and contiguity. Through elucidating the respective function or value of each 
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type of signs in the trichotomy, Peirce further emphasized the interdependent relation 
between the three: 
The value of an icon consists in its exhibiting the features of a state of things 
regarded as if it were purely imaginary. The value of an index is that it assures us of 
positive fact. The value of a symbol is that it serves to make thought and conduct 
rational and enables us to predict the future. It is frequently desirable that a 
representamen should exercise one of those three functions to the exclusion of the 
other two, or two of them to the exclusion of the third; but the most perfect of signs 
are those in which the iconic, indicative, and symbolic characters are blended as 
equally as possible. (CP 4.448) 
The Peircean scholar Max Fisch (1978: 44) describes this relationship fairly clearly: 
These [Icons, indices, and symbols] are rather elements or aspects of semeioses that 
vary greatly in relative prominence or importance from semeiosis to semeiosis. We 
may therefore call a sign, for short, by the name of that element or aspect which is 
most prominent in it, or to which we direct attention, without thereby implying that 
it has no element or aspect of the other two kinds. 
This statement further indicates that an actual sign may serve as any one of the three 
types of representation in different contexts rather than being a fixed type. In other words, 
despite their differences, icons, indices, and symbols are “not three mutually exclusive 
kinds of signs” (Fisch 1978: 44); rather, they are intrinsically transformable. Therefore, 
indices can be iconified, icons can be symbolized or lexicalized, and symbols can be 
further de-symbolized or re-iconified. 
On top of this understanding, Ding (2010, 2014, 2015b, 2016) further points out 
that, among the transformable three, indexical signs seem to appear first and symbols last 
from the perspective of sign emergence and evolution, and he argues his point as follows: 
From an evolutionary point of view, the appearance of symbols is the last of the 
three categories proposed by Peirce. Human beings seem to have first semiotized 
part of their natural and social surroundings as in the case of a particular bird-call 
being interpreted as an indexical sign of that that bird’s presence. Indices can then 
be artificially produced for the purpose of communication as in the case of 
onomatopoeia, drawing or other imitative devices, giving rise to icons in their 
various forms. (Ding 2014: 126-127) 
Thus, according to the sequence of sign evolution, index should come before icon, and a 
new evolutionary order of the three techniques should be: index, icon, and symbol. This 
viewpoint has insightfully developed Peirce’s theory of representation. Clearly shown, 
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the “three different techniques of sense making” (Ding 2010: 77) play vitally different 
roles in human cognition and communication. As mentioned earlier, an index represents 
a causal or contiguous relationship between a sign and its object. In this sense, a real 
index is not intentionally produced. It is thus safe to say that any form of deliberate 
production of indices will cause an iconification or symbolization of indices. In other 
words, there are two types of intentional production of indices: iconificaiton by 
simulation and symbolization through staging (Keller 1998). It is in this way that an 
index evolves into an icon or a symbol. We thus need to hear what Ding (2016: 167-168) 
has to say on this issue: 
In terms of the evolutionary order, the use of indexes preceded other types of signs 
and played an important role in the lives of pre-literate people. It is not hard to 
imagine that our illiterate ancestors were able to predict rain if they saw a heavy 
concentration of dark cloud above their heads; nor is it ridiculous to expect them to 
be able to tell the gender of a woman who had two big breasts above her belly. In 
the former situation, the dark cloud serves as an indexical sign of rain whereas big 
breasts function as one for womanhood in the latter. The use of indexical signs is 
not, of course, the monopoly of the human race and occurs quite frequently in other 
animals, high and low. Corpse-eating vultures, for example, are able to tell whether 
a mammal is already dead by its lack of movement; wild tigers can also know the 
presence of other animals in the vicinity through their particular smells. 
Ding (2016: 168) also points out that the ubiquitous use of indexical signs by animals 
further proves that “Cassirer’s famous definition of man as an animal symbolicum 
(Cassirer 1956: 44) is not sufficiently accurate because other animals also have the ability 
to use ‘symbols,’ by which Cassirer means ‘signs.’” He then came to the conclusion that 
“indexical signs and human languages co-exist in literate human societies, ancient or 
modern” (Ding 2016: 168). Ding thus explains: 
The ubiquitous presence of indexical signs indicates that both humans and other 
animals have the intellectual ability to deduce B from A and, not surprisingly, this 
ability has been put to good use for communication purposes, giving rise to so-called 
icons or iconic signs. To be more specific, if someone wishes to mention to another 
person an object or a state of things that is not directly accessible at the time of 
speaking, he/she is then motivated to produce something similar to a part of the 
intended object or state of things either in sound, or in shape, or in color so that his/ 
her listener could make a proper deduction thereupon. What we see here is a process 
of “iconification” of index essential to the emergence and evolution of any human 
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language and knowing this process can certainly help us avoid many of the 
confusions that have occurred in sign classification. (Ding 2016: 169-170) 
The evolution of index into icon can be further exemplified in people’s iconification of 
the sun-storm relationship. People observe that the sun will finally show up after bad 
weathers like a storm, a natural phenomenon that people observe. Over time, the 
phenomenon of “storm” becomes an indexical sign for the showing up of the sun. 
Moreover, most people prefer sunshine than storm, so they use the former to refer to hope 
or good wishes while use the latter to represent hardship or setback. And the expression 
“the sun will finally appear after storm” is also used metaphorically to refer to people’s 
wish that success will finally be achieved through overcoming hardships. Keller (1999) 
held the same idea with Ding on the part of iconification of indices, and we may have a 
better understanding of the process of iconification through one of his examples on this 
respect: 
Let’s consider this everyday example: if I want to silently indicate to my companion 
during the course of a lecture that I find it deadly boring, I can do this by turning to 
her and simulating a somewhat exaggerated yawn. A slight deviation from an 
authentic yawn is necessary to make sure that it is not interpreted as a real one. the 
simulated yawn should be sufficiently salient to cause the addressee to judge it as an 
attempt at communication and search for an appropriate interpretation. … Through 
simulation, the symptom becomes an icon. It undergoes a process of iconification, 
and this for the following reasons: a real yawn can be a symptom of a storage of 
oxygen. A simulated yawn can never be a symptom of a storage of oxygen. Only 
real symptoms are symptoms. Imitated symptoms resemble symptoms and are thus 
icons of symptoms. The addressee of iconified symptoms must perform two 
successively activated interpretive techniques. Because of the yawn’s similarity to a 
real yawn, as well as its difference from a real yawn, she interprets it as an icon of a 
yawn; this, in turn, she interprets as an icon of a symptom of boredom, on the basis 
of her knowledge of the causal connection between yawning, fatigue and boredom. 
(Keller 1999: 144-145) 
Being in the middle part of sign evolution, icon serves as a mediation between 
indicative activities and symbolization. Peirce sees the first two techniques (index and 
icon) as evolving from two fundamental modes of abductive thought: indexical reasoning 
and iconic reasoning (Ding 2010). An iconic element alone is not sufficient to make up 
perception, since “an indexical element that represents the insistency of the object is 
needed” (Johansen 1993: 96). Thus, successful communications require a combination 
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of the two reasoning. To illustrate this, let us borrow an example from Rudi Keller’s A 
Theory of Linguistic Signs: 
During a walk through the forest, I want to make my companion aware of a wood 
pigeon sitting on a branch, but without scaring her away (the pigeon, that is). I could 
do this by pointing towards the pigeon and imitating its cooing sound. From my 
pointing gesture and similarity of the sound I make to that of a pigeon, my 
companion will infer: “Aha, this guy probably wants to show me a pigeon.” (Keller 
1998: 150) 
During this communicative activity, iconicity in sound by itself cannot fix the pigeon. 
The companion hears the imitating sound, recognizes the gesturing hand, and sees a 
pigeon on the branch. It is not the cooing sound alone, with its mere iconic reasoning, 
i.e., association of similarity, but the gesture taken together with the companion’s 
indexical reasoning, i.e., experiential association of contiguity, which determines for him 
or her which pigeon is meant and where it is. Even after human beings have developed 
verbal language, they continue to make use of the two modes of reasoning which give 
rise to metonymy and metaphor. In other words, iconic reasoning and indexical reasoning 
are the underlying rules of metaphor and metonymy respectively. For Peirce, metaphor 
can be defined as the result of making links between things or states of affairs on the 
basis of similarity. As an indexical sign that bases its representation on proximity or 
causal relations, metonymy is often compared with metaphor by many linguists. 
Metaphor works by comparing two different entities, while metonymy works by using 
one element from a given topic to refer to another closely related element. Thus, a 
metaphor creates new links between otherwise distinct entities, whereas a metonymy 
only re-presents the existing links within them. In real language situations, the formation 
of metaphor is usually a combination of the two types of reasoning, as can be illustrated 
in the following anecdote in Chinese history. When the Ming Dynasty was first 
established in the mid-14th century, the government issued very rigid policies to govern 
its people. One of the most meritorious statesmen Liu Bowen did not agree with such 
means of governance and wanted to advise the Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang to be more 
tolerant to his people. He used the following expression in his letter to Emperor Zhu: “霜
雪之后，必有阳春, 今国威已立，宜少济以宽大。” /shuang xue zhi hou, bi you yang 
chun, jin guo wei yi li, yi shao ji yi kuan da/ (Zhang and Yu 2004: 2643) ‘After frost and 
snow, there shall be a warm spring. Now that the authority of our dynasty has been 
established nationwide, we should be a bit more tolerant in governance.’ (my translation) 
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There are two types of reasoning in this metaphorical expression. On the literal level, the 
expression contains indexical reasoning: warm spring always comes after cold winter 
(frost and snow). On the metaphorical level, frost and snow in winter refer to severe 
governance, while warm spring refers to tolerant governance. The indexical reasoning 
precedes the metaphorical reasoning, and the latter is based on the former: Spring always 
comes after winter, and, similarly, a tolerant governance should come after a severe one. 
Liu used this metaphorical technique to convey his idea to the Emperor because Emperor 
Zhu was a very brutal ruler and it would be quite risky for Liu to say something upfront. 
Since the metaphorical meaning is induced by a natural phenomenon which is also 
common sense to everybody, it is more likely that the Emperor will follow this advice. 
Another important relationship that is very useful for metaphor study is that of 
icon and symbol. For Peirce, a symbol is “determined by its object in that the thought 
which is determined by the symbol represents the symbol to be determined by its object” 
(MS 612: 47). Unlike index and icon, symbol is a result of rule application. We may have 
a better understanding of the Peircean symbol from the following definition given by 
Ding (2014: 126): 
By “symbol” Peirce means that group of signs whose interpretation does not rely on 
proximity or causality between things and events; nor does our interpretation depend 
on the various degrees of similarity that can be perceived between semiotic forms 
and their referents; instead, the association we make between a sign and its meaning 
is totally based on the social convention in which we operate. 
This definition precisely elucidates the conventional nature of Peircean symbols whose 
reference to their objects is mediated by abstract thought that intersubjectively exists in 
the mind of members within a given speech community. Relative to index and icon, 
symbol, as is argued by Ding (2010, 2014, 2015b, 2016), is the last to appear. Implication 
of this idea can also be found in Peirce who contends that symbol develops out of other 
two type of signs, “particularly from icons” (CP 2.302). Elsewhere he also adds that 
symbol “always involves an index” (NE 4: 256) and originates from a certain form of 
iconic signs (CP 2.222). In addition to this, Ding (2014: 127) further argues that 
symbolization occurs when an iconic sign (metaphor) is overused: 
However, repeated usage of iconic signs (aided by the gradual changes in the 
orthographic system as a whole) would eventually lead to the redundancy of those 
similarity-based “prompts” because the automatic association between the semiotic 
form and its corresponding meaning has become a rule of the entire sign community. 
92 
 
During the process of sign evolution, many once active metaphorical expressions are 
lexicalized through repeated usage and become symbols. This means that metaphor also 
evolves in language. The creation of a metaphor can be very easy and sometimes 
haphazard, but once it goes into the language it enters into the process of sign evolution. 
Many novel metaphors, especially the less used ones, will be forgotten, and those most 
frequently used are more likely to be lexicalized or symbolized. The process of 
symbolization or lexicalization will deprive most of the association between the former 
tenor and vehicle, which means that, when using symbolized metaphors, there will be no 
iconic association or imagination in the users’ mind. According to Ding (2014, 2016), 
Peirce’s concepts of “index”, “icon”, and “symbol” could be endowed with much greater 
explanatory power, if they are situated in the process of sign evolution where indexical 
and iconic signs eventually lose their original interpretive grounds and the association 
between the signifier and the signified of a sign becomes a matter of habit or convention. 
Thus, we can say that although Peirce himself does not deal with sign transformation in 
his writings, his trichotomous division of signs has enabled later generations of 
semioticans such as Umberto Eco and Ersu Ding to explore a possible theory of metaphor 
along the lines of indexical and iconic reasoning. 
Such a theoretical position of sign evolution held by Peircean semiotic theorists 
forcefully challenges Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor which does not 
make any distinction between icons (metaphors) and symbols (lexical items), and 
presupposes a well-structured Gestalt that determines the formation of metaphors. In 
their cognitive theory, Lakoff/Johnson adopt a large number of dead metaphors to prove 
the existence of some abstract conceptual metaphors. In fact, Lakoff/Johnson are aware 
of this problem in their theory. In the features they enumerated for “traditional views of 
metaphor” or the so-called “objectivist account of meaning”, they incorporate the issue 
of symbolization into the list: “Tenet 4: Conventional metaphorical expressions in 
ordinary everyday language are ‘dead metaphors,’ that is, expressions that once were 
metaphorical, but have become frozen into literal expressions.” (Lakoff/Johnson, 1999: 
124) However, there is nothing wrong with this so-called objectivist view of dead 
metaphor, on the contrary, it has a very good point on the issue of symbolization of 
metaphors. According to Peirce’s principle for sign classification, those signs that require 
iconic reasoning are metaphors, while those that do not have been lexicalized, hence dead. 
In other words, through symbolization or lexicalization, the once metaphorical meaning 
become a part of the denotation or Eco’s dictionary meaning of the expression. Clearly, 
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Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]: 211) do not take the phenomenon of sign evolution into 
account, which posed the most important deficiency in the cognitive theory of metaphor. 
Words and expressions that we have taken as instances of metaphorical concepts 
(e.g., digest in ‘I can’t digest all those facts’) would be taken by objectivists as not 
being instances of live metaphor at all. For them the word digest would have two 
different and distinct literal (objective) meanings—digest1 for food and digest2 for 
ideas. On this account, there would be two words digest which are homonyms, like 
the two words bank (bank of a river and bank where you put your money). 
Digest 1 and digest 2 are not two words, but two senses of the same word which point to 
its polysemous nature. Both digest 1 and digest 2 have become the dictionary senses of 
the word digest, as we can see from the four entries of the word “digest” in the Collins 
English Dictionary: 
digest 
1.  V-T/V-I When food digests or when you digest it, it passes through your body to 
your stomach. Your stomach removes the substances that your body needs and gets 
rid of the rest.  
2.  V-T If you digest information, you think about it carefully so that you understand 
it.  
3.  V-T If you digest some unpleasant news, you think about it until you are able to 
accept it and know how to deal with it. 
4.  N-COUNT A digest is a collection of pieces of writing. They are published 
together in a shorter form than they were originally published. 
(http://dict.youdao.om/w/eng/digest/#keyfrom=dict2.index) 
As shown in the dictionary entry, the word “digest” has at least four basic meanings. You 
can digest food, you can digest information or idea, and you can even digest, which 
means “bear”, unpleasant news. As they have all become dictionary meanings, none of 
them should be considered as live metaphor anymore, and, when people use them, there 
will be no iconic reasoning or metaphorical association in their mind. Hence, there is no 
need for any interpretation based on the hypothesized mechanism of cross-domain 
mapping in the cognitive theory of metaphor, as can be fairly explained in the following 
remark: 
An objectivist might grant that digest an idea was once a metaphor, but he would 
claim that it is no longer metaphorical. For him it is a “dead metaphor,” one that has 
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become conventionalized and has its own literal meaning. This is to say that there 
are two homonymous words digest. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 211-212)  
Here, Lakoff/Johnson have made a category mistake: they label anyone who believes in 
the process of symbolization as objectivist. As a non-objectivist, however, Peirce would 
certainly agree with this “objectivist” view. Symbolization occurs when a metaphor is 
overused. Again, digest 1 and digest 2 should not be considered as two separate words, 
but two senses of the same word “digest”. Interestingly, the “objectivist” views on the 
issue of dead metaphor are all very tenable: 
The objectivist would probably grant that digest1 and digest2 have similar meanings 
and that the similarity is the basis for the original metaphor. This, he would say, 
explains why the same word is used to express two different meanings; it was once 
a metaphor, it became a conventionalized part of the language; it died and became 
frozen, taking its old metaphorical meaning as a new literal meaning. 
(Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 212)  
Again, there is nothing wrong with this explanation; rather it represents a sound 
understanding of dead metaphor and a tenable interpretation of sign evolution. Similarity 
is, of course, the very basis of metaphor, but, through the process of symbolization, 
people do not need to recall the similarities between the related topics. This shows that 
metaphorical meaning and literal meaning are transformable through the mechanism of 
symbolization and re-iconification. It is rather strange that Lakoff/Johnson cannot 
understand this point. In fact, the following statement by Lakoff/Johnson clearly 
demonstrates how a metaphorical meaning of the word “pedigree” was lexicalized in 
English language. Their explanation by tracing the metaphorical meaning of the word 
“pedigree” becomes a very good example of re-iconification of dead metaphors: 
A dead metaphor is a linguistic expression that came into the language long ago as 
a product of a live conceptual metaphor. The conceptual mapping has long since 
ceased to exist, and the expression now has only its original target domain meaning. 
A good example is the word pedigree, which came from the French ped de gris, 
which means ‘foot of a grouse.’ It was based on an image metaphor in which the 
image of a grouse’s foot was mapped onto a family-tree diagram, which had the 
same general shape. The family-tree diagram was thereafter called a ped de gris - ‘a 
grouse’s foot’-which came to be spelled ‘pedigree.’ Nowadays, the image mapping 
from a grouse’s foot to a family tree diagram has ceased to exist as a living part of 
our conceptual system. Moreover, English speakers no longer call a grouse’s foot a 
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ped de gris. Both the conceptual and linguistic aspects of the mapping are dead. 
(Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 124) 
Without a proper perspective of sign evolution, Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 125) also believe 
that dead metaphor only refers to a small number of expressions: 
The point is that the term dead metaphor applies to only a very narrow range of 
cases, like pedigree. Indeed, it takes some effort to come up with such cases. Cases 
like pedigree work differently from cases like comprehend, in which the conceptual 
metaphorical mapping is still alive, but the term has ceased to be a linguistic 
expression of that mapping. Pedigree is also quite different from conventional 
metaphorical expressions like not going anywhere, which instantiate the live Love 
Is A Journey mapping. 
Again, the examples are irrelevant. It is not true that dead metaphor only has a very 
narrow range. In fact, most of the expressions given by Lakoff/Johnson for justifying a 
conceptual metaphor are, judging from the Peircean criterion, dead metaphors. It takes 
much effort to come up with such generalized conceptual metaphors, but effort is not the 
key point here. Coincidentally, Glucksberg and McGlone (1999) have proved through 
experiment that the “Love Is A Journey” interpretation is unnecessary for metaphor users 
and the relevant mapping also does not exist. Another false idea by Lakoff/Johnson is 
that they believe dead metaphors are isolated and unsystematic while live metaphors 
naturally form a coherent system, as demonstrated in their analysis of the dead metaphor 
“the foot of the mountain”: 
Examples like the foot of the mountain are idiosyncratic, unsystematic, and isolated. 
They do not interact with other metaphors, play no particularly interesting role in 
our conceptual system, and hence are not metaphors that we live by. The only signs 
of life they have is that they can be extended in subcultures and that their unused 
portions serve as the basis for (relatively uninteresting) novel metaphors. If any 
metaphorical expressions deserve to be called “dead,” it is these, though they do 
have a bare spark of life, in that they are understood partly in terms of marginal 
metaphorical concepts like A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON. (Lakoff/Johnson 
2003[1980]: 55) 
Our systemic critique in the last chapter has refuted any coherent system or systematicity 
for metaphor, be it dead or live. Instead, most metaphors have the aforementioned 
features (arbitrary and unsystematic) and our everyday life is closely connected with all 
of them as a whole.  
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The problem of dead metaphor can obviously receive a better solution in Peirce’s 
typology of the sign through the view of sign evolution. In Peircean semiotics, those dead 
metaphors such as “Your claims are indefensible” and “He attacked every weak point in 
my argument” (Lakoff/Johnson 2003 [1980]: 4) are in fact normal expressions that no 
longer require iconic reasoning. Therefore, when Lakoff/Johnson think they are 
discussing metaphors, they are actually talking about the Peircean symbols most of the 
time. What they have done is, at best, re-iconifying those lexical items to prove the 
existence of meta-linguistic constructs that they call conceptual metaphors such as 
“ARGUMENT IS WAR” (Lakoff/Johnson 2003 [1980]: 4). Signs seem to never evolve 
in their theory. Unlike Lakoff/Johnson, Peirce defined metaphor not as a proposition or 
a preexisting construct, but as an original iconic sign that represents a fresh sign relation 
and, hence, innovative thought. Compared with the essentialist view of the cognitive 
theory, this interpretive method on metaphor is much more convincing. 
From the categorization of phaneron to the division of signs, Peirce demonstrates 
how human minds perceive, distinguish, and construe their experience to form an idea of 
the world they live in. The process reveals that all the three elements of human thought 
and experience should be embodied in and also mediated through a certain form of sign. 
In other words, each episode of human thought and experience, no matter how simple it 
might be, has to be understood in terms of another thing, i.e., the sign representing it. 
This clearly reflects the semiotic nature of human thought: always understanding one 
thing in terms of another. 
2.2.2 Three Modes of Iconicity 
If we admit the sign-mediated nature of human thought, then we may have special 
interests in seeking more detailed features of metaphor in Peirce through his subdivision 
of iconic signs. As is mentioned above, a pure icon is only a possibility and does not exist 
in the actual process of signification. Peirce terms the “substantive” (CP 2.276) iconic 
representamen “hypoicon” (CP 2.276), and he first provides his definition of metaphor 
through a further division of hypoicons into image, diagram, and metaphor. 
Hypoicons may be roughly divided according to the mode of Firstness of which they 
partake. Those which partake of simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; 
those which represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of 
one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those which 
represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a 
parallelism in something else, are metaphors. (CP 2.277) 
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Despite its obscurity, this is the only time when Peirce ever defines metaphor. Again, the 
definition is given in a Peircean way by providing two other contrasting terms within one 
tripartition. Image is argued by Peirce as the first Firstness in that the quality it resembles 
is concrete and perceivable in the object. A man’s picture, for instance, depicts a certain 
aspect of him that can be easily recognized by his acquaintance. Diagram is the second 
Firstness in that two relata are identical in one respect, i.e., one structural relation. A 
geometrical diagram is a good example here which represents its object through depicting 
the formal structure in it. Metaphor is the third Firstness in that one relatum provides a 
parallel quality to that of the other. In other words, metaphor seems to contain four items: 
two relata, and the respective quality of each relatum (Anderson 1984). From image to 
diagram and then to metaphor, iconicity between a representamen and its object becomes 
more and more abstract, which accordingly involves three modes: iconicity in (simple) 
quality, iconicity in (structural) relation, and iconicity in (parallel) representation or 
parallelism. In other words, image represents iconicity in simple or concrete quality of a 
sign, diagram represents a structural relation between a sign and its object, and metaphor 
represents a parallel representation or parallelism. The three modes of iconicity can be 
easily found in all types of iconic signs, which reflect the evolution of human mind from 
perceiving simple qualities to abstract ones. Which mode becomes predominating in 
actual process of signification is very important for us to decide whether an iconic sign 
is an image, or a diagram, or a metaphor. Other theorists also realized the different 
degrees of abstraction or “increased abstraction” (Givón 1985) in the three modes, as 
argued by Givón (1985: 192) in the following remark: 
Further, part of the argument has already been presented by Haiman (to appear) in 
his suggestion that such a gradual scale indeed exists between imagic and 
diagrammatic representation: “…although Peirce did not emphasize this point, it 
should be clear that the distinction between an icon which is an image (like a 
photograph), and one which is a diagram (like a stick figure), is also mainly a matter 
of degree ….” … Extrapolating Haiman’s scale further from diagram to symbol is, 
I think, a natural extension of the process of witnessed in the first portion of this 
scale, namely the process of increased abstraction, generality simplification. Further, 
it is actually possible to argue that Peirce himself went one step toward such 
gradation by positing one more type of icon that is more abstract than the diagram: 
the metaphor. 
Although Peirce does not go much further in elucidating the relationships within 
these three types of iconic signs, the way he divides them has provided us with a fresh 
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perspective for understanding metaphor. Among the three, metaphor is often more easily 
confused with diagram than with image. According to the brief definitions Peirce gives 
on metaphor and diagram, he tends to distinguish the two in terms of the mode of 
iconicity. Diagram depicts a strict isomorphic relation with its object, while metaphor is 
regarded as a “broad” (CP 7.590) and “abstract” (CP 7.590) comparison between two 
things. For a further development in this respect, Anderson (1984) attempts to distinguish 
them through two contrasting terms: isomorphism and isosensism. The iconicity in a 
diagram is named by Anderson (1984) as isomorphism, while the one in metaphor as 
isosensism. He thus contends that whether an iconic sign depicts isomorphic structure or 
not should be considered as a demarcation between diagram and metaphor. He 
exemplifies his point by arguing that the golf ball smiles should be subsumed in the 
category of diagram rather than metaphor in that the golf ball (object) has a slash in it 
whose form resembles that of a smile (diagram). We, however, cannot accept such 
classification by Anderson because a smiling face does not depict the actual form of a 
slash in the golf ball as what a map does to its corresponding territory; rather, it represents 
it (slash in golf ball) through providing an identical parallelism (furrow in smiling face). 
That is why Peirce calls metaphor a third Firstness: metaphorical iconicity is established 
when one parallel quality in the sign represents the other in the object. It is in this sense 
that we call the golf ball smiles a metaphor rather than a diagram. 
Since all iconic signs are to a certain degree diagrammatical, the isomorphism by 
Anderson (1984) seems to be ubiquitous in all types of iconic signs. We can easily find 
an isomorphic structure between an image and its object. The lines and strokes in a 
realistic sketch precisely depict the formal structure of its object. Different from the one 
in an image, what an isomorphic form in a diagram signifies is a series of detailed 
relations, largely mathematical, inherent in its object. Compared with diagram, metaphor 
involves a higher degree of human imagination in both signifying and interpreting 
processes. A metaphor may also contain some diagrammatical elements, but the 
imaginary elements in it dominates. Therefore, the real demarcation between diagram 
and metaphor depends on whether during this period of time there are imaginary qualities 
imputed on the metaphorical tenor. Back to the example of the golf ball smiles, since a 
golf ball can never actually smile, “smiling” is an imaginary quality imputed on it. Thus 
we say the slash on a golf ball arouses the metaphor user’s imagination to connect it with 
the furrow of a smiling face. Such imputed quality often represents the creative aspect of 
metaphor. It is also in this sense that we say metaphor creates new meaning. Our 
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understanding of the term “imputed quality or property” may be enhanced by reviewing 
the following remark by Peirce: 
A reference to a ground may also be such that it cannot be prescinded from a 
reference to an interpretant. In this case it may be termed an imputed quality. If the 
reference of a relate to its ground can be prescinded from reference to an interpretant, 
its relation to its correlate is a mere concurrence or community in the possession of 
a quality, and therefore the reference to a correlate can be prescinded from reference 
to an interpretant. It follows that there are three kinds of representations. (CP 1.558) 
A very similar example can also be found in Chinese culture. As a tradition, Chinese 
housewives, especially in the northern parts of China, make steamed buns several days 
before the Spring Festival. If a bun dehisces on its surface, they will probably mock 
themselves by saying “the steamed bun is smiling”. Of course, no bun can ever smile, 
not even with dehiscence on the surface. Everyone knows that the dehiscence on the bun 
merely partially resembles rather than describes the furrows in a smiling face. In the 
example of a roadmap, on the contrary, the spatial relation of the corresponding territory 
are strictly described in the map, and there are no such imputing on the territory as that 
on the golf ball or the steamed bun. 
Peirce has not made a fuller discussion on metaphor than on diagram or analogy. 
Anderson (1984) ascribes this to Peirce’s theoretical preference for science than art, for 
“in the growth of thought analogies are effective primarily for science and metaphors 
primarily (not exclusively) for art” (Anderson 1984: 455). Due to its strict isomorphism, 
diagrams are particularly suitable for mathematical representation, and it is also in this 
sense that Peirce calls the icon “mathematical sign par excellence” (NE 4: 242). For 
Peirce, diagrammatical thinking which is stricter and does not arouse imagination is the 
basic reasoning for scientific inquiry, whereas metaphorical thinking is the underlying 
logic for art creation. 
2.3 Metaphor and the Peircean Abduction 
Keeping himself away from the psychological dimension of human communication, 
Peirce mainly focused on the logical aspects of signification and semiosis. The term 
“abduction” or “hypothesis” is developed by Peirce to refer to one of the three means of 
human reasoning as opposed to the induction and deduction. Thus, deduction, induction, 
and abduction or hypothesis constitute the most important Peircean triad in logic. 
Philosophers like Russell all attribute the discovery of abductive reasoning to Peirce: “A 
completely different outlook from positivism informs the philosophy of C. S. Peirce 
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(1893-1914). Where Comte had discarded hypotheses as metaphysical, Peirce, on the 
contrary, was intent on showing that the framing of hypotheses is a vital activity with a 
logic of its own.” (Russell 1959: 276) Let us have a quick glimpse at Russell’s comments 
on Peirce’s unique contribution to logic: 
In the discussion of the logic of hypotheses, Peirce made a fundamental contribution. 
It had been variously supposed by philosophers that hypotheses are the result either 
of deduction, as rationalists might incline to hold, or of induction, as the empiricists 
think. Peirce saw that neither of these views was adequate. Hypotheses are the 
outcome of a third and radically different logical process, which Peirce in his 
customary colorful style calls “abduction”. It amounts to tentatively adopting a 
hypothesis because it saves some particular appearance. That the appearance is 
saved is of course a matter of deduction, but not the acceptance of the hypothesis. 
(Russell 1959: 277) 
First of all, let us have a thorough look at Peirce’s exposition on the difference between 
deduction and abduction or hypothesis: 
In an argument, the premisses form a representation of the conclusion, because they 
indicate the interpretant of the argument, or representation representing it to 
represent its object. The premisses may afford a likeness, index, or symbol of the 
conclusion. In deductive argument, the conclusion is represented by the premisses 
as by a general sign under which it is contained. In hypotheses, something like the 
conclusion is proved, that is, the premisses form a likeness of the conclusion. Take, 
for example, the following argument: 
M is, for instance, PI, PII, PIII, and PIV; 
S is PI, PII, PIII, and PIV: 
.·. S is M.  
(CP 1.559) 
In deduction, premises serve as a rule or convention for the conclusion, while in 
abduction the relation between premises and conclusion is their likeness. In other words, 
in abductive arguments, the premises are not the adequate condition for the conclusion. 
Therefore, if we use the formula Peirce adopted in the above argument to describe the 
deductive process, it will be like this: 
S is M. 
M is, for instance, PI, PII, PIII, and PIV: 
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.·. S is PI, PII, PIII, and PIV 
Suppose there is an N, and N is also PI, PII, PIII, and PIV. Deductively, we cannot say 
neither N is M nor N is S, for the premise S is M is not adequate for the conclusions and 
we do not know what new premises will be. Abductively, however, it is safe for us to say 
that N is M and N is S. In other words, in abduction, “PI, PII, PIII, and PIV” represent a 
likeness of M, and thus “the premises are or represent a likeness of the conclusion” (CP 
1.559). Clearly, abductive reasoning is not governed by rule-based conventions but based 
on likeness. In this sense, abductive reasoning in Peirce can also be called association or 
associative inference. As Keller (1998: 151) puts it: “Association is a creative process 
without normativity. You cannot make a mistake while associating.” Similarly, Gellner 
(1988: 57) held that associative or abductive reasoning “is inherently free and 
undisciplined”. This is perhaps the most important distinction between abduction and 
deduction. Through deduction, we get new facts, while through abduction, we get new 
relations or connections. Then, we have a look at the distinction between induction and 
abduction: 
Induction is where we generalize from a number of cases of which something is true, 
and infer that the same thing is true of a whole class. Or, where we find a certain 
thing to be true of a certain proportion of cases and infer that it is true of the same 
proportion of the whole class. Hypothesis is where we find some very curious 
circumstance, which would be explained by the supposition that it was a case of a 
certain general rule, and thereupon adopt that supposition. Or, where we find that in 
certain respects two objects have a strong resemblance, and infer that they resemble 
one another strongly in other respects. (CP 2.624) 
In inductive reasoning, we generalize conclusion based on true rather than similar cases, 
while in abductive reasoning we base the conclusion on a similar or supposed premise. 
To echo the above two formulas, Peirce depicted the process of inductive reasoning in 
the following formula: 
SI, SII, SIII, and SIV are taken as samples of the collection M; 
SI, SII, SIII, and SIV are P: 
.·. All M is P. (CP 1.559) 
Moreover, Peirce pinpointed that the real difference between induction and abduction 
lies in that the former is designed for making classification while the latter is designed 
for making interpretation: 
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The same thing is true of the distinction between induction and hypothesis. In the 
main, it is broad and decided. By induction, we conclude that facts, similar to 
observed facts, are true in cases not examined. By hypothesis, we conclude the 
existence of a fact quite different from anything observed, from which, according to 
known laws, something observed would necessarily result. The former, is reasoning 
from particulars to the general law; the latter, from effect to cause. The former 
classifies, the latter explains. (CP 2.636) 
Therefore, for Peirce, interpretation is based on abductive reasoning. In other words, 
abductive reasoning is the most basic or primitive means by which we understand the 
outside world. In fact, human perception only reflects the partial instead of complete 
features of things, based on which we interpret and understand things. Because abductive 
reasoning is based on inadequate premises, the resemblance we get from it is only partial. 
This explains why metaphor is always based on partial similarities between two things. 
Thus, metaphorical meaning can also be seen as a “biased” or inadequate meaning. 
Metaphor or metaphorical thinking can, to some extent, be called a “biased” or 
inadequate human understanding. However, such “biased” or inadequate reasoning can 
be very creative, much more creative than the other types of “adequate” reasoning, for it 
can quickly make more connections between different things and create more 
possibilities. According to Peirce, even the process of mathematical reasoning cannot be 
isolated from metaphorical reasoning and stand totally on its own. In fact, all creations 
are based on abductive or metaphorical thinking, including scientific creations. In 
genome science, for example, in order to produce manmade creature, scientists choose a 
cell as a tenor and a gene as a vehicle. The combination of the two result in a different 
creature, and by doing this, people can control the process of creation. In the time when 
human beings cannot control the gene, creation of new species is subject to natural 
selection. The philosophy of natural science is also based on a kind of abductive linking. 
Similarity is the base of categorization. People categorize things according to different 
degrees of similarity they perceive. But, there are things they cannot directly perceive, 
for instance, genome. Genome technology tells us that similarity can not only be 
discovered, they can also be created, like cloned creatures. The ability of abductive 
reasoning enables scientists to have a synthetic view of species creation. For instance, 
the newly developed synthetic biology works on integrating different things to create not 
only new signs but also new meanings.  
103 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Peircean abduction is quite similar to Vico’s poetic 
logic, and Peirce went one step further than Vico to divide abduction into two types: 
indexical reasoning and iconic reasoning. My earlier elaboration on sign evolution has 
already shown that, as an iconic sign, the formation of metaphor actually needs a 
combination of the two types of reasoning. In other words, abductive reasoning is the 
fundamental drive for the formation of metonymy and metaphor. One crucial nature of 
Peircean abduction lies in that it is arbitrary (CP 1.646), open-ended, and thus 
unpredictable. Lakoff/Johnson, however, failed to see this crucial point. As argued in the 
last chapter, Lakoff/Johnson made a very serious logical mistake when working out their 
conceptual metaphors, i.e., they use inductive results as the starting point of their 
deduction. After the construction of their cognitive theory, they bring those inductive 
results back for evidence. In fact, they have been trapped in a weird circle of 
interpretation that finally makes the cognitive theory unattractive. Much worse than their 
aforementioned logical mistake is their ignorance of abduction. Their strong belief in 
metaphorical essentialism shows that they have no knowledge about the underlying logic 
of metaphor, let alone its real operation in our entire conceptual would. This is almost 
fatal to their theory. If they had the chance to know the essence of Peirce’s philosophy, 
they might be able to make a better choice for the construction of their theory．Indeed, 
Peirce can provide a rather sound semiotic framework for understanding and interpreting 
metaphor. The American scholar Michael Haley (1999), who specialized in Peircean 
philosophy and semiotics, also realized this by contending that Lakoff/Johnson and their 
followers must “have neglected a veritable goldmine in neglecting Peirce” (Haley 1999: 
421). In the present section, therefore, I am going to demonstrate the operation of 
abductive reasoning in metaphor through a detailed criticism of an important conceptual 
metaphor or orientational metaphor, MORE IS UP. By doing this, we can correct the 
distorted logic in Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory and show how abductive reasoning 
really works in our conceptual world. 
While putting forward the idea of metaphorical essentialism, Lakoff/Johnson did 
not forget to find evidence to back it up: they argue that there is physical basis for 
conceptual metaphors. Following their logic, it seems that those conceptual metaphors 
are based on direct physical experiences we get from life. However, the so-called 
“physical basis”, mainly for orientational metaphors, in Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive 
theory is merely subjective deduction on the basis of their instincts or intuition, and 
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therefore are not able to justify the supremacy of these conceptual metaphors over others. 
MORE IS UP and LESS IS DOWN are a pair of Lakoff/Johnson’s important conceptual 
metaphors based on our sense of orientation. In Lakoff/Johnson’s framework, they are 
seen as a fundamental pair of concepts that govern a lot of other metaphors. The 
following is Lakoff/Johnson’s (2003[1980]: 15-16) own statement on it: 
MORE IS UP; LESS IS DOWN  
The number of books printed each year keeps going up. His draft number is high. 
My income rose last year. The amount of artistic activity in this state has gone down 
in the past year. The number of errors he made is incredibly low. His income fell last 
year. He is underage. If you’re too hot, turn the heat down.  
Physical basis: If you add more of a substance or of physical objects to a container 
or pile, the level goes up.  
To begin with, the physical basis for this pair of concepts is also quite problematic. 
Visually, the concept “more” or an increase in amount is not confined vertically in the 
state of piling up; rather, it might be substantiated in almost all directions. To be more 
specific, it can be upward (piling up), downward (the eighteenth layer of hell is at the 
bottom of the hell), inward (deep thinking is more thinking), outward, backward, and 
forward, all of which are equally possible to semiotize the abstract concept “more” and 
thus to produce a metaphor.  
In fact, we can find a lot of evidence in our life to prove that the concept “more” 
is not necessarily understood in terms of “up”. For instance, more is also down because 
the more things you have, the heavier they become. When weighing something on a scale, 
the more things we put the scale, the lower the scale moves. In the harvesting season, we 
observe in the rice field that those rice ears that bear the most rice hang downward, while 
the ones with little rice stay up. The more rice they bear, the lower they sink. Ancient 
Chinese farmers also observed this, they thus compared the rice rears with most rice to 
knowledgeable gentlemen (with more knowledge) who are always very humble (walking 
with the head slightly down for showing respect to others), and compared the ears with 
little rice to those ignorant people (with little knowledge) who are usually very arrogant 
(walking with their heads up regardless of the conduct code for a gentleman). In other 
words, the more knowledge one has, the humbler he/she is. In this case, more is well 
metaphorized by being down, and less is understood by being up. When there is more 
evaporation, the water level goes down. Correspondingly, the less one weighs, the higher 
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he can jump. If you add more of a substance, the size become bigger. So why not MORE 
IS BIG? This means that the process of metaphorization is not structured by one 
fundamental physical basis. (And this also proves the subjective nature in confirming 
conceptual metaphors.) In a word, the abstract concept MORE IS UP should never be 
taken for granted.  
In addition to the phenomena we observe, we can also find lots of linguistic 
examples in which the concept “more” is also metaphorized in terms of “down”. For 
instance, the phrase “use up” can also serve as a good counter-example for the conceptual 
metaphor MORE IS UP and LESS IS DOWN. When you use up something, the amount 
of it turns from less to zero. Thus, “less” (zero is an extreme of being less) is associated 
with “up” in this case. If concepts like “MORE IS UP” and “LESS IS DOWN” are so 
fundamental in English language and its users, then why people still use “up” instead of 
“down” to collocate the word “use” here? This casts serious doubts on the centrality and 
supremacy of the conceptual metaphors MORE IS UP and LESS IS DOWN even in the 
culture where English is the mother tongue, let alone other cultures. 
Having proved the uselessness of the conceptual metaphors “MORE IS UP” and 
“LESS IS DOWN” in metaphor interpretation, let us examine other conceptual 
metaphors in the so-called “coherent system” held by Lakoff/Johnson. The first that 
appear in their system of metaphors are two pairs of concepts, “HAVING CONCTROL 
or FORCE IS UP” and “BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL or FORCE IS DOWN”. 
Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]: 15) provided linguistic evidence for these metaphorical 
concepts and explained the physical basis for such kind of conceptualization: 
HAVING CONTROL or FORCE IS UP; BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL or 
FORCE IS DOWN 
I have control over her. I am on top of the situation. He’s in a superior position. He’s 
at the height of his power. He’s in the high command. He’s in the upper echelon. 
His power rose. He ranks above me in strength. He is under my control. He fell from 
power. His power is on the decline. He is my social inferior. He is low man on the 
totem pole. 
Physical basis: Physical size typically correlates with physical strength, and the 
victor in a fight is typically on top. 
In the real world, having force does not always mean having control. In traditional culture 
of Daoism, for example, pugilists of Tai Ji tend to weaken the attacking force by changing 
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its directions rather than facing it directly. Put differently, instead of meeting the fists 
head-on, pugilists of Tai Ji are more willing to leverage the force of their opponents 
through agile movements. This philosophical idea is represented in a Chinese idiom “四
两拨千斤” /si liang bo qian jin/ ‘to defeat a thousand-pound force with four ounces of 
strength’. The pugilists hold this idea typically because they view things as a hemisphere 
like the Tai Ji ball and deal with them. Thus, in real situations, the one who is forceful 
does not mean that he or she has the control over the force. In fact, this is more related 
to social ranking than to physical fight. Metaphorical vehicles come from all spheres of 
life, and can be associated with unlimited kinds of tenor under abductive reasoning. 
Again, to consider some metaphorical vehicles as primary and others as secondary lacks 
evidence.  
The next two pairs of conceptual metaphors are “HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP” 
and “SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN”, and the explanation provided by 
Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]: 15) are quoted below: 
HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN  
He’s at the peak of health. Lazarus rose from the dead. He’s in top shape. As to his 
health, he’s way up there. He fell ill. He’s sinking fast. He came down with the flu. 
His health is declining. He dropped dead. 
Physical basis: Serious illness forces us to lie down physically. When you’re dead, 
you are physically down. 
In real situations, while we use “at the peak of health”, we also use “at the peak of one’s 
sickness or madness. In the latter case, do we still say “health is up”? The answer is 
obvious. Furthermore, in Chinese expressions like 染上疾病 /ran shang ji bing/ ‘infected 
with a disease’ and 体温下不来 /ti wen xia bu lai/ ‘the body temperature remains high’，
the word 上 ‘up’ refers to illness while the word 下 /xia/ ‘down’ refers to being healthy. 
In the expression 翘辫子 /qiao bian zi/, a sarcastic way of saying ‘die’, the word 翘 /qiao/ 
also means erecting.  And contrary to the concepts of LIFE IS UP and DEATH IS DOWN, 
the Chinese expressions 上西天 /shang xi tian/ ‘go up to the sky in the west’ (a religious 
expression of death) and 上天堂 /shang tian tang/ ‘go to heaven’ both contain the word 
上 /shang/ ‘up’. Furthermore, “go to heaven” 上天堂 /shang tian tang/ and “go to hell” 
下地狱 /xia di yu/ are very common expressions of death in both English and Chinese 
languages. All these examples prove that there is no absolute relation between death and 
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down. Similarly, there is also no absolute relation between life and up. The point is that 
when you are not dead, you also lie down a lot. The more rest one gets, the healthier one 
becomes. 
Moreover, we also find great contradiction between MORE IS UP and 
HAEALTH IS UP. Consider, if “MORE” is always up, then aged people are up simply 
because they have lived more years than young people. However, the fact is that, 
generally speaking, aged people are more possible to encounter health problems than 
their juniors. Furthermore, being healthy for most modern people means eat less rather 
than more food. Since the empty concept “HEALTH IS UP” cannot tell us which 
semantic features of the word health is compared with “UP”, it is very likely that we will 
be confused. In fact, the deficiency lies in that MORE IS UP and HAEALTH IS UP are 
merely partially related. Health is up is consistent with the concept of MORE IS UP only 
if we understand this “more” in health as having more energy or strength in life. If, 
however, MORE here is understood as having more years or eating as much food as 
possible, there will be no consistency at all. This shows that the so-called coherent system 
is more relative than absolute. The fact that, sometimes, abstract concepts like “MORE” 
and “HEALTH” may be semiotized by our spatial intuitions should be understood 
through a more dynamic cultural framework than a universalized conceptual framework. 
Thus, the greatest weak point of Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory become quite obvious 
through such kind of anatomy: they tend to take partial and temporary relations between 
things as absolute permanent relations. They thus go further to define these partial and 
temporary relations based on similarity as the essence of metaphor. Direct bodily 
experience is only one means of metaphorical association, and definitely should not be 
considered as a driving source for metaphorical thinking. It is therefore not surprising 
that they finally lead their school of thought to a theoretical impasse and do not know 
how to get out of it. 
The next concept pattern Lakoff/Johnson put forward is “CONSCIOUS IS UP” 
and “UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN”, and their justification for these conceptual 
metaphors are shown as follows: 
CONSCIOUS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN  
Get up. Wake up. I’m up already. He rises early in the morning. He fell asleep. He 
dropped off to sleep. He’s under hypnosis. He sank into a coma. 
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Physical basis: Humans and most other mammals sleep lying down and stand up 
when they awaken. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 15). 
This explanation is questionable because the whole physical basis is more related to sleep 
rather than to consciousness. There is evident switch of concept here in their argument. 
What is more, such concepts are not fundamental because unconsciousness can also be 
up. In English language, people say “When one dies, one’s soul goes up.”, and there is 
also an idiom in Chinese, saying “灵魂出窍” /ling hun chu qiao/ ‘the soul comes out of 
the body’. This idea is further enhanced in Chinese people’s mind by the classic fiction 
Journey to the West, where the soul of the Monkey King frequently flies out of the body 
to call for help. This is possible because abductive reasoning is not confined to things or 
events that happen in real life, it also gets materials through imagination.  
Another important pair of concepts is “GOOD IS UP and BAD IS DOWN”, as is 
argued by Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]: 16) in the following paragraphs: 
GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN  
Things are looking up. We hit a peak last year, but it’s been downhill ever since. 
Things are at an all-time low. He does high-quality work.  
Physical basis for personal well-being: Happiness, health, life, and control—the 
things that principally characterize what is good for a person—are all up.  
Both the accounts and the physical basis are untenable, because bad can also be 
interpreted as being up. For instance, if someone becomes crazy, he or she would be up 
a lot (hypertension), but this does not mean it is good. And as argued before, lying down 
in rest is usually good for health. Furthermore, in the following sentence from Martin 
Luther King’s famous speech “I Have a Dream”, he compares “despair” to “mountain” 
and “hope” to “stone”: “With this faith, we will be able to hew out of the mountain of 
despair a stone of hope.” Normally, “despair” is not considered as being good, and 
mountain is erect and therefore is up. Compared with a mountain, a stone is physically 
downward, minute, and unimpressive in sight. Of course, the metaphors here are not 
suggesting that despair is good and hope is bad, although sometimes they can also be 
interpreted in this way; rather, hope as a stone is promising, and despair as a mountain is 
up like a block in front of any road to good prospects. In this metaphorical context, 
therefore, good is not up and bad is not down. This case is thus a good example that 
refutes the conceptual metaphors GOOD IS UP and BAD IS DOWN. Moreover, different 
religions may have very different views on orientation. For instance, Buddhism has a 
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very different orientation view from both Daoism and Christianity. Both Daoist and 
Christians believe that the best afterlife for us is to go to heaven, and heaven is “up” there. 
However, for Buddhists, the best choice is to go to the Western Paradise or the Pure Land. 
Clearly, in Buddhism, Heaven means “west”, while in Daoism and Christianity, Heaven 
means “up” over our head. Since Heaven means good, we may also find a GOOD IS 
WEST metaphor in Buddhism in light of Lakoff/Johnson’s logic. 
Another pair of concepts Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]: 16) put forward as 
orientational metaphors is FORESEEABLE FUTURE EVENTS ARE UP, and their 
accounts for them are stated as follows: 
FORESEEABLE FUTURE EVENTS ARE UP (and AHEAD)  
All up coming events are listed in the paper. What’s coming up this week? I’m afraid 
of what’s up ahead of us. What’s up? 
Physical basis: Normally our eyes look in the direction in which we typically move 
(ahead, forward). As an object approaches a person (or the person approaches the 
object), the object appears larger. Since the ground is perceived as being fixed, the 
top of the object appears to be moving upward in the person’s field of vision. 
If the physical basis stated here is the ultimate cause for the abovementioned metaphor, 
why don’t we have FORESEEABLE FUTURE EVENTS ARE LARGE or 
FORESEEABLE FUTURE EVENTS ARE BIG? That fact is that, according the 
experiential situation mentioned above, we are more likely to metaphorize the 
foreseeable future events in terms of “largeness” rather than in terms “up”. Here, let us 
take one step back and think about this issue in a inversed way: Even if the metaphorical 
concept FORESEEABLE FUTURE EVENTS ARE UP as a conceptual metaphor is 
really tenable, it also contradicts Lakoff/Johnson’s another metaphor UNKNOWN IS UP 
as is argued in the following paragraph: 
The role of the experiential basis is important in understanding the workings of 
metaphors that do not fit together because they are based on different kinds of 
experience. Take, for example, a metaphor like UNKNOWN IS UP; KNOWN IS 
DOWN. Examples are “That’s up in the air” and “The matter is settled.” This 
metaphor has an experiential basis very much like that of UNDERSTANDING IS 
GRASPING, as in “I couldn’t grasp his explanation.” With physical objects, if you 
can grasp something and hold it in your hands, you can look it over carefully and 
get a reasonably good understanding of it. It’s easier to grasp something and look at 
it carefully if it’s on the ground in a fixed location than if it’s floating through the 
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air (like a leaf or a piece of paper). Thus UNKNOWN IS UP; KNOWN IS DOWN 
IS coherent with UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING.  
But UNKNOWN IS UP is not coherent with metaphors like GOOD IS UP and 
FINISHED IS UP (as in “I’m finishing up”). One would expect FINISHED to be 
paired with KNOWN and UNFINISHED to be paired with UNKNOWN. But, so far 
as verticality metaphors are concerned, this is not the case. The reason is that 
UNKNOWN IS UP has a very different experiential basis than FINISHED IS UP. 
(Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 20-21) 
In fact, there is no coherence between those conceptual metaphors proposed by 
Lakoff/Johnson. Lakoff/Johnson claim that there is different experiential basis between 
UNKNOWN IS UP and FINISHED IS UP, because, in their system, FINISHED IS UP 
also contradicts UNKNOWN IS UP. Clearly shown in their above statement, 
Lakoff/Johnson used only one phrase “finishing up” to justify the concept FINISHED IS 
UP. Following their reasoning, can we say that STARTED IS UP is also a conceptual 
metaphor simply because there is also a phrase called “starting up”? The contradiction 
here is evident enough. From this case, we know that the Lakoff/Johnson’s criterion for 
conceptual metaphors is so loose that nearly each verb-preposition phrase can generate a 
metaphorical concept and finally the number of the abstracted concepts is likely to 
exceed the number of actual phrases. In this sense, what is the significance of these 
conceptual metaphors? 
As anatomized above, there are no absolute concepts in these “orientational 
metaphors”, and there is no “internal systematicity to each spatialization metaphor” 
(Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 17). Those physically based or culturally based metaphors 
are randomly assigned rather than appear in “a coherent system” (Lakoff/Johnson 
2003[1980]: 17). In addition to the great doubt cast on the cognitive theory of metaphor 
by philosophers or theorists like Haley (1999) and Haser (2005), there is also empirical 
evidence from various linguistic dimensions done by corpus linguists. While they serve 
as adequate evidence for proving the meaninglessness of conceptual metaphors, they also 
justify the true nature of abductive reasoning that makes metaphors possible. Most 
recently, for instance, David Hoover (2016) conducted a positive study to test the 
prevalence of some metaphorical collocations held by Lakoff/Johnson with the help of 
huge natural language corpora. Hoover’s study also shows that conceptual metaphors 
MORE IS UP and LESS IS DOWN are not as basic and fundamental as is assumed by 
Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]). To be more specific, Hoover (2016: 3) examines the 
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prevalence of MORE IS UP in Mark Davies’s 450 million words Corpus of 
Contemporary American English (Davies 2008), and the result is quite interesting: 
Perhaps surprisingly, more, less, increase, and decrease do not collocate 
significantly with up and down, in COCA. In fact, all of these collocations have 
negative mutual information scores, showing that more, less, increase, and decrease 
are actually found less frequently than would be expected by chance within nine 
words left or right of up and down. 
Note: The mutual information score measures how frequently two words appear near 
each other, taking into account how frequently this would happen by chance, based 
on the frequencies of the words and the size of the corpus. 
These collocations for the MORE IS UP metaphor proposed by Lakoff/Johnson have 
shown lower mutual information scores, many of them negative, in Davies’s historically-
based Corpus of Historical American English (Davies 2010), implying that “it is unlikely 
that the low scores are a result of language changes in the last thirty-five years” (Hoover 
2016: 4). In other words, results of these data analysis show that the basic expressions in 
Lakoff/Johnson’s MORE IS UP metaphor appeared in English language merely scarcely 
even in the time when their Metaphors We Live by was first published in the early 1980s. 
Therefore, the result serves as very good evidence to prove that the idea of conceptual 
metaphor is based on very untenable assumption rather than careful justification. In fact, 
the Peircean scholar Michael Haley (1999: 427-428) had already made a quite thorough 
and illuminating comment on this major conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP: 
The reason they are not satisfying is that such explanations do not really grapple 
with the underlying psychological and ontological mechanisms of the mind-space 
metaphor; rather, they deal with some of the conventional uses to which this 
metaphor is put in our culture. To speak of feeling happy as feeling “up,” for instance, 
is merely one conventionalized use of the cognitive metaphorical structure that 
allows us to use orientation in space as an analogy for emotional states. That same 
metaphorical structure is what permits exactly the opposite (and less conventional) 
use: My happiness, please note, may also be deep, which means reaching or 
extending down in space, rather than up. Up is not always good, either; that’s merely 
a hackneyed, conventional use of the spatial metaphor. The same metaphorical 
structure of mind-space that allows good to be thought of as “up” also allows any 
idea or phenomenon before the mind to be “up” – as when we say that crime is up, 
discontent is rising, or fear and uncertainty have reached a peak.  
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To be sure, these metaphorical possibilities are provided for under Lakoff/Johnson’s 
MORE IS UP conceptual metaphor. More of what is up? Well, more of anything – 
wealth or poverty, happiness or happiness, crime or virtue. And what is the 
explanation for this? “If you add more of a substance or of physical objects to a 
container or pile,” say Lakoff and Johnson, “the level goes up” (1980: 16). True, in 
many instances, but what if I add more cars to a lane of traffic? The increase is 
horizontal, not vertical. Borrowing this particular spatial axis for metaphor, I may 
find it more natural to say that my grief has no end, instead of saying that it has no 
ceiling or lid. And what if I add more air to a balloon? The growth is in all directions 
simultaneously. Borrowing from this particular law of physical space to create a 
metaphor, I might choose to say that my grief is swelling instead of rising. Thus, 
while the Lakoff/Johnson explanation may help us to understand why MORE is 
usually or conventionally UP, this explanation avoids the far more interesting 
question where metaphor is concerned: Not why is MORE usually UP (and 
sometimes outward or even downward), but why should any dimension of physical 
space, along any axis, provide such a persistent, intuitive, and universally natural 
metaphor in human thought for cognizing abstract phenomena – like grief or 
happiness – which (presumably) cannot themselves be literally quantified or 
assigned a position, let alone a dimension, in physical space? 
Haley’s argument here is quite reasonable. Indeed, our task is not to account for the 
meaningless concepts as MORE IS UP and HAPPY IS UP, but to find out the underlying 
mechanism for cognizing abstract phenomena such as happiness or grief in terms of a 
position. As mentioned earlier, in real situations, “more” or the increase in amount can 
be achieved both vertically and horizontally. In Haley’s example, the increase of cars in 
number is shown horizontally, and thus is visually expanding rather than erecting (up). 
This shows that the physical instincts or intuition of the outside world are also diversely 
and multi-valently semiotized in our language. Ample examples have been adopted in 
this section to prove the futility of these concepts when they are adopted to account for 
metaphorical expressions as abductive results. In fact, our instincts or intuition are quite 
relative than absolute. These orientational and ontological concepts might be meaningful 
from the perspective of psychology, but will meet great challenge when explaining 
results of abductive reasoning like metaphor. This explains why conceptual metaphors 
like MORE IS UP or GOOD IS UP are so fiercely challenged and criticized by 
researchers when they are adopted as conceptual framework for analyzing metaphorical 
expressions in real cultural situations.  
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In a nutshell, Lakoff/Johnson made great effort to seek stable structures in 
metaphor, but stableness in metaphor is quite temporary. The concepts that they deem as 
stable are actually gained from re-iconification of the Peircean symbols which are indeed 
much more stable in language system than real metaphors. From this perspective, their 
work is nothing but concept induction by means of abstracting lexical items in language. 
It is worth noting that such kind of work has great difference from tracing the 
metaphorical patterns in a culture, because the latter is a form of interpretation in which 
we may find real life while the former is mere lifeless abstraction. One important reason 
for the failure of the conceptual metaphor theory is that it did not grasp the abductive 
impulse of metaphor. 
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Chapter Three: Beyond the Ontology of Metaphor 
In the previous chapter, we proposed a Peircean epistemology of metaphor in light of the 
phenomenological analysis of the sign. Through the analysis, we have shown that 
Peircean semiotics can indeed provide a sound framework of analysis for the 
understanding and interpretation of metaphor. In his trichotomous division of the sign 
into index, icon, and symbol and a further division of the iconic signs, we have found a 
better way of categorizing and defining metaphors. Through the operation of abductive 
reasoning, with iconic reasoning in particular, we have found the underlying logic of 
metaphorization. These insights we get from the Peircean semiotics help to establish a 
sound epistemology of metaphor. However, due to the lack of a full and thorough 
discussion on metaphor in Peirce’s existing works, the thought of Peirce alone is still 
inadequate for a more ambitious framework of metaphor interpretation. As I mentioned 
in Chapter Two, the epistemology of metaphor is an unfinished project, and our efforts 
should not stop at exploring Peirce’s thought but should incorporate insights from 
scholars of the same tradition so as to obtain an integrated framework for metaphor 
interpretation. Based on his theory of the sign, semioticians after Peirce, like Ersu Ding 
and Umberto Eco, have further developed his theory on metaphor and iconicity. Through 
his concept of arbitrary iconicity, for example, Ersu Ding stresses the arbitrary nature of 
metaphorization and tries to shift our attention away from Lakoff/Johnson’s abstract 
epistemological Gestalt to the specific cultural contexts in which metaphors occur. He 
also emphasizes the subjective nature of metaphor. Umberto Eco, on the other hand, sees 
interpretation of signs as an open-ended process that involves knowledge of all kinds. 
Encyclopedic knowledge, in other words, serves as unlimited source for metaphorical 
association. For Eco, metaphor should be interpreted in the cultural framework based on 
a specific cultural community. These ideas are in line with Peirce’s theoretical 
framework where the meaning of a metaphor depends on an interpreter or metaphor user 
in a particular socio-historical context. Both Ding and Eco suggest that we go beyond the 
ontology of metaphor for a better understanding of its operation. Based on the above 
theories, the present chapter proposes a cultural space for dynamic interpretation of 
metaphor on the part of metaphor users. I will also introduce the theory of intersubjective 
communication from Habermas as a philosophical solution for interpersonal 
understanding of metaphorical meaning. Structurally, the present chapter will include 
five sections. In the first section, I will discuss the subjective nature of metaphor from 
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the perspective of Peircean semiotics. In the second section, I will elaborate on Ersu 
Ding’s theory of metaphor with a special concentration on his concept of “arbitrary 
iconicity”. In the third section, I will elucidate Umberto Eco’s metaphorology through 
the relation between metaphor and culture and Eco’s key concept of encyclopedia. In the 
fourth section, I will discuss the relation between metaphor and intersubjectivity through 
a theory of intersubjective communication in Habermas as opposed to Lakoff/Johnson’s 
experientialism or embodied philosophy in the cognitive theory of metaphor. Finally, in 
the last section, I will examine the relation between metaphor and ideology. 
3.1 The Subjective Nature of Metaphor 
As mentioned earlier, it is the imputed imaginary quality on the object that makes 
metaphor different from other modes of iconicity. The “imputedness” here also indicates 
the inadequacy of distinguishing the three types of iconic signs merely from the 
perspective of similarity. It is true that similarity is the ground of the relation between an 
icon and its object, yet similarity alone is insufficient to form an actual iconic sign for to 
Peirce everything is similar to each other in certain respects (CP 2.276; Johansen 1993). 
Therefore, similarity should be specified in order to express clear meaning, which 
presupposes human factors. The following interpretation by Johansen on Nelson 
Goodman’s example for unspecified similarities is quite illuminating: 
In “Seven Strictures on Similarity” (1970) Nelson Goodman gives the following 
example of what difficulties might be involved in using unspecified similarity as a 
criterion of classification. Goodman presents the following three figures (Fig. 19).  
B I3 O 
Fig. 19 
Goodman’s point is that figure two is not topologically equivalent to figure one, but 
to figure three (Goodman 1972: 439). If we are less interested in geometrical 
topology than, for instance, in deciphering a handwritten manuscript, we would 
probably take figures one and two to be replicas of the legisign ‘B’, rather than 
figures two and three to be replicas of the legisign ‘O’ (Goodman would prefer to 
say ‘replicas of each other,’ but to discuss this would take us too far afield). 
Goodman’s example proves unequivocally that similarity, which as in Peirce is 
understood as the possession of common characteristics, is always similarity for a 
purpose. (Johansen 1993: 95-96) 
For Peirce, similarity or iconicity also presuppose perception as a human factor: 
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Peirce stresses the relationship between iconic signs on the one hand and perception 
and experiential observation on the other. Not only are icons (i.e., iconic signs) said 
to be “percepts minus the insistency and percussivity of percepts” (Ms. 293, 1906: 
9), but Peirce also identifies with an iconic sign the idea excited by an external 
reacting upon the brain (2.276). Although iconicity alone is certainly insufficient to 
make up perception, since an indexical element that represents the insistency of the 
object is needed, and although iconic signs need not be bound to actual perception, 
since they can be representations of memory or fantasies, iconicity and perception 
presuppose each other. (Johansen 1993: 96) 
This significance of human perception and its specific operation is further elaborated by 
Ersu Ding (2014: 126) in the following insightful statement: 
…the formation of signs depends on human beings’ ability to perceive connections 
between disparate phenomena around them. To borrow an example from Thomas 
Sebeok (1994: 4), when a dog stares at a person, growling, barking, head held high 
and neck arched, lips contracted vertically and teeth bared, ears erected and turned 
forward, he or she normally takes evasive action. The person involved does so 
because such expressions of a dog usually lead to an immediate attack on other 
animals or humans in the vicinity. In other words, the growling, barking, teeth-
baring, and ear-erecting activities of a dog have been interpreted as a sign of danger, 
or more specifically, as an indexical sign where one thing points to another and 
therefore stands for another. 
Moreover, by including the term of “interpretant” in his semiotic triad, Peirce 
emphasizes human factors in the signifying process. This concept originated from 
Peirce’s Lowell Lecture VII in the year 1866: 
Indeed, the process of getting an equivalent for a term, is an identification of two 
terms previously diverse. It is in fact, the process of nutrition of terms by which they 
get all their life and vigor and by which they put forth an energy almost creative 
since it has the effect of reducing the chaos of ignorance to the cosmos of science. 
Each of these equivalents is the explication of what there is wrapt up in the primary 
- they are the surrogates, the interpreters of the original term. They are new bodies, 
animated by that same soul. I call them the interpretants of the term. And the 
quantity of these interpretants, I term the information or implication of the term. 
(WP 464-465) 
As can be seen, the term interpretant presuppose a sign user. Although, for Peirce, there 
are distinctions between interpretant and meaning (CP 1.339; Johansen 1993), the term 
interpretant is closely related to meaning interpretation of a sign. The meaning of 
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linguistic signs is, for Peirce, dependent on “our tendencies to weld together qualities 
and our aptitudes to see resemblances, or, to use the received phrase, upon associations 
by similarity” (CP 3.419). The concepts of “tendency” and “aptitude” behind similarity 
also involve that of a human purpose. Indeed, the purpose of sign users is often decisive 
in sign interpretation, and Johansen (1993: 96) is essentially right in pointing out that 
similarity “is always similarity for a purpose”. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in 
actual signifying processes, the three kinds of representations are mutually transformable 
with the change of different interpretants, i.e., according to different purposes of sign 
users. In other words, whether a sign is an icon, or an index, or a symbol depends upon 
the interpretation of sign users. A woman’s photo, for instance, can be her icon, but for 
someone unfamiliar with her the photo might be an index indicating a camera. A 
physiognomist, on the other hand, will focus on the lady’s facial features in order to 
analyze her personality, during which the same photo serves as a symbol. In the eyes of 
the photographer who took the photo, it might go beyond its immediate object and 
represent a piece of art that shows a certain aspect of human beauty. As remarked by 
Peirce, “nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign” (CP 2.308). Indeed, we may 
also say that nothing is an icon unless it is interpreted as such, and thus nothing is a 
metaphor unless it is interpreted as a metaphor. 
In addition to similarity or iconicity, Peirce is fully aware of the subjective nature 
of metaphor. Realizing the subjective nature of metaphor will be very crucial for us to 
establish a sound interpretive framework for metaphor. The fact that Lakoff/Johnson did 
not pay enough attention to this has had a very negative influence on our understanding 
of metaphor. Not only the meaning of metaphor, but also the meaning of all signs is 
largely dependent on human interpretation. Ellis (1997: 115) is right when he criticized 
the tendency of confining literary analysis to a limited number of conceptual framework: 
“Human life is a complex and diverse phenomenon. The number of factors and values at 
work in any human situation is always so large that no single factor or concept is likely 
to give one an adequate understanding of it.” The same is true for metaphor interpretation. 
Behind metaphor, there is human perception and human purpose. Given the complexity 
and diversity of things, events, and life situations, any single conceptual framework, like 
conceptual metaphors, used for the analysis of metaphor is insufficient because of its 
narrowness in nature. The lyric of a Chinese song, 高级动物 /gao ji dong wu/ “Superior 
Animal”, by a famous Chinese rock star, 窦唯 /dou wei/, vividly depicts the contradictory 
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and complicated nature of humankind through enumerating 32 individual adjectives, and 
it goes like this:  
矛盾/mao dun/ ‘contradictory’, 虚伪/xu wei/ ‘hypocritical’, 贪婪/tan lan/ ‘greedy’, 
欺骗/qi pian/ ‘deceitful’, 幻想/huan xiang/ ‘phantasmic’, 疑惑/yi huo/ ‘doubtful’, 
简单/jian dan/ ‘simple’, 善变/shan bian/ ‘capricious’, 好强/hao qiang/ ‘competitive’, 
无奈/wu nai/ ‘helpless’, 孤独/gu du/ ‘lonely’, 脆弱/cui ruo/ ‘fragile’, 忍让/ren rang/ 
‘tolerant’, 气愤 /qi fen/ ‘indignant’, 复杂 /fu za/ ‘complicated’, 讨厌 /tao yan/ 
‘bothersome’, 嫉妒/ji du/ ‘jealous’, 阴险/yin xian/ ‘insidious’, 争夺/zheng duo/ 
‘fighting’, 埋怨 /man yuan/ ‘complaining’, 自私 /zi si/ ‘selfish’, 无聊 /wu liao/ 
‘boring’, 变态/bian tai/ ‘abnormal’, 冒险/mao xian/ ‘adventurous’, 好色/hao se/ 
‘concupiscent’, 善良/shan liang/ ‘virtuous’, 博爱/bo ai/ ‘caritative’, 诡辩/gui bian/ 
‘sophisticated’, 能说/neng shuo/ ‘eloquent’, 空虚/kong xu/ ‘vacuous’, 真诚/zhen 
cheng/ ‘sincere’, 金钱/jin qian/ ‘moneyed’. (my translation) 
The seemingly random enumeration in the lyric shows that there is no fixed order 
concerning our personalities. We should not even try to use one word or a single concept 
to summarize the character or phycological process of a person. Due to our diversified 
dispositions, we are born to define the world from various perspectives rather than from 
merely one angle through the operation of abductive reasoning. Moreover, we often 
project on things around us the contradictory and complicated qualities we discover in 
ourselves. Thus, we find different qualities in things through perception, and things 
around us are multi-faceted because our mind are multi-faceted, or because we endow 
those kinds of qualities to them. Similarly, during the process of metaphorization, we 
inject our emotions, feelings, and sensations into the metaphor we produce.  
To take the formation of a literary metaphor in Hemingway’s The Old Man and 
the Sea as an example. In this novella, the images of lions appear five times among which 
the old man dreams of lions three times and thinks of lions twice. More importantly, lions 
appear every time the old man is about to go fishing in the sea and therefore needs 
spiritual encouragement. Whenever the old man needs a spiritual vehicle for his ideal 
and dream, the lions always show up. Such contiguous arrangement may arouse readers’ 
imagination so much that they can easily compare the old man with lions. The proximity 
of the two items, the lion and the old man, leads people to make comparison between the 
two, and then a metaphorical meaning arises. The author, however, had never made any 
direct metaphorical linkage, such as “the old man is a lion” or “the old man is courageous 
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as a lion”, between the two. It is, in fact, the repeated appearance of lions in crucial parts 
of the novella that helps readers link the lion-image with the protagonist. Thus, the lion 
may become a metaphorical representation of the old man. Of course, lions represent the 
old man not in all aspects but in some. Since the publication of this novella, many literary 
critics have attempted to account for the metaphorical meaning of the lion metaphor. In 
other words, they wanted to find out in which aspect or aspects the old man resembles 
lions. To some extent, the metaphorical meaning of “the old man is a lion” is very much 
open for interpretation. Over the years, different literary critics have offered various 
versions of interpretation. They examined the similarities between the lion and the old 
man from both physical and spiritual dimensions. Many argued that the lion represents 
the tough-guy image of the old man (Nie 2009), and that the old man resembles lions in 
courageousness and fearlessness. Of course, this interpretation does not come out of thin 
air. The old man’s courage is repeatedly depicted in many places of the work, through 
the boy’s praising words, his retrospection of early years, and vivid descriptions of his 
fighting on the sea, etc. Some scholars, however, have different ideas on the metaphorical 
meaning here. Nie (2009), for instance, proposed an ethical reading of this character, 
indicating that the image of lion represents the ethics of the animal world, the jungle law, 
the old man abides by. Nie (2009) held that, in nature, lion is on the top of the food chain, 
just like the shark in the sea. By associating the old man with the lion, the writer implies 
the old man’s intention to follow the jungle law and be a lion in the sea. Different from 
the former version of interpretation that focused on the lion’s feature of “courageousness 
and fearlessness”, Nie’s (2009) interpretation concentrated on the lion’s feature of “the 
vindicator of the jungle law” or “animal on the top of the food chain”. Thus, the two 
versions of interpretation are based on different perspectives of the interpreters. 
Qian Zhongshu, a well-known contemporary Chinese scholar, also emphasized 
the subjective nature of metaphor and put forward a theory of “two handles of metaphor”: 
A particular object or image, when employed as a metaphor, may be used positively 
as praise or negatively as censure, or it may be expressive of delight or revulsion, 
the connotation changing this way and that. Students of rhetoric and stylistics may 
want to take note of this. One of the Stoic philosophers observed, ‘Everything has 
two handles,’ and people take hold of whichever suits their needs. Taking a clue 
from this, and mindful of early Chinese uses of the same phrase (to designate 
rewards and punishments, two devices used by the ruler to maintain order), I might 
call the concept I wish to discuss ‘the two handles of metaphor.’ (Qian 1998: 122) 
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The import of this notion lies in its dialectic view on people’s diverse appropriations of 
things as metaphorical vehicles. On example provided by Qian on this point is people’s 
different interpretations of the same object in The Book of Changes. For the metaphor of 
“a sack tied up” under the entry of 坤 /kun/, both Xunzi and The Han Dynasty History 
take it to be censorious and unfavorable, while Huo Xing adopted it as an auspicious 
expression (Qian 1998: 122). Another example can be found in the contradictory 
semantic features of the Chinese word 水/shui/ ‘water’. In Chinese language, we have 柔
情似水 /rou qing si shui/ ‘as tender and soft as water’, but we also have 水火无情 /shui 
huo wu qing/ ‘fire and water have no mercy’. In other words, water can be tender and 
merciless at the same time. Moreover, in Tao Te Ching, Lao-Tzu sees in “water” the 
virtue of supreme good 上善若水 /shang shan ruo shui/ (Lao-Tzu 1993: 8). Indeed, 
which sememe of the word “water” is put in the foreground depends on the metaphor 
user’s particular interpretation of a tenor. As averred by Ding (2007: 132), “the choice 
of a particular aspect of the vehicle as the meaning focus is closely linked to the aesthetic 
inclination of the metaphor user”. People, for instance, can observe various functions or 
traits in dogs, like minding the house, guarding property, fidelity, and being eatable. As 
a result, they become semantic features of a cultural unit called “dog”, from which we 
may choose to make metaphors according to different language situations. Thus, dogs 
can be metaphorized either positively or negatively. Take Chinese people’s opinion on 
dog and the use of dog in Chinese language for example. In Chinese society, people have 
complicated feelings on dogs, some of which are rather contradictory. On the one hand, 
we praise dogs for their loyalty, while, at the same time, we also disdain them for having 
no guts and do whatever they are told to do (Yi 2005: 227). The newly coined word 汪
星人 /wang xing ren/ extends people’s affection for dogs. Meanwhile, we also notice that 
there are many idioms in which dogs are used negatively as censure, such as 狗眼看人
低 /gou yan kan ren di/ ‘dog eyes see people low’ (the metaphorical use of the phrase 
“act like a snob”)，狼心狗肺 /lang xin gou fei/ ‘rapacious as a wolf and savage as a 
cur’，狗嘴吐不出象牙 /gou zui tu bu chu xiang ya/ ‘you can never get ivory from a 
dog’s mouth’，丧家之犬 /sang jia zhi quan/ ‘stray cur’，狗急跳墙 /gou ji tiao qiang/ 
‘a cornered dog will do something desperate’，落水狗 /luo shui gou/ ‘dog in the water’，
鸡鸣狗盗 /ji ming gou dao/ ‘(ability to) crow like a cock and snatch like a dog’，狐朋
狗友 /hu peng gou you/ ‘evil associates like foxes and dogs’. In modern Chinese 
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language, most idioms about “dog” 狗 /gou/ have a derogatory sense. Such complicated 
connotation of the animal dog is caused by diversified interpretations by language users. 
In other words, the semantic features of dog are diverse rather than unitary or monoacidic.  
For the same thing or object, people of different times might also have different 
views, sometimes quite contradictory views (Qian 1998). For example, people in 
different historical periods see the bird raven (See Figure 1) quite differently. In Han 
dynasty, people saw it as a blessing or auspicious bird, while modern people see the bird 
as something that can bring bad luck. In ancient times, primitive Chinese worshiped 
ravens, for they believed ravens are the sunbird in mythology.  
 
Figure 1 Raven 
Another example can be found in the meaning change of the Chinese word 小姐 
/xiao jie/ ‘Miss’ or ‘lady’. Historically, the word 小姐 /xiao jie/ has a derogatory sense. 
In the age of Song and Yuan Dynasties in China, the word 小姐  /xiao jie/ meant 
prostitutes or girls of mean parentage, while, during the period of the Republic of China 
or Min Guo (1912-1949), the word was used positively to refer to a daughter from an 
eminent family. In contemporary China, however, the old meaning of 小姐 /xiao jie/ in 
Song Dynasty was restored, because people use the word as a euphemism of sex workers 
in society. It should be pointed out that this usage is confined to the mainland China, 
while, in Taiwan and Hong Kong, people today still use the meaning that was pervasive 
in the Republican or Min Guo period. Therefore, the meaning change of 小姐 /xiao jie/ 
is actually dependent on a social convention sanctioned by members of the Chinese 
community. This further reveals that the evolution of word meaning is based on socio-
historical contexts which vary from time to time. The historical disparity in people’s 
views on the same thing is thus formed. One important result of our different views and 
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perceptions on things is that, when we make metaphors, we highlight “one or several 
aspects of the vehicle that resemble or correspond to those in the target” (Ding 2007: 
129). In other words, similarities in metaphor are only partial. Qian Zhongshu had made 
a concise but rather insightful remark on this point (Quoted from Ding 2007: 129): 
“When two things are similar, one is used as a metaphor for the other. However, the 
similarity between them is partial rather than complete. If they were completely alike, 
they would be two instances of the same thing; and if they were the same, there would 
be no need for metaphor.”  
In fact, Lakoff/Johnson have also realized the importance of the subjects’ 
purposes and interests in human cognition (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 26), although such 
viewpoint, to some extent, contradicts their major philosophical position on metaphor: 
“Cognitive science and neuroscience suggest that the world as we know it contains no 
primary qualities in Locke’s sense, because the qualities of things as we can experience 
and comprehend them depend crucially on our neural makeup, our bodily interactions 
with them, and our purposes and interests.” Here, “our purposes and interests” reveal the 
subjective nature of metaphor. 
When developing their theory, Lakoff/Johnson criticized both objectivist view of 
metaphor and subjectivist view of metaphor. It should be noted that emphasizing the 
subjective nature of metaphorization does not mean that we hold a subjectivist view. We 
stress the role of metaphor users because oftentimes it is ignored by many researchers, 
especially the cognitive linguists. It is true that meaning is where the subject meets the 
object, but it is also a result of intersubjective agreement. A study of metaphor will never 
be complete if we do not go beyond the ontological aspects of metaphor.  
3.2 Ersu Ding’s Metaphor Theory 
The metaphor theory proposed by Ersu Ding (2014, 2016) is based on his close scrutiny 
of sign relations and classification, mainly from the Peircean semiotic perspective. As 
we have already mentioned in chapter two, Ersu Ding further developed Peirce’s 
typology of the sign through elucidating the process of sign evolution and proposing a 
fresh concept of arbitrary iconicity. On sign classification, he has laid much importance 
on Peirce’s trichotomous division of the sign into icon, index, and symbol, which 
according to Peirce, is also the most important division of signs. Ding (2016: 167) has 
the following to say on this respect: 
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Peirce’s system of sign classification is on the whole rather cumbersome and for that 
reason has been largely ignored by semiotic scholars who are not Peirce specialists. 
The only exception to this state of limbo is his last trichotomy, which contains some 
very good insights and has had a huge influence on subsequent efforts at classifying 
signs. In fact, when scholars engage in sign classification today, they mostly adopt 
Peirce’s theoretical framework of dividing signs into three categories of icon, index, 
and symbol. 
Despite its great influence, Ding (2016) found out that this classic Peircean trichotomy 
has a deficiency concerning the sequence of appearance of the tree correlates. In Peirce’s 
categorical analysis of the sign, icon was always discussed before index. Most scholars 
(Huang and Chen 2004; Zhao 2011) today tend to follow Peirce’s original sequence of 
discussion and talk about them in the sequence of icon, index, and symbol. Ding, 
however, puts forward an evolutionary order of the sign: index, icon, and symbol. This 
idea resonates with Rudi Keller’s categorical analysis of symptom, icon, and symbol. For 
Keller (1999), symptom, the Peircean index, can be imitated to form icons and thus 
precedes the latter in the process of sign evolution. As we have argued in the last chapter, 
the view of sign evolution is very crucial for us to develop a sound epistemology of 
metaphor in which indexical signs are iconified to form icons (metaphor) and iconic signs 
(metaphors) are lexicalized to form symbols. As we also elaborated in chapter two, this 
view of sign evolution casts serious doubts on Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of 
metaphor in which metaphors are confused with lexical items (symbols). Thus, through 
rethinking the relationship between Peirce’s trichotomous division into index, icon, and 
symbol, Ersu Ding’s theory of sign evolution has made a great leap on the theory of the 
sign in the Peircean tradition.  
“Arbitrary iconicity” is a very important term in Ersu Ding’s theory of metaphor 
and meaning. The issue of arbitrariness is, actually, an old question in linguistics and 
philosophy, and the tension between arbitrariness and motivatedness has been always 
one of the focuses of many linguists and philosophers. Peirce once said: “All human 
thought and opinion contains an arbitrary, accidental element, dependent on the 
limitations in circumstance, power and bent of individual; an element of error, in short.” 
(CP 8.12) Ersu Ding discussed the issue in relation to the first principle of linguistic sign, 
i.e., the arbitrary relation between signifier and signified championed by the Swiss 
linguist and semiotician Ferdinand de Saussure. According to Ding (2014: 121), 
Saussure’s problem lies in that he is “too quick to dismiss the importance of the iconic 
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relationship between signs and things – a methodological move that has since caused a 
lot of controversy in the field of linguistics, particularly in China where the official 
language (Mandarin) is known for its prominent feature of iconicity at all levels”. 
Saussure’s problem might have been caused by his emphasis on European alphabetic 
languages. For him (Ding 2014), iconicity only exists in a very limited number of 
linguistic phenomena like onomatopoeia and interjections, and can thus be ignored, or at 
least seen as irrelevant to the main task of language study. In his seminal essay 
“Ubiquitous but arbitrary iconicity,” Ding (2014: 121) makes the following remark: 
After nearly a century of continuous debate, the majority of scholars today agree 
with Saussure’s view that the linguistic sign is arbitrary in the sense that there is no 
intrinsic relationship between words and things or states of affairs, but his dismissal 
of iconicity as insignificant is open to criticism on several accounts. First, cross-
language variations of onomatopoeia and interjections cannot take away the fact that 
there exist ubiquitous iconic connections between words and things, be they in the 
form of “tick tock,” “katchin katchin” or “dī dā.” Second, the phenomenon of 
iconicity far exceeds the mere categories of onomatopoeia and interjections and 
plays a much greater role in language than Saussure gives it credit for. In addition 
to the phonetically motivated signs that Saussure mentions, there are also iconic 
expressions at other levels of language, particularly in the area of lexical connotation 
where similarity-based metaphors (alongside metonymies which are based on spatial, 
temporal as well as logical contiguity) serve not only as an effective means of 
communication but also as a major engine for language change. 
Ding (2014) then employed ample examples from pictophonetic languages including 
Chinese language and Egyptian language, which include “phonaesthetic iconicity” and 
“pictographic iconicity” or “image iconicity”, to demonstrate the ubiquity of iconicity in 
linguistic signs. Now, here comes a very crucial question: Does ubiquitous iconicity in 
language contradicts the arbitrary nature of linguistic sign? Ding’s answer is no. On the 
contrary, he believes that arbitrariness and motivatedness co-exists in language, which 
means that “iconic signs are also arbitrary in the sense that there is no intrinsic or essential 
link between an icon and its referent” (Ding 2014: 127). Ding further pointed out that 
motivatedness in pictophonetic characters is not based on an absolute relation, but varies 
a great deal from one culture to another. 
It also should be pointed out that most of Chinese characters were icons only at 
the initial stage when they were formed. Through more than two thousand years of 
development, those Chinese iconic characters have been symbolized as a result of sign 
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evolution, so much so that when people use them today, there are no iconic association 
in the mind. In other words, modern Chinese characters are also Peircean symbols just 
as alphabetic words in western languages. We shall hear what Ding (2014: 125) has to 
say on this respect: 
This is not to say that Chinese is an iconic language as opposed to English or French, 
which are not. On the contrary, the interpretative movement from modern Chinese 
characters to their corresponding meanings is no longer based on the similarity 
between their forms and extralinguistic objects or situations but rather on the 
linguistic convention that has been established among its users. It is only after the 
conscious and professional efforts of the linguist that the iconicity hidden 
underneath those characters is revealed. 
Back to the question of arbitrariness in icons. The most salient feature of iconic 
signs is, perhaps, motivation, i.e., the similarity between iconic representamen and the 
object it refers to. While accepting the prominent motivatedness in icons, we may also 
realize, at the same time, that the relationship between the signifier and signified of an 
icon, or between iconic representamen and interpretant, is not an intrinsic one. We shall 
hear from Ding (2014: 127) again: 
Last but not least, we have seen from the process of sign evolution discussed above 
that the concept of arbitrariness has less to do with whether or not a sign is motivated 
(symbolization of icons and re-iconification of symbols have made these two 
categories mutually transformable) than with how a segment of the natural or social 
world can be semiotized differently in unrelated sign systems. This is to say that 
iconic signs are also arbitrary in the sense that there is no intrinsic or essential link 
between an icon and its referent. 
Unlike the aspect of likeness in icon which is quite evident, the arbitrary aspect in icon 
is much more latent. The pervasive arbitrariness in iconic signs reveals the subjective 
nature of iconic representation, which means that the role of human subjects is always 
vital for any signifying process. Ding’s study of pictophonetic characters in different 
linguistic systems clearly demonstrates that which specific quality of an iconic character 
is chosen to represent the entire object differs from language to language and from culture 
to culture. One case of transliteration can exemplify arbitrary iconicity: the English word 
“cool” is translated into the Chinese word “酷” /ku/. The translation is based on the same 
pronunciation between the two words, i.e., the similarity between /ku:l/ in English and 
/ku/ in Chinese. However, there are other words that have the same pronunciation as 
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“cool”, such as 库 /ku/, 裤 /ku/, and 绔 /ku/, which are also homophones of “cool”. Just 
like other Chinese homophones of cool, the word 酷 /ku/, although polysemous, has 
completely different meanings (like cruel and harsh) with that of “cool” in English. The 
fact that people choose 酷 /ku/，rather than 库 /ku/, 裤 /ku/, or 绔 /ku/, to represent the 
meaning of the English word “cool” might be based on some individualized or cultural 
considerations which is never known to us, but it all the same reveals the arbitrary nature 
of the iconic representation. 
The same rule applies to metaphor. The arbitrariness of iconic representation 
enables metaphor users to have freedom in selecting vehicles, hence opportunities for 
meaning creation. Thus, through his concept of arbitrary iconicity, Ersu Ding (2010, 
2014) stresses in true Peircean spirit the subjective nature of metaphorization and tries to 
shift our attention away from Lakoff/Johnson’s abstract epistemological Gestalt to the 
specific cultural contexts in which metaphors occur. Recognizing the arbitrariness in 
iconicity can certainly help us achieve a better understanding of metaphor: Despite the 
similarity they share, the link between a tenor and a chosen metaphorical vehicle is still 
arbitrary. Therefore, we may put forward the concept of “arbitrary metaphoricity” to 
specifically refer to the arbitrariness in metaphor. After presenting some metaphorical 
equivalents that coincidently exist in both Chinese and English languages, Ding (2010: 
104) makes an important statement on arbitrary metaphoricity: 
The important point to be emphasized here is that these metaphorical expressions 
are not concrete manifestations of some pre-existing universal conceptual metaphors; 
rather, they are the results of arbitrary pairing of a metaphorical signifier with a 
metaphorical signified that happen to be identical or similar across two languages. 
It is astonishing how Saussure’s principle of linguistic arbitrariness has taken root 
in our mind when we discuss the relationship between a signifier and a signified at 
the literal level but is completely forgotten when we talk about the link between a 
signifier and a signified at the metaphorical level. 
In addition to this, even within one language, a metaphorical vehicle is often employed 
to represent different tenors that sometimes contain opposite meanings. Ding (2008, 2010) 
adopts the term “vehicular multivalency” to refer to the polysemous nature of 
metaphorical vehicles, casting doubt on the cognitive theory of metaphor. Ding (2008, 
2010) further developed the notion of “Two Handles and Several Sides of metaphor” ‘两
柄多边论’ /liang bing duo bian lun/ by Qian Zhongshu, the late well-known Chinese 
scholar whose original statement on metaphor is given below: 
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Metaphors may have two handles, but they also have several sides. Now, a certain 
thing may be one, but its qualities and capabilities are likely to be many. 
Consequently, the one thing is not restricted to one use or one effect. Those who 
employ a ﬁgure of speech may do so with different aspects in mind or with a 
different feature in view, so that even when the denotatum is the same the 
signiﬁcatum will vary. That is why a single image may fulﬁll several different 
purposes or meanings even while it remains the same. (Qian 1998: 125) 
According to Ding (2007: 124), the above notion by Qian (1998) “best complements 
what Umberto Eco called contemporary ‘metaphorology’ (1984: 88) in the West”.  
Another example of vehicular multivalency in which one metaphorical vehicle 
can be adopted to metaphorize multiple kinds of tenors can be found in the following 
table: 
Table 2. Examples of water-related metaphors (Quoted in Feng 2002: 309, Ding’s translation) 
Example Tenor Vehicle Ground 
The friendship of a gentleman is insipid as 
water. (Zhuangzi) 
Friendship water being clean and not 
sticky 
Tender feelings are like water; good times are 
like a dream. (Qingguan, Song Dynasty) 
affection, 
love 
water being inseparable 
The long night is like deep water. (Qingguan, 
Song Dynasty) 
Long night  water being long and deep 
It is a matter of common regret that human mind 
is not calm as water and great waves could 
suddenly arise for no good reasons. (Liu Yuxi, 
Tang Dynasty) 
Human 
mind 
water being calm and level 
He kept looking anxiously until the glistening 
autumn waters dried up. (Wang Shifu, Yuan 
Dynasty) 
Eyes water having sparkles and 
being crystal clear 
Watery moonlight fell upon the black coat. (Lu 
Xun) 
Moonlight Water being cold and bright 
The nearly cloudless blue sky was water-like. 
(Liu Yong, Song Dynasty) 
Sky water being transparent 
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The bamboo mat looks like water and the 
mosquito net looks like smoke. (Su Shi, Song 
Dynasty) 
bamboo mat water undulating and 
creating ripples 
Although silent, the strong cavalry looks like 
water. (Lu You, Song Dynasty) 
columns of 
horses and 
soldiers 
water moving rapidly 
Should I be asked how much anguish I have 
found, strange! It is like ﬂowing water, 
eastward bound. (Li Yu, the Five Dynasties) 
anxiety and 
distress 
Water  going a long distance 
Qian’s notion of “two handles” of metaphor vividly demonstrates the diversity of 
metaphorical vehicles: vehicular diversity and vehicular multivalency which refers to the 
phenomenon that a single tenor can have multiple vehicles respectively representing one 
of its semantic features. This notion can be exemplified by the way people metaphorize 
the word “life”. For Lakoff/Johnson (2003[1980]), LIFE IS A STORY and LIFE IS A 
GAMBLING GAME are conceptual metaphors that have priority over other 
metaphorical expressions related with the topic of life. For real language users, however, 
life as topic can be associated to “innumerous other vehicles” (Ding 2007: 124), and 
metaphorical vehicles like “story” and “gambling game” are merely two very ordinary 
vehicles of life. Thus, we frequently hear people talk about life through the metaphorical 
expressions listed below: 
– life IS drama  
– life IS book  
– life IS poetry  
– life IS tea  
– life IS water  
– life IS lamp  
– life IS porcelain  
– life IS bridge  
– life IS ﬂax  
– life IS ﬂower  
– life IS smoke 
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– life IS dream  
– life IS fantasy  
– life IS bubble  
– life IS shadow  
– life IS painting  
– life IS riddle  
– life IS fog  
– life IS waves  
– life IS wine  
– life IS electricity  
– life IS wind  
– life IS ﬁre  
– life IS poker  
– life IS chess  
– life IS dinner party  
– life IS stars and constellations  
– life IS duckweed  
– life IS stock market  
– life IS the world of mortals  
– life IS long-distance running  
– life IS bus ride  
– life IS morning dew  
– life IS ﬂower in a mirror  
– life IS moon reﬂection in water ... (Ji 2002: 16, Ding’s translation) 
The enumeration can go on and on with nearly no constraints, demonstrating the 
countless number of potential vehicles for the tenor “life”. In fact, the phenomenon of 
“vehicular diversity” is prevalent in almost all topics in our daily communication. Let us 
take the everlasting topic of marriage for another example. In real life situations, 
marriage is also frequently discussed by many, and the metaphor we use to describe it 
can be well related with but not necessarily confined to the following vehicles: 
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– a magician (who turns a freezing house into a warm home)  
– Santa Claus (who brings to the couple nice gifts in the form of children) 
– a judge (who while giving one partner life imprisonment makes the other a 
permanent warden)  
– a politician (who sometime resorts to lying in order to keep a respectable facade)  
– a miser (who refuses to share any leftover of affection with a third party)  
– a beautician (who is capable of bringing youthful radiance back onto a time-worn 
face) – a poet (except that his sentimental subject matters have become daily chores)  
– an actor (who always savors his own sadness and joy through other people’s stories)  
–a Confucian businessman (who inevitably engages in some selﬁsh dealings behind 
the facade of respectability)  
– a thief (who steals every bit of love from the couple)  
– a philosopher (who often analyze himself like this: 99% of what ﬂows in my body 
is the blood of a devil and the rest is the tears of an angel)  
– a pair of shoes (and only the feet that wear them know whether or not they are 
comfortable)  
– a book (that always begins with beautiful poems but fades into insipid prose 
thereafter) – monochromatic; if it is red, green is not tolerated; if it is yellow, blue 
cannot exist  
– a lottery ticket (with which the man bets on satisfaction and the woman on 
happiness)  
– a besieged fortress; (those who are outside it want to get in and those who are 
inside want to get out)  
– a zipper (which always obtains harmony through friction)  
– a river (where there are beautiful waves that you can see as well as huge whirlpools 
that you cannot see) (Ji 2002: 15, Ding’s translation) 
As contended by Ding (2007: 128), one advantage of vehicular diversity lies in that “it 
enables a language community to look at things or states of affair from multiple 
perspectives”.  
Even in the list of conceptual metaphor patterns proposed by Lakoff/Johnson, one 
metaphorical tenor may have diverse vehicles and one vehicle may also represent 
different tenors, proving the existence of vehicular diversity and multivalency in 
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metaphor. For instance, as a metaphorical vehicle in orientational metaphors, “up” can 
be employed to describe many tenors such as “happy”, “good”, “unknown”, “more”, 
“finished”, and “rational” among which no coherence in meaning can be found. 
As mentioned earlier, the fact of arbitrary metaphoricity hit the conceptual 
metaphor theory right on the head. Lakoff/Johnson believe that the iconic relation 
between Love and Journey is fundamental in the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY, which is not true. In real language situations, the right side of the equation 
may be replaced by a nearly unlimited number of other things, events, or life situations, 
such as “<drama>, <a book>, <poetry>, <a song>, <tea>, <water>, <a lamp>, 
<porcelain>, <a bridge>, <flax>, <flower>, <smoke>, <a dream>, <fantasy >, <a 
bubble>, <a shadow>, <a picture>, <a riddle>, <fog>, <huge waves>, <wine>, 
<electricity>, <wind>, <fire>, <a poker game>, <a chess game>, <a dinner party>, <stars 
and constellations>, <duckweed>, <stock market>, <dust>, <long-distance running>, <a 
bus ride>, <morning dew>, <flower in a mirror>, <moon reflection in the water>” (Ding 
2010: 93), and so on. One of Bei Dao’s poem may further prove our point here. In the 
poem entitled A Bouquet, the Chinese poet depicted “love” through a number of 
metaphorical vehicles: <a bay>, <a sail>, <the two faithful ends of a rope>, <a fountain, 
a wind>, <a shrill childhood cry>, <a picture frame>, <a window>, <a field covered with 
wild flowers>, <a breath>, <a bed>, <a night that keeps the stars company>, <a calendar>, 
<a compass>, <a ray of light that slips through the gloom>, <a resume>, <a bookmark>, 
<a preface that comes at the end>, <a gauze curtain>, <a mist>, <a lamp shining into my 
drams>, <a bamboo flute>, <a wordless song>, <a closed eyelid carved in stone>, <a 
chasm>, <a pool>, <an abyss plunging down>, <a balustrade>, <a wall>, <an eternal 
pattern on a shield>. (Bei Dao 1986: 36-37, my translation) As shown in the above 
examples, love can be metaphorizaed by almost everything beyond the scope of any 
conceptual metaphor Lakoff/Johnson propose. Once again, arbitrary metaphoricity 
reveals the superfluousness of Lakoff/Johnson’s conceptual metaphors. 
As mentioned in the previous section, things might be interpreted differently from 
culture to culture and from region to region (Qian 1998; Ding 2010). And the same thing 
might be interpreted quite differently in different historical periods. All these contribute 
to our diversified views on things and give rise to vehicular diversity and multivalency 
in metaphor, which validates the theory of arbitrary metaphoricity and arbitrary iconicity. 
Although the linkage between a metaphorical signifier and a metaphorical signified is 
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arbitrary in nature, the whole process of metaphorization reveals the value orientation of 
the group of people who use them (Ding 2009; Ding 2010). Most of the time, connections 
between a tenor and a vehicle represent collective memory of a group of sign users, and 
that is why Ding (2010) suggests that we should reconnect the relation between metaphor 
and culture. In one of his articles entitled “Metaphor and Culture”, Ding (2009; 2010) 
made a comprehensive examination of metaphorical patterns in the Chinese culture, 
indicating a promising direction for the future study of metaphor.  
In addition to the concept of arbitrary iconicity, Ding (2016: 168) further put 
forward the concept of arbitrary indexicality in his newly published article “Rethinking 
the Peircean trichotomy of icon, index, and symbol”.  
Whatever circumstance they are in, indexical signs are born out of their users’ 
interpretations or judgments of the relationship between things or events. If event A 
frequently occurs prior to event B, one could interpret the former as an indexical 
sign of the latter as in the case of dark cloud leading to rain. One could also perform 
his/her deduction inversely in which case B becomes an indexical sign of A. For 
example, because fire often precedes smoke in time, if one sees smoke in a certain 
place, he/she could conclude from this that there was a fire in the same location 
earlier. Many semioticians view such a relationship as one of cause and effect, which 
is not exactly the case because a dark cloud does not always lead to rain and smoke 
is not necessarily caused by a preceding fire. 
Another example may be found in the indexical signs of a ship. The keel is usually 
adopted by English users to represent a ship as is shown in “a thousand keels approached 
the shore”. In other words, keel as a part is an index of ship as a whole. Meanwhile, 
English speakers also use “sail” to represent ship, as reflected in the phrase “in sail” or 
“set sail”. In Chinese, “sail” is also more often used to represent ship as is revealed in the 
expression “千帆竞渡” /qian fan jing du/ ‘A thousand sails are competing in the boat 
race’. Obviously, which exact part might be adopted to serve as an index of the whole is 
also arbitrary. In ancient time, people used horses as an important means of transportation. 
Those who rode strong horses and wore light fur were considered as being rich and noble. 
Confucius used “肥马轻裘” /fei ma qing qiu/ ‘on strong horses and in light fur’ to 
describe one of his disciples. Such expression is frequently adopted by many other people, 
especially the literati. Gradually, strong horse and light fur are symbolized and become 
an idiom in Chinese. People in the 21st century do not use horses as their major means 
of transportation. Instead, they use cars. Luxurious cars thus replace strong horses in 
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representing great fortune. If Confucius lives in 21st century, it is very likely that he will 
use fancy car instead of strong horse to represent richness and luxury. Ding (2016: 168-
169) himself has given us a rather extreme example of arbitrary indexicality: 
An extreme example of the arbitrariness of indexicality comes from the dynastic 
histories of ancient China where, even though the emperor held supreme power, his 
courtiers could still exert some moral influence over him through a semiotic theory 
of “telepathy between humans and nature” (天人感应). According to such a theory, 
if an emperor misconducts himself, he would lose the Mandate of Heaven, resulting 
in huge and frequent natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and droughts 
(Fairbank and Goldman 2006: 48). For us moderns, there is no testable causal 
connection between the moral conduct of a person and the natural phenomena that 
transpire afterwards, but that did not prevent ancient Chinese scholars from 
interpreting the latter as indexical signs of the former. The story proves once again 
that indexical signs are the results of making arbitrary connections between things 
and events by sign users and not all connections are equally convincing in terms of 
general acceptability. 
Another good example for arbitrary indexicality can be found in the formation of 
the Chinese Zodiac (See Figure 2). The Chinese Zodiac is a classification scheme that 
assigns an animal to each year in a repeating 12-year cycle. It derives from the Ancient 
Five Elements Theory, and every sign in Chinese culture is composed by the five 
elements.  
 
Figure 2. The Chinese Zodiac 
The pairing between each animal and its denotatum, the earthly branch, is shown as 
follows: 
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1. Rat – 鼠 (子) (Yang, 1st Trine, Fixed Element Water) 
2. Ox – 牛 (丑) (Yin, 2nd Trine, Fixed Element Earth) 
3. Tiger – 虎 (寅) (Yang, 3rd Trine, Fixed Element Wood) 
4. Rabbit – 兔 or 兎 (卯) (Yin, 4th Trine, Fixed Element Wood) 
5. Dragon – 龍 / 龙 (辰) (Yang, 1st Trine, Fixed Element Earth) 
6. Snake – 蛇 (巳) (Yin, 2nd Trine, Fixed Element Fire) 
7. Horse – 馬 / 马 (午) (Yang, 3rd Trine, Fixed Element Fire) 
8. Goat – 羊 (未) (Yin, 4th Trine, Fixed Element Earth) 
9. Monkey – 猴 (申) (Yang, 1st Trine, Fixed Element Metal) 
10. Rooster – 雞 / 鸡 (酉) (Yin, 2nd Trine, Fixed Element Metal) 
11. Dog – 狗 / 犬 (戌) (Yang, 3rd Trine, Fixed Element Earth) 
12. Pig – 豬  / 猪  ( 亥 ) (Yin, 4th Trine, Fixed Element Water) 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_zodiac) 
Some people assume that the formation of the Chinese Zodiac is based on a certain 
similarity between each animal and its corresponding earthly branch. However, 
according to the existing literature, we cannot find any reliable evidence that can justify 
an iconic relation between them. In fact, the formation of the Chinese Zodiac is not based 
on similarity but contiguity. Thus, the relation between the chosen animal and its 
corresponding earthly branch is indexical. At the initial stage of the formation of Zodiac, 
ancient fortune-tellers randomly picked 12 animals they were familiar with to represent 
each of the earthly branch in a 12-year circle. They are picked because all of them were 
very closely related to farming activities in an agricultural culture. The only imaginative 
animal, Dragon or Long, is, in fact, also relative to farming, for Dragon is in charge of 
rain in Chinese mythology. Perhaps, that is the reason why fish was not picked, since 
fish is mainly rooted in oceanic culture. However, there is no reason to explain why other 
animals, like duck and donkey, of the farming culture were not chosen as a symbol. In 
this sense, it is safe to say that, although the relation between each animal and the earthly 
branch it represents is generally based on contiguity, the relation between each pair is 
still not intrinsic but arbitrary. In other words, each animal can be replaced by many other 
ones in our life, and the choosing of them is rather haphazard. After its formation, people 
begin to discover similarities between the two items in each pair. Our feelings on each 
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of the 12 animals might differ very much from one another, but, in each year, we can 
always find some way to interpret the sign positively. One important reason might be 
that zodiac animal also represent Chinese people’s year of birth, and, when we celebrate 
our year of birth, our affection is also transferred to the animal representing the year. In 
fact, given the numerous semantic features we can discover in things, it is not at all 
difficult for us to find positive features in each animal and relate them with the values 
we treasure. Gradually, some similarities between the animal and its denotatum become 
more and more stable, and these indices are thus iconified in Chinese culture. Take the 
first animal “rat” for example. In real life, they are often believed to be very disgusting 
animals. As a zodiac sign, however, rat receives praise from Chinese people. It is true 
that rats steal food, but they store some food for future consumption and thus are viewed 
as good at managing fortunes. In this way, Chinese people connect rats with the value of 
fortune. Another feature people get from rats is that they reproduce fast. In China, we 
deem it a happy thing to have many children and grandchildren. Indeed, we human beings 
are very good at creating a self-consistent bubble to live in. We can always find a reason 
to like something, or to hate something, thanks to our ability in abductive reasoning. We 
never live by any conceptual metaphors. If there is something we live by, it should be the 
abductive reasoning that underlies the whole process. Similarly, indexical vehicles 
adopted in the Chinese 八卦 /ba gua/ ‘the Eight Diagrams’ (eight combinations of three 
whole or broken lines formerly used in divination) in The Book of Changes are also as 
arbitrary as the indexical relations in Chinese Zodiac.  
In a nutshell, the facts of arbitrary iconicity, arbitrary metaphoricity, and arbitrary 
indexicality further prove that the motivations in icons and indices are not based on 
absolute relations, and the fact that these indices and iconic signs are motivated “does 
not in the least contradict the general principle of the arbitrariness of signs” (Ding 2014: 
134); rather arbitrariness and motivatedness coexist in our language and sign system. 
3.3 Umberto Eco’s Metaphorology 
The Italian scholar Umberto Eco is an eminent theorist of semiotics who aims to establish 
a general and rigorous theory able to explain the mechanisms of signification. Like Ersu 
Ding, Umberto Eco also holds a Peircean view on metaphor. And from the following 
short remark by him, we can grasp his general idea in this respect: 
The “most luminous and therefore the most necessary and frequent” (Vico) of all 
tropes, the metaphor, defies every encyclopedic entry. It has been the object of 
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philosophical, linguistic, aesthetic, and psychological reflection since the beginning 
of time. (Eco 1984: 86) 
For Eco, the study of metaphor is an interdisciplinary enterprise that embraces nearly all 
subjects in the field of humanities. Habitually, he (Eco 1984: 88) would like to call the 
enterprise of metaphor study “metaphorology”, and his comments or criticism on the 
western discourse of metaphor in general was quite illuminating: 
Not the least of the contradictions encountered in a metaphorology is that, of the 
thousands and thousands of pages written about the metaphor, few add anything of 
substance to the first two or three fundamental concepts stated by Aristotle. In effect, 
very little has been said about a phenomenon concerning which, it seems, there is 
everything to say. The chronicle of the discussion on metaphors is the chronicle of 
a series of variations on a few tautologies, perhaps on a single one: “A metaphor is 
that artifice which permits one to speak metaphorically.” Some of these variations, 
however, constitute an ‘epistemic break’, allowing the concepts to drift toward new 
territories – ever so slightly, but just enough. It is with these variations that we shall 
be concerned. 
For Eco, most theorists of metaphorology are only repeating or at best making footnotes 
on major concepts or problems raised by Aristotle, while few of them make real insights 
into the core issue of metaphor. Eco (1984) made such comments on the basis of a careful 
scrutiny of the western discourse of metaphor developed from Aristotle to Vico, with an 
attempt to grasp the real impulse of metaphor. While making the above remark, Eco was 
also quite aware of the theoretical dilemma the western academia is confronting:  
Every discourse on metaphor originates in a radical choice: either (a) language is by 
nature, and originally, metaphorical, and the mechanism of metaphor establishes 
linguistic activity, every rule or convention arising thereafter in order to discipline, 
to reduce (and impoverish) the metaphorizing potential that defines man as a 
symbolic animal: or (b) language (and every other semiotic system) is a rule-
governed mechanism, a predictive machine that says which phrases can be generated 
and which not, and which from those able to be generated are ‘good’ or ‘correct’, or 
endowed with sense; a machine with regard to which the metaphor constitutes a 
breakdown, a malfunction, an unaccountable outcome, but at the same time the drive 
toward linguistic renewal. (Eco 1984: 88) 
The two radical views on language and metaphor depict the tension between literal 
meaning and metaphorical meaning. However, the point is that both views in the above 
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statement saw metaphor from inside of the language system, and none of them was able 
to see metaphor from outside. Eco (1976: 61) thus argues in his theory of codes: 
Within the theory of codes it is unnecessary to resort to the notion of extension, nor 
to that of possible worlds; the codes, insofar as they are accepted by a society, set 
up a ‘cultural’ world which is neither actual nor possible in the ontological sense; its 
existence is linked to a cultural order, which is the way in which a society thinks, 
speaks and, while speaking, explains the ‘purport’ of thought through other thoughts. 
In order to get out of the dilemma perplexing western discourse of metaphor, Eco 
suggested that we have an external view to see metaphor from a cultural context in which 
encyclopedia knowledge of members of the culture community plays a vital role for 
metaphor production. By doing this, he also emphasized the subjective nature of 
metaphor. In other words, Umberto Eco (1976, 1984) aimed to establish a cultural 
framework for metaphor study. As an interactionalist, he criticized the traditional 
ontological view of metaphor who confined their discussion on ontological similarity in 
metaphor, and contended, like Ersu Ding, that we should go beyond the ontology of 
metaphor to meet the cultural dimension of metaphor. His point in this respect was well 
summarized by Bent Sørensen (2011: 152-153): 
Eco stresses that similarity has nothing to do with presumed ontological relations or 
the structure of reality itself. Similarity is coherent, not motivated, and depends only 
on a set of rules and conventions of a symbolic character. Or in other words, 
similarity is determined culturally – with close affinity to the nominalistic thesis. 
Consequently, if we want to be able to analyze and understand the concept of 
similarity we must not make any recourse to the world of objects and things; 
similarity is a purely semiotical matter according to Eco. This is also in consistence 
with the fact that Eco does not grant the referent any place in his definition of the 
sign; he even speaks of the “referential fallacy”, that is, the erroneous assumption 
that the content of an expression has anything to do with a corresponding referent. 
Eco does not want to deny the existence of objects in an extra-semiotic world, but 
what he wants is to avoid making an ontological commitment of any sort. 
Evidently, for Eco, similarity is a cultural product, and thus the only effective way of 
examining it is in the cultural framework. Of course, Eco’s awareness of metaphor in 
culture did not come out of thin air; rather, it was a result of integrating different 
conceptions and theories of other thinkers, especially notions of Vico and Peirce. In fact, 
Eco based his theory of meaning and a general theory of the sign mainly on the Peircean 
semiotics, and many of Eco’s important concepts are, in fact, developed from the two 
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key Peircean concepts of “interpretant” and the “unlimited semiosis”. There is no 
exception for his metaphorology, and we explain them one by one in this section. 
To begin with, Eco developed a cultural framework for metaphor interpretation 
from the Peircean concepts of “interpretant” and “community”. The term “interpretant” 
in Peirce consists of not only the immediate receiver (including self-interpretation by the 
sign producer) of the sign but also any possible interpreter in the process of unlimited 
semiosis. As we have discussed in section one of this chapter, interpretant presupposes 
human factors or sign users. Interpretant refers to the idea and information people get 
from a sign on the basis of not only individual knowledge but also common knowledge 
of a group in a society. In other words, the term interpretant is socio-culturally defined. 
In addition to interpretant, Peirce adopts the philosophical term “community” (CP 2.654; 
CP 5.311; CP 8.101; cf. Liszka 1996: 83-88) to refer to the actual space where reality is 
acknowledged and where people of the same culture reach agreement through 
negotiation and communication with the help of signs. We shall have a look at what 
Peirce has to say on this respect: 
The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally 
result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, 
the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially 
involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a 
definite increase of knowledge. … And so those two series of cognition -- the real 
and the unreal -- consist of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the community 
will always continue to re-affirm; and of those which, under the same conditions, 
will ever after be denied. (CP 5.311) 
For Peirce, a community is where knowledge increases and mutual agreements among 
members are made. The following exposition about the conditions of the Peircean 
“community” by Liszka (1996: 83) may help us to achieve a better understanding of the 
somewhat abstract concept by Peirce: 
In one sense, then, a community requires that its members be capable of coming into 
an immediate or mediate intellectual relation; in other words, the first formal 
condition of having a community is that its members are capable of mediative or 
sign-interpreting capacity to some degree. Second, there must be some connection 
or relation, especially a communicative one, between such sign users. Third, this 
passage suggests that this connection or relation must be established as “ours” in 
some sense, that is, there must be some identification with this relation on the part 
of those so related. The first condition allows the possibility of the second, since 
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signs enable us to transform objects or events into meanings, which in turn allow the 
possibility of something being shared and shared in a communicative fashion. The 
second condition allows for the possibility of the third, since identifying shared 
meanings as “ours” assumes that there is, first of all, something that can be shared. 
For Peirce, a sign is not an isolated term; rather, it is situated in the process of unlimited 
semiosis. Similarly, a sign-interpreting agency or a sign user is always “intrinsically 
related to other sign users. Sign and community are inherently correlative.” (Liszka 1996: 
84) In a secular sense, therefore, the Peircean community refers to the cultural 
community for sign users. 
Vico’s concept of common sense is also important for the development of Eco’s 
cultural framework. For Vico (1948: 57), common sense is “judgment without reflection, 
shared by an entire class, an entire people, an entire nation, or the whole human race”. 
Vico’s common sense also serves as the source of metaphorical thinking and 
understanding. The following remark elucidates the position of common sense in Vico’s 
theory of memory and imagination: 
A topos in Vico’s sense is brought about by a metaphor conceived as an imaginative 
universal. Sensory topics are the primordial places, or loci, of the human mind. They 
make up its common sense, its sensus communis. In the Study Methods Vico says 
that the young must be educated in memory and imagination so that they can acquire 
common sense. Without common sense there is no basis for the mind to bring forth 
the basis of arguments. (Verene 1981: 175) 
Eco (1984) also understood Vico’s theory of metaphor from a cultural perspective, and 
he made a rather concise but accurate comment on his compatriot: 
… Vico’s semiotic resembles, more than an aesthetics of ineffable creativity, a 
cultural anthropology that recognizes the categorical indices on which metaphors 
are based, indices whose historical conditions, birth, and variety it researches even 
as it explores the variety of brave deeds, of medallions, and of fables. (Eco 1984: 
108) 
Based on the theories of Vico and Peirce, Eco (1984) further established his own 
theory of meaning: a theory of encyclopedia. He sees interpretation of signs as an open-
ended process that involves knowledge of all kinds. Following Peirce, he contends that 
the semiotic triad is a recursive process that gives rise to a sequence of sign functions 
and involves our encyclopedic knowledge. Such shared encyclopedic knowledge formed 
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during the process of semiosis resembles the aforementioned “common sense” in Vico 
(1948). Eco (1984: 68) thus elaborated the concept “encyclopedia” as follows: 
If a dictionary is a disguised encyclopedia, then the only possible representation of 
the content of a given lexical item cannot be provided except in terms of an 
encyclopedia. If the so-called universals or metatheoretical constructs that work as 
markers within a dictionary-like representation are mere linguistic labels that cover 
more synthetic properties, an encyclopedia-like representation assumes that the 
representation of the content takes place only by means of interpretants in a process 
of unlimited semiosis. These interpretants being in their turn interpretable, there is 
no bidimensional tree able to represent the global semantic competence of a given 
culture. 
As elaborated in the above statement, the semiotic encyclopedia is situated in the 
unlimited semiosis in the Peircean sense. In fact, encyclopedia is developed from various 
forms of interpretant in the process of semiosis. Therefore, it is necessary for us to take 
a close look at this key term in Peircean semiotics. 
Peirce developed the term “semeiosis” (original spelling by Peirce) from a Greek 
treatise of the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus in which “semeiosis” was frequently 
referred to (Fisch 1978: 40-41). The word “semeiosis” is a derivation from the Greek 
verb “semeio” which means “to mark”, and the Greek suffix “-sis” means “act, action, 
activity, or process of” (Fisch 1978: 41); thus, the derivation refers to any form of activity, 
conduct, or process that involves signs, including the production of meaning. Put very 
briefly, semeiosis is sign action, sign process, or sign-interpretation. Peirce understands 
semeiosis in Philodemus’ treatise from either of the two aspects: “(1) from the side of 
the sign, as sign action, the functioning of a sign, or (2) from the side of the interpretant, 
as sign-interpreting or inferring from signs.” (Fisch 1978: 41) Peircean semiotics entails 
the two aspects in one same semeiosis: “To act as a sign is to determine an interpretant.” 
(Fisch 1978: 41) Although Peirce prefers the word “semeiosis”, his successors like Eco 
also use the word “semiosis” to designate the same concept. According to Peirce, 
semiosis is “an action, or influence, which is, or involves, an operation of three subjects, 
such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any 
way resolvable into an action between pairs” (CP 5.484). What to Peirce is most 
important is that semiosis contains logical processes of inferences. Johansen (1993) has 
provided us with an insightful summary in terms of the whole process: “Since each sign 
interprets the previous sign, each is at the same time an interpretant of the sign prior to it 
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and a sign interpreted by a subsequent sign.” (Johansen 1993: 80) To put it another way, 
the knowledge we gain from understanding the meaning of a certain thing or the 
significance of an event can serve as the experience or preunderstanding of our 
subsequent activities. Such unlimited semiosis is the very mechanism that processes 
meaning, concepts, knowledge, and experience at the same time so as to demonstrate the 
actual process of our understanding. 
The process of semiosis begins the time we perceive the world, and, as defined 
by Peirce, it results in the growth of knowledge. Put differently, through his theory of 
semiosis, Peirce aims to elucidate the process of human communication and knowledge 
growth (Johansen 1993). By contending “a sign is something by knowing which we know 
something more” (CP 8.332), Peirce describes sign as the only medium through which 
we can get new knowledge. In other words, the way we gain new knowledge is 
fundamentally semiotic, or to be more exact, iconic (metaphorical). Thus, for Eco, one 
important function of metaphor is that it adds fresh meaning and new knowledge to our 
life, and he called this the cognitive value of metaphor. 
And, finally, we must ask whether the metaphor is an expressive mode with 
cognitive value. As an ornament, the metaphor is of no interest to us, because, if it 
says more pleasantly that which can be said otherwise, then it could be explained 
wholly within the scope of a semantics of denotation. We are interested in the 
metaphor as an additive, not substitutive, instrument of knowledge. (Eco 1984: 89) 
Through the concept of encyclopedia, Eco demonstrated how various kinds of 
interpretants in the unlimited semiosis actually work. Indeed, the notion of encyclopedia 
represents “the global semantic competence of a given culture”, and it is thus “multi-
dimensional” rather than “bidimensional” (Eco 1984: 68). As a core concept in Eco’s 
theory of meaning, encyclopedia is defined as being opposed to the other concept 
“dictionary”. Eco (2014: 3) further elaborated the distinction between dictionary 
meaning and encyclopedia meaning. 
In defining a term (and its corresponding concept), the dictionary model is expected 
to take into account only those properties necessary and sufficient to distinguish that 
particular concept from others; in other words, it ought to contain only those 
properties defined by Kant as analytical (analytical being that a priori judgment in 
which the concept functioning as predicate can be deduced from the definition of 
the subject). Thus the analytical properties of dog would be ANIMAL, MAMMAL, 
and CANINE (on the basis of which a dog is distinguishable from a cat, and it is 
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logically incorrect and semantically inaccurate to say of something that it is a dog 
but it is not an animal). This definition does not assign to the dog the properties of 
barking or being domesticated: these are not necessary properties (because there 
may be dogs incapable of barking and/or hostile to man) and are not part of our 
knowledge of a language but of our knowledge of the world. They are therefore 
matter for the encyclopedia. 
As shown in the above statement, unlike the fairly restricted dictionary meaning, 
encyclopedia in Eco represents “the sum total of knowledge” (Eco 2014: 22) we possess 
about the world. It should be pointed out that Eco’s semiotic conception of encyclopedia 
and dictionary are different from the encyclopedia and dictionary “in the flesh”, i.e., the 
ones in our library or bookshelf, in that, oftentimes, dictionary “in the flesh” is not 
composed according to the dictionary model. Through the concepts of dictionary and 
encyclopedia, Eco stresses two different models of semantic representation. The notions 
have been adopted by various disciplines (like semiotics, psychology, linguistics, the 
cognitive sciences, and the philosophy of language) “to identify two models of semantic 
representation, models that in turn refer back to a general representation of knowledge 
and/or the world” (Eco 2014: 3).  
Eco (2014) employed the concept “tree” to represent his notion of dictionary and 
the concept “labyrinth” to represent his notion of encyclopedia. He described the network 
of the “labyrinth” as a multidimensional polygon. For Eco (1984: 81), “the best image” 
of the net of encyclopedia or the “labyrinth” is a rhizome (See Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. The Rhizome 
The philosophical concept of rhizome was first defined by Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari in their collaborated book A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 
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1987). Based on Deleuze and Guattari’s exposition, Eco (1984: 81-82) further specified 
the features of a rhizome: 
The characteristics of a rhizomatic structure are the following: (a) Every point of the 
rhizome can and must be connected with every other point. (b) There are no points 
or positions in a rhizome; there are only lines … (c) A rhizome can be broken off at 
any point and reconnected following one of its own lines. (d) The rhizome is 
antigenealogical. (e) The rhizome has its own outside with which it makes another 
rhizome; therefore, a rhizomatic whole has neither outside nor inside. (f) A rhizome 
is not a calque but an open chart which can be connected with something else in all 
of its dimensions; it is dismountable, reversible, and susceptible to continual 
modifications. (g) A network of trees which open in every direction can create a 
rhizome … (h) No one can provide a global description of the whole rhizome; not 
only because the rhizome is multidimensionally complicated, but also because its 
structure changes through the time; moreover, in a structure in which every node can 
be connected with every other node, there is also the possibility of contradictory 
inferences: if p, then any possible consequence of p is possible, including the one 
that, instead of leading to new consequences, leads again to p, so that it is true at the 
same time both that if p, then q and that if p, then non-q. (i) A structure that cannot 
be described globally can only be described as a potential sum of local descriptions. 
(j) In a structure without outside, the describers can look at it only by the inside…. 
Evidently, a rhizome is open-ended, and we may never hope to predict what the next 
connection will be. The construction of a rhizome thus provides a space for abductive 
reasoning. The meaning in our mind comes from our conceptualization of a thing, an 
event, or particular segment of our life experience in the world. Semantic features thus 
constitute our knowledge of the meaning of the world. As part of the encyclopedia, 
semantic features of a thing, an event, or life situations in our mind are not well-structured 
but rhizomatically linked with each other. The following remark by Ding (2014: 127) in 
this respect is very illuminating: 
Even at the most basic level where a semiotic form is supposed to be a direct 
mimicry of the extra-semiotic object it denotes, icons vary a great deal from one 
culture to another. Like a word in language, an object or life situation is always part 
of a larger structure showing various relations to the others and it can also be 
analyzed into innumerable semantic features that are rhizomic in nature. Which of 
these features are chosen to represent the object or life situation as a whole depends 
very much on what Umberto Eco calls the “recognition codes” of a particular culture 
(1976: 206). 
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The above remark insightfully depicted the actual process of metaphorization. Moreover, 
it also indicates Eco’s cultural view of metaphor. Indeed, Eco’s insightful exposition on 
the structure of human culture in a form of the encyclopedia deserves a thorough perusal: 
The universe of semiosis, that is, the universe of human culture, must be conceived 
as structured like a labyrinth of the third type: (a) It is structured according to a 
network of interpretants. (b) It is virtually infinite because it takes into account 
multiple interpretations realized by different cultures: a given expression can be 
interpreted as many times, and in as many ways, as it has been actually interpreted 
in a given cultural framework: it is infinite because every discourse about the 
encyclopedia casts in doubts the previous structure of the encyclopedia itself. (c) It 
does not register only ‘truths’ but, rather, what has been said about the truth or what 
has been believed to be true as well as what has been believed to be false or 
imaginary or legendary, provided that a given culture had elaborated some discourse 
about some subject matter; the encyclopedia does not register only the ‘historical’ 
truth that Napoleon died on Saint Helena but also the ‘literary’ truth that Juliet died 
in Verona. (d) Such a semantic encyclopedia is never accomplished and exists only 
as a regulative idea; it is only on the basis of such a regulative idea that one is able 
actually to isolate a given portion of the social encyclopedia so far as it appears 
useful in order to interpret certain portions of actual discourses (and texts). (e) Such 
a notion of encyclopedia does not deny the existence of structured knowledge; it 
only suggests that such a knowledge cannot be recognized and organized as a global 
system; it provides only ‘local’ and transitory systems of knowledge, which can be 
contradicted by alternative and equally ‘local’ cultural organizations; every attempt 
to recognize these local organizations as unique and ‘global’ – ignoring their 
partiality – produces an ideological bias. (Eco 1984: 83-84) 
For Eco, our sum total of knowledge about the world is an encyclopedia that contains so 
many semantic features that it can be related to almost anything, which accordingly 
serves as the unlimited source for metaphorical association. To exemplify this, let us 
come back to the lion metaphor in The Old Man and the Sea we illustrated earlier. We 
may find that both the formation and the interpretation of the lion metaphor need our 
encyclopedia knowledge. Hemingway’s encyclopedia knowledge of the lion gave rise to 
the frequent appearances of the word “lion” in the novel, while any other writer, who has 
the experience and knowledge different from Hemingway, might use another cultural 
unit such as “tiger” or the Chinese “Long” to substitute “lion” in the novel. On the other 
hand, semantic features of “lion” in readers’ mind are the source of metaphorical 
interpretation. Thus, we can say that the meaning of metaphor is based on encyclopedia 
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knowledge of interpreting subjects rather than any preexisting concepts. Eco (1984: 127) 
thus has the following to say: 
The success of a metaphor is a function of the sociocultural format of the interpreting 
subjects’ encyclopedia. In this perspective, metaphors are produced solely on the 
basis of a rich cultural framework, on the basis, that is, of a universe of content that 
is already organized into networks of interpretants, which decide (semiotically) the 
identities and differences of properties. At the same time, content universe, whose 
format postulates itself not as rigidly hierarchized but, rather, according to Model Q, 
alone derives from the metaphorical production and interpretation the opportunity 
to restructure itself into new nodes of similarity and dissimilarity. 
For Eco, the meaning of a metaphor should be interpreted in the cultural framework based 
on a specific cultural community rather than in a presupposed hierarchical structure. Let 
us come back to the metaphor of the steamed bun is smiling we illustrated earlier in 
chapter two to explain Eco’s framework of metaphor interpretation. Chinese people tend 
to avoid saying words like “break” or “rupture” during the joyous occasions in hope of a 
good fortune. Thus, instead of saying “the bun is broken”, housewives in northern China 
say: “the bun is smiling”. Such euphemistic usage is obviously a metaphor. One crucial 
reason for the formation of this particular metaphor lies in the traditional culture of saying 
auspicious words during happy events in China which inspires people to use their 
association and imagination rather than describe the fact as it is (As a matter of fact, too 
much soda is the main cause of the dehiscence.). The same cultural habit works in another 
similar situation. As a tradition, Chinese dumplings are prepared on the New Year’s Day. 
During cooking, some dumplings might rupture in the boiling water, and, seeing this, 
housewives often use the phrase 挣了 /zheng le/ as a euphemism for 破了 /po le/ 
‘ruptured’ to describe the broken dumplings, which metaphorically means “(the 
dumplings) have earned money”. The connection here lies in that the Chinese word 挣 
/zheng/ contains the dual meanings of “to earn money” and “to rupture”, whereas the 
Chinese word 破 /po/ only has one meaning of “to rupture”. In other words, Chinese 
people are more willing to link the broken dumplings with the word 挣 /zheng/ instead 
of the word 破 /po/ for auspicious associations like getting rich. Thus, calling the broken 
dumplings 挣了 /zheng le/ is a metaphor for making a fortune in the coming year.  
Understanding the role of culture in metaphor formation and change is essential 
for us to understand the nature of metaphor. To take the formation of the hare-moon 
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metaphor in Chinese culture for example. Chinese people often use 嫦娥 /chang’e/ 
‘Chang’e’ or 玉兔 /yu tu/ ‘the Jade Hare’ to metaphorize the moon. In fact, the two 
vehicles are more likely to have been derived from the same story of Chang’e. According 
to the ancient Chinese mythology, the body of Chang’e had undergone tremendous 
changes during the process of her flying to the moon, and she finally became an ugly 
toad. By logic, it is the toad that should be adopted as the metaphorical vehicle of the 
moon, not the hare. However, toad is ugly and disgusting, and thus not an auspicious 
animal in the Chinese culture. (In fact, the English word “toad” also has a meaning of 
being disgusting as is recorded in the phrase “as ugly as a toad”.) For this reason, people 
are reluctant to use the toad vehicle to talk about the moon. Meanwhile, the Jade Hare 
had a vulgar name: 膽兔 /dan tu/, which has a similar pronunciation with the Chinese 
phrase 蟾蜍 /chan chu/, i.e., they are homophones especially in the ancient Chinese. Due 
to Chinese people’ affection for the lovely appearance of hare, they gradually abandoned 
the former toad vehicle and began to use the hare vehicle more frequently. Overtime, 
People add the word Jade to the hare vehicle to form an even more auspicious 
metaphorical vehicle of the moon – the Jade Hare. Evidently, cultural factors play a vital 
role in the formation of the Jade Hare vehicle of the moon.  
In fact, many metaphorical patterns in Chinese culture are formed through 
combination of homophones, for Chinese language is rich in homophone or near 
homophones. Examples for this phenomenon include, to name just a few, 蝠 /fu/ ‘bat’ 
and 福 /fu/ ‘luck’; 鱼 /yu/ ‘fish’ and 余 /yu/ ‘surplus’; 鸡 /ji/ ‘rooster’ and 吉 /ji/ 
‘auspicious’; 鹿 /lu/ ‘deer’ and 禄 /lu/ ‘official’s emolument’ (Ding 2010: 114). Eco 
explains this phenomenon fairly clearly:  
In truth, though, the force of the pun (and of every successful and inventive metaphor) 
consists in the fact that prior to it no one had grasped the resemblance. Prior to 
‘Jungfraud’ there was no reason to suspect a relationship between Freud, 
psychoanalysis, fraud, lie, and lapsus (linguae or calami). The resemblance becomes 
necessary only after the contiguity is realized. Actually (FW itself is the proof), it is 
enough to find the means of rendering two terms phonetically contiguous for the 
resemblance to impose itself; at best, the similitude of signifiers (at least in the place 
of encounter) is that which precedes, and the similitude of signifieds is a 
consequence of it. (Quoted in Innis 1985: 256)  
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Take the pair of 蝠 /fu/ ‘bat’ and 福 /fu/ ‘luck’ for example. The value 福 /fu/ ‘luck’ in 
China is pursued by many. Since it has the same pronunciation with the word 蝠 /fu/ 
which is the Chinese character of “bat”, Chinese people often use the image of bat 
metaphorically as a sign of 福 /fu/. The image of 福 /fu/ can be found on the doors of 
many Chinese family during the Spring Festival, and it is usually placed reversely 
because the Chinese character for “reverse” ‘倒’ /dao/ is a homophone of the Chinese 
word for “come” ‘到’ /dao/. Thus, the reversed image of 福 /fu/ signifies “good luck is 
coming”. Since the similarity here is based on physical sound (word pronunciation), 
metaphors of this kind are language specific and thus culture specific. Indeed, culture 
plays a vital role in the formation of metaphor. It will be very hard for the American or 
British people to make a connection between luck and bats. For Chinese people, however, 
this connection is one of the most active metaphorical patterns. Some metaphorical 
patterns are based on physical form, which means that two sides are brought together by 
the resemblance of physical form. For instance, the mandarin ducks are always in pairs 
when they show up, and Chinese people have grasped this point and use it to represent 
couples or lovers. In addition to similarity, contiguity is also very important for such kind 
of metaphor. As is concluded by Ding (2010: 107), these culture-specific metaphorical 
expressions “originate in the unique social customs of their users”. Indeed, cultural 
factors are so vital in the formation of a metaphor that in many cases they can be called 
motivation of metaphor production. As a result of this motivation, a broader space of 
comparison and imagination is created in the process of metaphorization. Therefore, 
interpretation of such metaphors should be brought back to the specific cultural context 
where they are produced. 
In addition to emphasizing Eco’s cultural framework for metaphor interpretation, 
we should at the same time realize one result of cultural diversity: people of different 
cultures may view things differently. In Aristotle’s famous metaphor “life is a stage”, life 
is compared to a stage where people perform. Danesi (2004: 11-12) made a rather 
convincing remark on this specific metaphor by Aristotle, which can also shed new light 
on the relation between metaphor and culture: 
Needless to say, Aristotle’s metaphor is understandable only to someone who is 
familiar with stages. What if this were not the case? The power of poetic logic lies 
in the fact that it allows people to come up with a metaphorical expression to render 
the same concept intelligible. Indeed, life could be compared to virtually anything 
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that would make sense in a specific cultural context, provided that it is exemplary of 
life in some way. So, for example, a statement such as life is a river coined in a 
culture where rivers play an important role in sustaining life would be “poetically 
logical” and, thus, highly effective in getting the job of explaining what life means 
done. 
In fact, many of the metaphors and metonymies we use are culture-specific. As averred 
by Ding (2010), metaphor conveys special meanings of a specific cultural tradition, and 
this cultural uniqueness is first and foremost connected to metaphor users’ specific social 
and living habits. The detailed cultural differences between westerners and easterners are 
also reflected by the different vehicles they respectively choose. Furthermore, vehicles 
of metaphor may come from historical classics and works in literary tradition, like 
historical biography, ancient mythology, and other literary works, which have caused 
even more obstacles in understanding metaphors cross-culturally.  
Thus, due to differences in culture and social customs, people across cultures and 
languages often have difficulty in understanding each other’s metaphorical expressions: 
…there are a fair number of metaphors where the connection between the vehicle 
and the tenor is made not on the basis of a common background shared by people 
across different languages but rather through some special knowledge about some 
unique aspects of the culture in which they appear. Specifically, some metaphors are 
difficult to understand because the vehicles used to illustrate the tenors belong 
exclusively to a particular way of living as manifested in social customs and textual 
traditions. (Ding 2010: 107) 
“More often than not”, as is further revealed by Ding (2010: 104), “the same life situation 
is metaphorically semiotized in different ways across languages and cultures.” This point 
may be exemplified by the bamboo metaphor in China. Since the center of the bamboo 
(its heart) is hollow, Chinese people often link it to a Chinese phrase 虚心 /xu xin/ 
‘modesty’ (Ding 2010). In other words, the bamboo is often used by Chinese people, 
especially the literati, to refer to humility. People from other cultures, however, may have 
difficulties understanding the related metaphors, and many of them are more likely to see 
the hollowness in bamboo as a mere physical phenomenon. The following statement on 
metaphorical non-coincidence across cultures by Ding (2010: 107) is essentially right: 
The reasons for such metaphorical disparity across languages are many, but the most 
important one derives from the fact that there are numerous cultural units available 
to the metaphor user, each of which consist of a huge bundle of semantic components 
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that can be used to illuminate various aspects of social life. Which cultural unit is 
eventually chosen to serve as a metaphorical vehicle for a particular life situation is 
decided arbitrarily and therefore unpredictable. 
Besides the metaphorical meaning of hollowness, bamboo as a cultural unit contains 
many other semantic components. The structure of this plant, for example, “is such that 
it breaks rather than bends, which makes it a perfect vehicle for the upright character of 
the Confucian scholar” (Ding 2010: 130). It needs to be pointed out that such “huge 
bundle of semantic components” in one cultural unit exist not in a hierarchical structure 
but in the shape of a rhizome, and which component will be triggered for metaphorical 
association depends to a great extent on the purpose of metaphor users. For this reason, 
we can say that the relationship between metaphor and culture is “mostly haphazard and 
therefore unpredictable” (Ding 2010: 112). And which aspects of things and phenomena 
are highlighted in the process of metaphorical conceptualization reflect the collective 
value orientations of the metaphor users in a certain cultural community (Ding 2010). 
What should be pointed out here is that, in the age of globalization, an increasing 
number of metaphors arise from cultural exchanges. In contemporary English, for 
instance, announcing one’s homosexual tendency to the public is called “coming out” or 
“coming out of the closet”, and those who do not want their homosexual tendency to be 
known by others are called “closeted”. This metaphorical meaning of the word “closet” 
evolves from the English expression “skeleton in the closet”, in which “closet” means 
something that can hide secrets. In the traditional Chinese culture, on the other hand, the 
word “closet” ‘柜’ /gui/ also refers to the place where the future husband hides. The 
meaning develops from a traditional Chinese drama called 柜中缘 /gui zhong yuan/ 
‘Romance in the Closet’, in which a young man hides in the closet of a young girl’s 
boudoir during his runaway from calamity. The drama ends with the young man luckily 
and happily marrying the young girl. Gradually, the word 柜 /gui/ ‘closet’ in Chinese 
obtains a metaphorical meaning of something that can bring lovers together. Evidently, 
there are some differences between the Chinese word 柜 /gui/ and the English word closet 
with respect to their metaphorical meanings. In the contemporary Chinese, however, the 
word 出柜 /chu gui/, literally ‘getting out of a closet’, also contains the metaphorical 
meaning of announcing one’s homosexual tendency to the public. Evidently, this new 
semantic feature of the Chinese word “柜” /gui/ is borrowed from the English language 
through cultural exchange. As a result, many Chinese young people today relate the 
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expression 柜中情 /gui zhong qing/ ‘romance in the closet’ to homosexual affairs rather 
than “heavenly marriage”. In fact, the traditional meaning is nearly forgotten by 
youngsters because most Chinese youngsters prefer movies and TV series to traditional 
Chinese drama, and, consequently, the association between 柜 /gui/ ‘closet’ and the 
traditional drama 《柜中缘》 /gui zhong yuan/ ‘Romance in the closet’ is scarcely 
triggered. This is proof that culture based metaphors will be forgotten by users with the 
decline of the culture or subculture they are rooted in. Furthermore, this example also 
shows that metaphor can be influenced by cultural exchange, especially in the era of 
globalization, and local culture is facing great challenge from cultural globalization. 
Expressions like “coming out” in English or “出柜” /chu gui/ in Chinese has become the 
language of our “global village”. Another pervasive metaphorical meaning of the 
Chinese 柜 /gui/ ‘closet’ comes from its homophonic counterpart: 贵 /gui/ ‘noble’ or 
‘honorable’. Because of the similarity in pronunciation, 柜 /gui/ is often associated with 
“nobleness” or “honorableness”. For instance, in the old days, Chinese parents would 
present their marrying daughter closets or wardrobes as her dowry, and, by doing this, 
they wanted to express their good wishes for their daughter to lead a noble life after 
getting married. Moreover, the Chinese phrase 柜子 /gui zi/ ‘closet’ or ‘wardrobes’, is a 
homophone of 贵子 /gui zi/ ‘noble son’, and bringing new closets or wardrobes in the 
room also has a metaphorical meaning of bringing new life to the newly founded family. 
The above two metaphorical meanings of 柜 /gui/ further enhanced its position as a 
positive or auspicious vehicle of marriage in Chinese culture. This is proof that people 
are good at extending their wishes with special objects in their life. Through repeated 
usage, the metaphorical meaning of these objects become relatively stable in a culture. 
The old meanings, such as “nobleness” and “noble son”, coexist with newly added 
meanings like “coming out” in the same cultural unit 柜 /gui/ ‘closet’. Which semantic 
feature will be chosen to represent a specific a thing, an event, or a life situation in 
metaphor, is dependent on real communicative contexts. This demonstrates the dynamic 
influence of culture on metaphor, and metaphorical meanings are mutable rather than 
static in a cultural framework. 
It should be further noted that the same cultural community may have multifarious 
links for one metaphorical tenor. For instance, ancient Chinese people use oil lamps and 
they thus consider the burning of oil as the passage of time. Time is thus seen from the 
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angle of oil consumption: the consuming of oil is related to the consuming of time. But 
to mean “surviving hard times”, people may use the word 熬 /ao/ ‘to boil, to endure’ 
which derived from boiling the oil in a pot. We also use 点灯熬油 /dian deng ao you/ 
‘lighting the oil lamp’ to express “staying up late”. Likewise, in the English language, 
people use “burning the midnight oil”. During the same period in ancient China, people 
also adopted gold as a metaphorical vehicle of time, which is reflected in the following 
phrase: 一寸光阴一寸金，寸金难买寸光阴 /yi cun guang yin yi cun jin, cun jin nan 
mai cun guang yin/ ‘an inch of time equals an inch of gold, and gold cannot buy time’. 
Therefore, the same “time” can be compared to “oil” and “gold”, and they are both vivid 
reflections of real life situations in language that reveals poetic wisdom. Obviously, 
living environment and cultural contexts are to some extent the soil of metaphor 
production, which have a much greater impact on metaphor than abstract metaphorical 
concepts and schemas in the cognitive theory. This is also a good example to explain 
why we do not live by any particular metaphor or particular sets of metaphors. 
In fact, the difference between Eco and Ding’s cultural view on metaphor and 
Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor lies in that the latter bases its 
argumentation on mutable intuition and untenable assumptions. Although 
Lakoff/Johnson also talk about metaphor in cultures, they actually based their arguments 
on individual’s intuition and postulation rather than the real culture of a community. The 
following argument by them well exemplifies their tendency of transforming individual’s 
speculation into culture norms: “Try to imagine a culture where arguments are not 
viewed in terms of war, where no one wins or loses, where there is no sense of attacking 
or defending, gaining or losing ground.” (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 4-5). As discussed 
in chapter one, this is a rather meaningless supposition. To our knowledge, there is no 
culture that cannot view argument as war. If they cannot prove the existence of such a 
culture, then their argument should be considered invalid. Second, argument can also be 
viewed from perspectives other than war even in the Western culture. The point is that 
you can never predict, let alone decide, what fresh vehicle will be adopted to represent 
the tenor in the next minute. When Lakoff/Johnson are making decisions on a particular 
metaphorical linking for “members” in a “culture” that only exists in their mind, the a 
priori and determinist nature of their theory becomes obvious. Cultural factors are 
reflected in real language use rather than the linguist’s mere imagination. 
Lakoff/Johnson’s fault also lies in their misunderstanding of culture. They did not see 
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culture as something based on a contract among members in a community; rather, they 
deem it as something that can be randomly supposed. By doing this, they actually left 
out the communal feature of culture. A cultural view of metaphor should base its 
arguments on real language materials from people of all walks of life.  
Compared with Eco’s notion of encyclopedia in metaphor, conceptual metaphors 
in Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory are more of dictionary-like representations. As 
metaphorical potentials, semantic features of objects or life situations are for Peirce 
rhizomaticly linked on the basis of encyclopedic knowledge shared by members of a 
particular culture. If you trigger one link of semantic features, you trigger the rhizomatic 
network of metaphorical association, for which Eco’s encyclopedic knowledge provides 
unlimited sources. Therefore, similarities in metaphor are not created but discovered. 
New or creative metaphors are often produced by a particular user of a particular cultural 
community under a particular communicative situation. It is in this sense that Eco (1984) 
believes no algorithm ever exists for metaphor and computer instructions cannot produce 
metaphors as human minds do. Indeed, metaphor is subject to no mathematical principle 
and therefore unpredictable. Dependent on the logic of similarity, metaphor creates new 
symbols and novel concepts, thus serving as an important vehicle for ever-changing 
communicative situations. 
3.4 Metaphor and Intersubjective Communication 
In the previous two sections of this chapter, we explored through the theories of two 
scholars the socio-cultural nature of metaphor. In doing this, we go beyond the ontology 
of metaphorical expressions to acquire a dynamic perspective on metaphor interpretation. 
What we should not forget is that metaphor is a type of language whose basic function is 
for communication. This means we should also investigate why people can understand 
each other’s metaphor. 
For this, we can turn to the theory of communicative action championed by the 
German thinker and philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1984, 1987a, 1987b). In his book The 
Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas talks about a kind of intersubjective 
rationality that is inherent in our communicative activities: 
If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially 
coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination has to be established 
through communication – and in certain central spheres through communication 
aimed at reaching agreement – then the reproduction of the species also requires 
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satisfying the conditions of a rationality that is inherent in communicative action. 
(Habermas 1984: 397) 
In his critique of the philosophy of the subject or the subject-centered reason, Habermas 
(1987b: 296-297) further argued that a model of mutual understanding may remedy the 
deficiency of Foucault’s radical critique of human sciences based on the philosophy of 
subject: 
If we can presuppose for a moment the model of action oriented to reach 
understanding that I have developed elsewhere, the objectifying attitude in which 
the knowing subject regards itself as it would entities in the external world is no 
longer privileged. Fundamental to the paradigm of mutual understanding is, rather, 
the performative attitude of participants in interaction, who coordinate their plans 
for action by coming to an understanding about something in the world. When ego 
carries out a speech act and alter takes up a position with regard to it, the two parties 
enter into an interpersonal relationship. The latter is structured by the system of 
reciprocally interlocked perspectives among speakers, hearers, and non-participants, 
who happen to be present at the time. On the level of grammar, this corresponds to 
the system of personal pronouns. Whoever has been trained in this system has 
learned how, in the performance attitude, to take up and to transform into one 
another the perspectives of the first, second, and third persons. 
Habermas’s theory of intersubjective communication is deemed as a modified 
version of Kantian Transcendentalism that aims to “establish the scope and validity of 
the different spheres of rationality through a reflection on the condition of the possibility 
of the types of communicative action” (Whitebook 1997: 173). Habermas argues that the 
human sciences’ attempt to escape from the contradictory self-thematization makes them 
“deeply ensnared in the self-reification of scientism” (Habermas 1987b: 294). Foucault’s 
critique of the philosophy of the subject through his theory of power attempted to “rise 
above those pseudo-sciences to a mere rigorous objectivity, and in doing so it gets caught 
all the more hopelessly in the trap of a presentist historiography, which sees itself 
compelled to a relativist self-denial and can give no account of the normative foundations 
of its own rhetoric” (Habermas 1987b: 294). In order to solve this problem, Habermas 
proposed a communicative model of action, which is very crucial for participants of a 
speech community to reach mutual agreements through a linguistic mediation. In other 
words, since the “the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness is exhausted” 
(Habermas, 1987b: 296), Habermas suggested a paradigm shift from the philosophy of 
consciousness to the paradigm of mutual understanding. As an analogy to the cognitive 
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a priori of Lukacs’s “form of objectivity” within the framework of the philosophy of the 
subject, Habermas (1987a: 187) introduced the concept of “a form of understating”: 
After the change of paradigm introduced by the theory of communication, the formal 
properties of the intersubjectivity of possible understanding can take the place of the 
conditions of the objectivity of possible experience. A form of mutual understanding 
represents a compromise between the general structures of communicative action 
and reproductive constraints unavailable as themes within a given lifeworld. 
The following review on Habermas’s idea on paradigm shift by Thomas 
McCarthy is concise but quite accurate: 
The key to Habermas’s approach is his rejection of the “paradigm of consciousness” 
and its associated “philosophy of the subject” in favor of the through-and-through 
intersubjectivist paradigm of “communicative action.” This is what he sees as the 
road open but not taken at the crucial junctures in the philosophical discourse of 
modernity. (Habermas 1987b: x) 
Besides a paradigm shift from the philosophy of consciousness, Habermas also suggested 
a paradigm shift from “the knowledge of objects” to “the paradigm of mutual 
understanding between subjects capable of speech and action” (Habermas 1987b: 295-
296). A more detailed discussion on intersubjective model of communication can be 
found in the following remarks: 
Now this attitude of participants in linguistically mediated interaction makes 
possible a different relationship of the subject to itself from the sort of objectifying 
attitude that an observer assumes toward entities in the external world. The 
transcendental-empirical doubling of the relation to self is only unavoidable so long 
as there is no alternative to this observer-perspective; only then does the subject have 
to view itself as the dominating counterpart to the world as a whole or as an entity 
appearing within it. No mediation is possible between the extramundane stance of 
the transcendental I and the intramundane stance of the empirical I. As soon as 
linguistically generated intersubjectivity gains primacy, this alternative no longer 
applies. Then ego stands within an interpersonal relationship that allows him to 
relate to himself as a participant in an interaction from the perspective of alter. And 
indeed this reflection undertaken from the perspective of the participant escapes the 
kind of objectification inevitable from the reflexively applied perspective of the 
observer. Everything gets frozen into an object under the gaze of the third person, 
whether directed inwardly or outwardly. The first person, who turns back upon 
himself in a performative attitude from the angle of vision of the second person, can 
recapitulate [nachvollziehen] the acts it just carried out. In place of reflectively 
155 
 
objectified knowledge – the knowledge proper to self-consciousness – we have a 
recapitulating reconstruction of knowledge already employed. (Habermas 1987b: 
297) 
As revealed in the above argument, the process of recapitulating reconstruction explains 
why people always understand new things on the basis of their old knowledge. This also 
indicates the process of the unlimited semiosis in human thought and communication. 
Therefore, it is safe to say that Habermas’s justification for intersubjective interaction or 
interpersonal communication through language has laid a solid foundation for a theory 
of intersubjective communication. Indeed, when “linguistically generated 
intersubjectivity gains primacy” (Habermas 1987b: 297), the problem will be solved as 
to the understanding between individual experiences. In this way, Habermas’s model of 
intersubjective communication can settle the problem in transcendental philosophy as 
depicted in the following statement: 
What earlier was relegated to transcendental philosophy, namely the intuitive 
analysis of self-consciousness, now gets adapted to the circle of reconstructive 
sciences that try to make explicit, from the perspective of those participating in 
discourses and interactions, and by means of analyzing successful or distorted 
utterances, the pretheoretical grasp of rules on the part of competently speaking, 
acting, and knowing subjects. Because such reconstructive attempts are no longer 
aimed at a realm of the intelligible beyond that of appearances, but at the actually 
exercised rule-knowledge that is deposited in correctly generated utterances, the 
ontological separation between the transcendental and the empirical is no longer 
applicable. As can be shown in connection with Jean Piaget’s genetic structuralism, 
reconstructive and empirical assumptions can be brought together in one and the 
same theory. In this way, the spell of an unresolved back-and-force between two 
aspects of self-thematization that are as inevitable as they are incompatible is broken. 
Consequently, we do not need hybrid theories any more to close the gap between 
the transcendental and the empirical. (Habermas 1987b: 297-298) 
As discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, Lakoff/Johnson’s embodied 
philosophy in cognitive theory of metaphor stopped at the question of how to bridge the 
gap between the transcendental and the empirical, leaving an ontological separation 
between the two. The lost link in Lakoff/Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor is the 
exact linguistically generated intersubjectivity put forward by Habermas. In fact, 
Lakoff/Johnson made a lot of discussions on embodied reason and transcendent reason, 
and they believed that these two approaches can never be compatible. They failed to not 
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realize that intersubjectivity is attainable through linguistic mediation, and accordingly 
an intersubjective reason can transcend individual’s utterance. The process of 
symbolization is also a very typical result of linguistically generated intersubjective 
reason. As discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, after the process of 
symbolization, indices and icons become the Peircean symbols or conventional language 
expressions. The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1959: 14) understood this 
process as signing a social contact by members of a speech community: 
Language is a well-defined object in the heterogeneous mass of speech facts. It can 
be localized in the limited segments of the speaking-circuit where an auditory image 
becomes associated with a concept. It is the social side of speech, outside the 
individual who can never create nor modify it by himself; it exists only by virtue of 
a sort of contract signed by the members of a community. 
This social contract is also based on linguistically generated intersubjective reason. As 
argued above, we can find the idea of intersubjectivity in the co-founders of western 
semiotics. Lakoff/Johnson, however, never realized the possibility of an intersubjective 
reason mediated by language; rather, they defined reason as being crucially shaped by 
human bodies: “In summary, reason is not, in any way, a transcendent feature of the 
universe or of disembodied mind. Instead, it is shaped crucially by the peculiarities of 
our human bodies, by the remarkable details of the neural structure of our brains, and by 
the specifics of our everyday functioning in the world.” (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 4) This 
remark by them is rather questionable. If reason cannot be transcendent, then how can 
people reach agreements in the first place? In fact, experiences, especially direct bodily 
experiences, are still quite individual rather than shared. In Habermas, the subject is a 
participant of interpersonal communication, while in Lakoff/Johnson, the subject is an 
individual practitioner who bases his or her understanding on isolated experience. The 
following remark on transcendence and intersubjective reason by Thomas McCarthy is 
essentially right: 
The undeniable ‘immanence’ of the standards we use to draw these distinctions – 
their embeddedness in concrete languages, cultures, practices – should not blind us 
to the equally undeniable ‘transcendence’ of the claims they represent – their 
openness to critique and revision and their internal relation to intersubjective 
recognition brought about by the ‘force’ of reasons. The ideas of reason, truth, 
justice also serve as ideals with reference to which we can criticize the traditions we 
inherit; though never divorced from social practices of justification, they can never 
be reduced to any given set of such practices. The challenge, then, is to rethink the 
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idea of reason, in line with our essential finitude – that is, with the historical, social, 
embodied, practical, desirous, assertive nature of the knowing and acting subject – 
and to recast accordingly our received humanistic ideals. (Habermas 1987b: x) 
Different from an intersubjective view, however, Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 497) 
defined embodied concepts in the following statement: 
Concepts arise from, and are understood through, the body, the brain, and experience 
in the world. Concepts get their meaning through embodiment, especially via 
perceptual and motor capacities. Directly embodied concepts include basic-level 
concepts, spatial-relations concepts, bodily action concepts (e.g., hand movement), 
aspect (that is, the general structure of actions and events), color, and others. 
Of all the three aspects that Lakoff/Johnson believe a concept arises from, none of them 
indicate an intersubjective or communicative channel, i.e., the means to mediate the 
transcendental and the empirical. They did not explain how people understand each 
other’s individual embodied concepts. Again, the gap between the transcendent and the 
empirical is still large. In fact, the proportion of meaning or semantic features we get 
from perception and embodiment is far less than the whole meaning we have on things. 
We get other proportions of meaning on things from the context of language use, which 
also contribute to our encyclopedia knowledge about things as elaborated in the previous 
section. Besides, the concept “reason” or “embodied reason” in the embodied philosophy 
is also of no difference from traditional views of reason, as may be revealed in the 
following remark by Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 128): “Reason and conceptual structure are 
shaped by our bodies, brains, and modes of functioning in the world. Reason and 
concepts are therefore not transcendent, that is, not utterly independent of the body.” In 
fact, philosophers have been saying all along that whatever understanding of the world 
is made from the human perspective, and there is of no difference in the so-called 
embodied view. That we believe reason and concepts are based on body and mind does 
not mean that they cannot be transcendent. They can be transcendent if they are 
intersubjectively established. In other words, intersubjective reason transcends 
individuals’ bodily experience.  
Moreover, the linguistically generated intersubjectivity or linguistically mediated 
intersubjective reason is also very important for us to understand truth and its relation 
with metaphor. In other words, it may provide better solutions for the following two 
questions: How can we define truth? and Can metaphors convey truth? In fact, the 
relation between metaphor and truth is a rather old question. The traditional view of truth 
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in philosophy treats metaphorical expressions as “false and uninterpretable unless they 
are recast explicitly or implicitly into similes” (Glucksberg and McGlone 1999: 1541). 
For instance, the expression “John is a pig” will be considered as literally false, but if it 
is transformed into the simile “John is like a pig”, then it is true (Hanks and Giora 2012: 
74). Also, it seems for many that metaphorical meaning is not very stable and thus cannot 
represent truth. It is so if you define truth as a fundamental and absolute one. However, 
an intersubjective view of meaning does not define truth in that way. We believe that 
truth is also a product of human reasoning and it is intersubjectively established. Since 
we believe in an intersubjective reason among members of a speech community, truth is 
also based on this linguistically generated intersubjectivity. Such an intersubjective view 
is compatible with Eco and Ding’s idea of seeing metaphor in culture, and they both 
believe that metaphor can convey truth on the basis of linguistically generated 
intersubjectivity. This is also what Lakoff/Johnson cannot provide for metaphor study 
through their experientialism or the embodied philosophy. In fact, Lakoff/Johnson may 
find better solutions for many problems in the cognitive theory of metaphor, if they 
believe in an intersubjective reason. One of the most important questions is related with 
truth. With the development of human cognition, we find that many so-called truths we 
held before are actually wrong ideas. Take our understanding of color for example. 
Recent research shows that color does not exist in the natural world (Lakoff/Johnson 
1999). Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 23) also take the issue of color as an example to talk about 
truth: 
What could be simpler or more obvious than colors? The sky is blue. Fresh grass is 
green. Blood is red. The sun and moon are yellow. We see colors as inhering in 
things. Blue is in the sky, green in the grass, red in the blood, yellow in the sun. We 
see color, and yet it is false, as false as another thing we see, the moving sun rising 
past the edge of the stationary earth. Just as astronomy tells us that the earth moves 
around the sun, not the sun around a stationary earth, so cognitive science tells us 
that colors do not exist in the external world. Given the world, our bodies and brains 
have evolved to create color. 
This shows that human cognition is confined by the limitations of our organic faculties, 
and our bodily experience is not reliable. Ancient people may believe that color 
inherently exists in things, just as they believe that the sun moves around the earth. Their 
consents on the above believes are also gained by interpersonal interactions and 
negotiations on the basis of the level of cognition at that time. In fact, very few people 
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today see colors as inherent in things. Moreover, it is not totally false to say that the sun 
is rising past the edge of the stationary earth if we put the statement in a “non-scientific” 
context, like in a poem. This further reveals the fact that we should go beyond the 
ontology of things to meet truth at an intersubjective level. Back to the question of color. 
When people believe in the objective ontology of color, it actually does not have one. 
Research shows that the world is not what we see through our eyes, and our eyes are very 
much like a looking glass. Maybe the world is more realistic in the eyes of those with 
achromatopia, but we still believe in color and talk about color. Why? Because it is a 
contract made by the great majority of community members. Thus, intersubjective reason 
enables us to achieve effective communication between each other. 
      Similar to the above idea of objectivity, Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 106) also expressed 
their idea on truth and understanding: 
In our earlier writings (Al, Lakoff and Johnson 1980; A4, Lakoff 1987), we 
recognized this dilemma and saw that it could be avoided by taking into account the 
role of embodied understanding. There is no truth for us without understanding. Any 
truth must be in a humanly conceptualized and understandable form if it is to be a 
truth for us. If it’s not a truth for us, how can we make sense of its being a truth at 
all? 
Except for their tenable argument on the relation between truth and understanding, we, 
however, cast doubt on their term “embodied understanding”, for we do not know that 
kind of understanding can be unembodied. After all, all forms of understanding are 
biologically generated from the brain. Perhaps, they use the term to refer to direct bodily 
experience, like they have expressed elsewhere. In doing this, however, they have also 
isolated brain or mind from body. Moreover, the above account by them also reveals that 
their version of embodied realism suggests nothing new and innovative for generating a 
new perspective of truth. In fact, what Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 107) can offer from their 
framework of embodied realism is an embodied truth: “Embodied truth is also not purely 
subjective truth. Embodiment keeps it from being purely subjective. Because we all have 
pretty much the same embodied basic-level and spatial-relations concepts, there will be 
an enormous range of shared ‘truths’, as in such clear cases as when the cat is or isn’t on 
the mat.” In fact, embodied truth means very limited truth. Even if embodiment can 
guarantee a shared truth, what about the unshared part? This means that embodiment also 
needs intersubjectivity. As mentioned before, embodied experience is communicative 
through intersubjectively established mechanism, i.e., the language system.  
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The following remark by Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 120) also shows that an 
“embodied interpretation” of truth is not enough: 
This folk theory is by no means all wrong. For basic-level concepts, the 
commonsense theory is fundamentally right. Given the centrality of basic-level 
concepts in our embodied understanding and their prevalence in our mundane 
experience, the commonsense theory does make sense. This is an embodied 
interpretation of the commonsense theory. It is not the usual interpretation. The 
commonsense theory is usually interpreted as an objectivist theory, in which the 
body and embodied understanding do not enter in at all. 
As argued above, truth is unattainable if everybody bases their understanding merely on 
bodily truth and never communicate or negotiate with each other. Lakoff/Johnson (1999, 
2003[1980]) also criticized the conception of truth in alleged objectivism. Instead of 
showing what went wrong in the objectivist truth, they simply substituted the objectivist 
view with an experientialist view, as revealed in Haser’s following remark: 
A theory which promises to invalidate objectivism should not simply supersede the 
objectivist conception of truth with an experientialist sense. In that case, objectivists 
and experientialists are talking about different things (different senses of truth) – 
which blocks from the start any attempt to argue that objectivists are mistaken in 
believing in absolute truth. Objectivists may even concur that “experientialist truth” 
is relative to conceptual systems, that is, to conceptual systems in the experientialist 
sense. (Haser 2005: 83) 
In very few places where Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 93) talk about intersubjectivity, 
the following remark indicates their ignorance of a linguistically generated 
intersubjectivity: 
Disembodied scientific realism creates an unbridgeable ontological chasm between 
“objects,” which are “out there,” and subjectivity, which is “in here.” Once the 
separation is made, there are then only two possible, and equally erroneous, 
conceptions of objectivity: Objectivity is either given by the “things themselves” 
(the objects) or by the intersubjective structures of consciousness shared by all 
people (the subjects). 
The first is erroneous because the subject-object split is a mistake; there are no 
objects-with-descriptions-and-categorizations existing in themselves. The second is 
erroneous because mere intersubjectivity, if it is nothing more than social or 
communal agreement, leaves out our contact with the world. The alternative we 
propose, embodied realism, relies on the fact that we are coupled to the world 
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through our embodied interactions. Our directly embodied concepts (e.g., basic-
level concepts, aspectual concepts, and spatial-relations concepts) can reliably fit 
those embodied interactions and the understandings of the world that arise from 
them. 
Intersubjectivity does not have to leave out humans’ contact with the world. In fact, it is 
about the human contact with the world. Furthermore, the above quotation smacks of the 
classic correspondence theory which they have criticized fiercely as follows: 
But giving up on color as a metaphysically real ‘primary quality’ has profound 
philosophical consequences. It means abandoning the correspondence theory of 
truth, the idea that truth lies in the relationship between words and the 
metaphysically and objectively real world external to any perceiver. Since there is 
no color in the world in itself, a sentence like ‘Blood is red,’ which we all take to be 
true, would not be true according to the correspondence theory. (Lakoff/Johnson 
1999: 26) 
They strongly believe that “metaphorical concepts are inconsistent with the classical 
correspondence theory of truth. Instead, what is required is embodied truth.” 
(Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 128) In fact, we can also talk about the correspondence theory 
from the intersubjective perspective. The concept “color”, for instance, should be 
considered as an intersubjectively agreed category with sub-categories that differ from 
culture to culture. This perspective explains how human beings perceive and define color 
while laying aside the unattainable world-in-itself. 
During the “dark age of metaphor”, as discussed in the first chapter, many 
mainstream philosophers like Locke and Hobbes did not believe that metaphor can 
generate serious thought, let alone conveying truth. Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 120) also 
realized this point, as argued in their criticism against “commonsense theory”: 
If the commonsense theory were true, metaphor would not serve the central function 
of language, which is supposedly to express and communicate literal truths about 
the world. Because of this, metaphor has been traditionally relegated to a theory of 
tropes, which is intended to handle uses of language in which truth is not thought to 
be at issue: poetry, rhetorical flourish, fictional discourse, and so on. The banishment 
of metaphor from the realm of truth explains why metaphor has traditionally been 
left to rhetoric and literary analysis, rather than being taken seriously by science, 
mathematics, and philosophy, which are seen as truth-seeking enterprises. 
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However, what Lakoff/Johnson failed to realize is that the real problem does not lie in 
that those philosophers did not hold an embodied philosophy but lies in that their theory 
of truth was not based on an intersubjective reason. Their failure in realizing the above 
fact led them to a fairly questionable framework of metaphor interpretation: 
We have evolved so that the hidden mechanisms of meaning produce a global 
experience for us that allows us to function well in the world. Our preponderance of 
commonplace basic experiences – with basic-level objects, basic spatial relations, 
basic colors, and basic actions – leads us to the commonsense theory of meaning and 
truth, that the world really, objectively is as we experience it and conceptualize it to 
be. As we have seen, the commonsense theory works very well in ordinary simple 
cases precisely because of the nature of our embodiment and our imaginative 
capacities. It fails in cases where there are conflicting conceptualizations or 
worldviews, and such cases are quite common. (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 509-510) 
Common or “global experience” is a result of a negotiated interpersonal contract rather 
than produced by a hidden mechanism of meaning in a single mind. As just mentioned 
above, the so-called “preponderance of commonplace basic experiences” is, in fact, very 
limited.  
Lakoff/Johnson (1999: 508-509) have enumerated three important findings in 
cognitive science based on empirical studies, all of which prove that human 
understanding is built upon intersubjectively negotiated ideas: 
• We experience objects as colored in themselves, even though it is now known that 
they are not. The neural system responsible for the internal structure of our color 
categories also creates for us the experience of color. 
• We experience space as structured by image schemas (as having bounded regions, 
paths, centers and peripheries, objects with fronts and hacks, regions above, below, 
and beside things). Yet we now know that space in itself has no such structure. The 
topographic maps of the visual field, the orientation-sensitive cells, and other highly 
structured neural systems in our brains not only create image-schematic concepts for 
us but also create the experience of space as structured according those image 
schemas. 
• We experience time in terms of motion and resources, even though neither of those 
is inherent in time itself. Our metaphors for conceptualizing time in terms of motion 
not only create a way to comprehend and reason about time in terms of motion but 
also lead us to experience time as flowing by or ourselves as moving with respect to 
time. 
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Besides the embodied experience, there is a space for cultural communication and 
negotiation among the subjects. Concepts are embodied, but they are at the same time 
not sealed in our bodies; rather, they are open for communication and negotiation. Not 
all the concepts have to be understood through individual experiences. 
In fact, the impasse of metaphorical essentialism and experientialism in the 
cognitive theory of metaphor is against Lakoff/Johnson’s original idea of seeking a 
middle course between objectivism and subjectivism because some of their initial 
arguments including the following one were once quite promising: 
An experientialist approach also allows us to bridge the gap between the objectivist 
and subjectivist myths about impartiality and the possibility of being fair and 
objective. The two choices offered by the myths are absolute objectivity, on the one 
hand, and purely subjective intuition, on the other. We have seen that truth is relative 
to understanding, which means that there is no absolute standpoint from which to 
obtain absolute objective truths about the world. This does not mean that there are 
no truths; it means only that truth is relative to our conceptual system, which is 
grounded in, and constantly tested by, our experiences and those of other members 
of our culture in our daily interactions with other people and with our physical and 
cultural environments. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 193)  
The notion of intersubjective and subject-object interactions here is quite important. 
However, such insightful understanding is not consistently carried out in 
Lakoff/Johnson’s theory. Although they mentioned the word “interactional” in the 
paragraph below, they did not interpret it in a right way: 
In summary, the usual objectivist accounts of these phenomena (dead metaphor, 
homonymy with similarities, or abstraction) all depend on preexisting similarities 
based on inherent properties. In general, similarities do exist, but they cannot be 
based on inherent properties. The similarities arise as a result of conceptual 
metaphors and thus must be considered similarities of interactional, rather than 
inherent, properties. But the admission of interactional properties is inconsistent 
with the basic premise of objectivist philosophy. It amounts to giving up the myth 
of objectivism. (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 215)  
Here Lakoff/Johnson have evidently misapplied the concept of “interactional properties”. 
The word “interactional” should be understood in the sense that human cognition is the 
result of human intervention. Similarities are not created by conceptual metaphors but 
recognized by metaphor users. In fact, the traditional comparison approach to metaphor 
is promising as long as it recognizes that similarities between things and events are 
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intersubjectively established. Lakoff/Johnson (2003: 209), however, have failed to see 
this important point as is shown in the following argument: “Metaphor can contribute to 
understanding only by making us see objective similarities, that is, similarities between 
the objective meanings M and M’. These similarities must be based on shared inherent 
properties of objects—properties that the objects really have, in and of themselves.” 
Epistemologically, there can be no “inherent properties” of objects; rather, we always 
locate properties of objects through intersubjective communication among members of a 
particular community. Habermas (1984: 12-13) terms this approach as “phenomenologist” 
compared to the “realist” approach revealed in the cognitive theory, and he has this to 
say: 
(b) The phenomenologist does not rely upon the guiding thread of goal-directed or 
problem problem-solving action. He does not, that is, simply begin with ontological 
presupposition of an objective world; he makes this a problem by inquiring into the 
conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the 
members of a community. The world gains objectivity only through counting as one 
and the same world for a community of speaking and acting subjects. The abstract 
concept of the world is a necessary condition if communicatively acting subjects are 
to reach understanding among themselves about what takes place in the world or to 
be effected in it. Through this communicative practice they assure themselves at the 
same time of their common life-relations; of an intersubjectively shared lifeworld. 
This lifeworld is bounded by the totality of interpretations presupposed by the 
members as background knowledge. 
Like Foucault’s concept of power, the conceptual metaphor theory is also not free 
from contradictory self-thematization. That is to say, on the one hand, conceptual 
metaphors are supposed to be near a priori, while on the other hand, they are also 
subjectively determined. In his critique of Foucault’s theory of power in genealogical 
historiography, Habermas (1987b: 274) made a very illuminating remark on the idea of 
“transcendental synthesis with the presupposition of an empiricist ontology”: 
In his basic concept of power, Foucault has forced together the idealist idea of 
transcendental synthesis with the presupposition of an empiricist ontology. This 
approach cannot lead to a way out of the philosophy of the subject, because the 
concept of power that is supposed to provide a common denominator for the contrary 
semantic components has been taken from the repertoire of the philosophy of the 
subject itself. According to this philosophy, the subject can take up the basically two 
and only two relationships towards the world of imaginable and manipulable objects: 
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cognitive relationships regulated by the truth of judgements; and practical 
relationships regulated by the success of actions. 
Similarly, in Lakoff/Johnson’s embodied philosophy, they also presuppose “an 
empiricist ontology” through their solid reliance on the neural connections for the near 
universal conceptual metaphors, in which the innovative capacity of metaphor disappears 
behind the abstract concepts. Most importantly, their theory is still very much rooted in 
the philosophy of the subject. As suggested by Habermas, they should find a way out of 
the subject-centered reason to meet on a higher level a communicative reason. A theory 
of meaning based on intersubjective reason demonstrates that the process of 
metaphorization is not only a cognitive process but also a process of negotiation. The 
negotiation can be a self-negotiation based on self-reasoning or a negotiation among 
members of a cultural community based on intersubjective reason. Guided by Habermas, 
we can then reach the following agreement for an effective solution to the issue 
Lakoff/Johnson failed to resolve: We admit that truths and certain norms can only be 
established intersubjectively through interactions among members in a particular cultural 
community. In this sense, we can say that nothing is a truth unless it is agreed upon as a 
truth. 
Lakoff/Johnson actually have made an interesting point in Metaphors We Live by: 
“When people who are talking don’t share the same culture, knowledge, values, and 
assumptions, mutual understanding can be especially difficult. Such understanding is 
possible through the negotiation of meaning.” (Lakoff/Johnson 2003[1980]: 231) It is a 
pity, however, that they fail to fully pursue this communicative approach to the study of 
meaning. In fact, a meaning is legitimate and understandable only if it survives the test 
of negotiation among members of a community. The same is for metaphor: a metaphor 
is legitimate and understandable in a particular cultural community only if it survives the 
test of negotiation among its members. Under the communicative approach, metaphor 
users regain the place they should have.  
3.5 Metaphor and Ideology 
As we have discussed in the previous section, the theory of communicative action and 
intersubjectivity by Habermas can provide a necessary space for communication between 
different metaphor users, and thus serves as a crucial dimension for our cultural 
framework of metaphor interpretation. Moreover, it can also remedy the deficiency in 
Lakoff/Johnson’s embodied philosophy in terms of the understandability between 
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individual experiences. However, it should be pointed out that Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action is based on an ideal mode of human communication where people 
spontaneously strive for mutual understanding and agreement. This reveals the Utopian 
nature of Habermas’s theory. He is right to believe that, in order to coordinate activities, 
people have to agree among themselves in relation to representations of their collective 
environment, but that may not always be the case. Put differently, although the theory of 
communicative action explains many speech activities in real life, there is still one link 
lost in their theory. In fact, Habermas’ mistake lies in that he equals speech acts geared 
to intersubjective recognition to all ordinary speech acts. In real life situations, language 
does not always act as mediation for mutual agreements. In his book entitled Beyond 
Ontology, Ding (1994: 117-118) made a very insightful critique on Habermas’ Utopian 
version of intersubjectivity: 
By confining communicative praxis solely to speech acts that are oriented to mutual 
agreement, Habermas has neglected a large portion of language reality that is 
antagonistic in nature. He speaks of the “learning processes” in which all the 
individuals gradually develop more advanced forms of moral consciousness 
culminating in a “a universal ethics of speech” where norms are justified 
argumentatively. If we accept what Habermas says as correct, history then would 
become nothing more than a process through which the aspiration towards rationally 
founded consensus becomes ever more explicitly articulated in language. In real life 
situations, however, there are innumerable instances where to speak is not to agree 
but to fight, and the solution often has to be brought about through the use of military 
or economic force. 
The same is to metaphor. Being one type of human speech and one important way 
of conveying meaning, metaphor is also not completely oriented to mutual agreement. 
Therefore, the deficiency of Habermas’s theory of communicative action, although it can 
to a great extent bridge the gap between idea and reality, lies in that it is based on an 
assumption of ideal communication between members of a society, and in doing this, it 
ignored the ideological differences between various metaphor users. An ideological 
dimension thus constitutes the missing link in Habermas’s theoretical framework. In this 
section, therefore, we are going to examine metaphor in relation to ideology so as to 
establish a sound cultural framework for metaphor interpretation. 
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Oftentimes, the choice of a metaphorical vehicle reveals a person’s class, 
educational background, and other ideological aspects. Look at the two metaphors Qian 
Zhongshu used in his well-known novel Fortress Besieged: 
When men students saw Miss Pao, they burned with lewd desire, and found some 
relief by endlessly cracking jokes behind her back. Some called her a charcuterie – 
a shop selling cooked meats – because only such a shop would have so much warm-
colored flesh on public display. Others called her “Truth,” since it is said that “the 
truth is naked.” But Miss Pao wasn’t exactly without a stitch on, so they revised her 
name to “Partial Truth.” (Qian 2003: 15) 
In the first metaphor, Miss Pao’s exposed body is compared to a charcuterie ‘熟食铺子’ 
/shu shi pu zi/, and, in the second metaphor, the same near naked body is compared to 
“Partial Truth”. The first metaphor can be quickly understood by most people from all 
walks of life, although, in the original Chinese version, the English translation of “熟食
铺子” /shu shi pu zi/ was presented, representing that the author is well-educated, 
especially in the 1940s of China. At least, the charcuterie vehicle is easy for people to 
understand and needs less explanation. The “Partial Truth” metaphor, however, reveals 
more of the ideological dimension of the writer, like his class, belief, and educational 
background, for the concept of truth is a rather abstract philosophical term and is not 
talked about much by ordinary people, especially in the time when the novel first 
appeared. To understand the metaphor, one should know another metaphor “truth is 
naked”, which is a rather difficult thing for the working class, let alone the majority of 
illiterate peasants at that time. In other words, the second metaphor reveals the 
intellectual background of the writer. This example shows that people from different 
classes may have different abilities in terms of metaphorical appreciation and 
interpretation, and sometimes those who want to display their meanings in a 
metaphorically understandable way should also accommodate themselves to their 
addressees’ interpretive abilities and cultural background. 
Besides, people of different classes and social ranks usually vary in values and 
world views, which results in diverse forms of subcultures within a cultural community. 
Oftentimes, unique metaphorical representations adopted by members of a class or social 
rank constitute an important part of a subculture, reflecting a special groupthink of its 
members. As pointed out by Kovecses (2005: 97): “Subcultures often define themselves 
in contradiction to mainstream culture, and, often, they can in part be defined by the 
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metaphors they use. And sometimes the self-definition of a subculture involves the 
unique metaphorical conceptualization of important concepts on which the separateness 
of the subculture is based.” This is essentially right if we examine the plant-related 
metaphors preferred by Chinese scholars who perceive in some plants the same virtues 
they pursue in life, such as perseverance and moral integrity, hence the formation of “the 
four noble flowers” and “three durable plants of winter”. To be more specific, “the four 
noble flowers” refer to plum, orchid, bamboo, and chrysanthemum, while the “three 
durable plants of winter” refer to pine tree, bamboo and plum. These plants often appear 
not only in homes and offices the scholars live and work but also in poems and paintings 
they create, serving as “a central motif of Chinese poetry and visual arts for well over a 
thousand years” (Ding 2010: 130). The inclinations of Chinese scholars featured by 
specific metaphorical representations form their social distinction. In other words, people 
of a class or occupation have their relatively stable forms of metaphorical representation, 
through which they “produce and reproduce at least the appearance of conformity to the 
behavioral rules that constitute their specific social field” (Ding 2010: 132). 
Moreover, metaphor can sometimes be a battlefield where different powers meet 
and struggle. For example, when someone says that “my surgeon is a butcher” or “my 
boss is a snake”, he or she does not only want to get agreement from others, rather, he or 
she wants to express anger or a feeling of dissatisfaction. If the surgeon or boss hears that 
kind of metaphor, they will not be happy and will probably fight back by using a different 
metaphor. Another example may be found in the American politics. The democratic party 
of the United States is metaphorized as a “donkey”, while the republican party is 
metaphorized as an “elephant”. When a republican calls his democratic colleague a 
donkey, he is probably using the metaphor negatively or at least ironically, although both 
parties accepted the nicknames for them. In this situation, the metaphor user is evidently 
not seeking for mutual agreement. Volosinov (1973: 23) is essentially right when said 
that language is the very site where power struggles, and meaning is usually the outcome 
of those struggles: 
Existence reflected in sign is not merely reflected but refracted. How is this 
refraction of existence in the ideological sign determined? By an intersecting of 
differently oriented social interests within one and same sign community, i.e., by the 
class struggle. 
Class does not coincide with the sign community, i.e., with the community which is 
the totality of users of the same set of signs for ideological communication. Thus 
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various different classes will use one and same language. As a result, different 
oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign. Sign becomes an arena of class 
struggle. 
Similarly, metaphor is also an arena of class struggle. In fact, the entire sign 
system is often an arena of class struggle, in which the class in power manipulate the use 
of signs and the use of metaphor to achieve political goals or material benefits. Although 
by law everyone has the right to metaphorize everything freely, there are moments in real 
situations when a certain metaphorical association is banned by rulers. Indeed, nothing 
can destroy the creation of meaning than a powerful hand. Because metaphor creates new 
meaning and new knowledge, all dictators will prevent it from being used freely. If you 
want to have control over other people, you should first control their freedom of using 
language, since language is directly related with how people think. One of the important 
things for the rulers is to control the use of metaphor. Such a ruler’s logic is very common 
in authoritarian states. For instance, in some countries, people are not allowed to connect 
very sensitive figures like state leaders with negative things. In the world of free speech, 
however, people may use whatever they want to metaphorize even the most powerful 
person. For example, the newly elected American president Donald Trump was 
extensively (both positively and negatively) metaphorized by the American press. 
Then there are metaphorical taboos in all cultures and societies, which remind 
metaphor users that some metaphorical associations are not suitable to be used in 
communication or in public. Generally speaking, there are two kinds of metaphorical 
taboos: those caused by the intervention of power and those caused by cultural taboos 
(the ordinary ones). And there is a huge difference between power manipulated 
metaphorical taboos and ordinary metaphorical taboos, because the former is more 
related to power while the latter is a result of intersubjective negotiation between 
members of a cultural community. In terms of the former, there have been many bans of 
metaphor in history. For instance, ordinary people in ancient China were forbidden to 
use the same given name as the emperor, which is called “避讳” /bi hui/ in Chinese. In 
Qing dynasty, poets who used the word “清” /qing/ in their pomes should be very 
cautious, because many poets who used the word in a negative manner or disrespectful 
manner were killed by the rulers. Since metaphor is deeply rooted in culture, they are 
more likely to be oppressed when normal cultural activities are largely constrained 
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throughout the society, such as the cultural disaster the Chinese nation had experienced 
during the notorious period of cultural revolution. 
Indeed, power behind metaphor can be best exemplified by the metaphor 
manipulation in China during the period of cultural revolution. Generally speaking, 
leaders usually would like to control the use of metaphor for the following two reasons: 
to avoid falling into “exorbitant affectation”, or to control people’s mind through 
language manipulation, like ideological control. Evidently, the control of metaphor use 
in the cultural revolution in China belongs to the latter situation. During that period of 
time, it would be a disaster for someone to make a metaphor like “communism is a 
withered tree”, or “communists are monsters”, or “Stalin is garbage” both in public and 
in private. Those who use these metaphors will be either punished or even beaten to death 
by the Red Guards. This means, when someone said: “Stalin is garbage”, his listeners 
would most likely tell him “Never say that!” or “Hold your tongue!” What is worse, the 
users of those metaphors were more likely to become enemies of the country and the 
people. The government at that time forbade people from using any metaphor that 
attacked it or belittled it so that they could achieve greater ideological control in the 
country. The reason they did this is that they wanted to unify the majority under the label 
of the working class to fight against the minority of people who believed in the bourgeois 
ideology. During that special time, communist mentors like Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, 
Lenin, and Stalin could only be associated with something positive, while negative 
association become metaphorical taboos. Although power cannot completely wipe out 
those semantic features from our mind, it definitely can prevent them from being used, 
at least for the time being. Thus, we can see how rulers try to control people’s mind 
through the manipulation of metaphor.  
The French scholar and semiotician Roland Barthes visited China in the year 
1974 (Barthes 2011). Years before his visit to China, he traveled in Japan, and that visit 
resulted in the book The Empire of Signs. Compared to his attitude on China, Barthes 
was evidently much more interested in Japan, which he also saw as a “cultural other” to 
the western world, although it seems that he also added much imagination into it, when 
he was immersed in the “mysterious oriental civilization”. Roland Barthes was, to some 
extent, not lucky because he visited China in a bad time when the country and its people 
were seared in the flames of the cultural revolution. China of 1970s had greatly 
disappointed Barthes because, at that time, the country was oppressed by a tight 
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ideological control, and the use of metaphor was strictly confined. Barthes did not see a 
country in which various kinds of signs, be it index, or icon, or symbol, could be adopted 
freely to form new signs and new meaning; rather, what he witnessed was a severe 
control of sign usage and around him was thousands of stereotyped symbols of 
ideological propaganda enforced by the government. Through the exposition and 
analysis in the previous chapters, we already have a clear idea that, in real language use, 
the formation of metaphor is never “governed” by those conceptual metaphors proposed 
by Lakoff/Johnson. In fact, the force actually governs or manipulates metaphor are its 
users. 
During the cultural revolution, political correctness had priority over all other 
matters. Chairman Mao was deified, and had the supreme power. Therefore, metaphors 
he created in his works were worshiped in the way Lakoff/Johnson see conceptual 
metaphors. Indeed, many of the metaphors in his poems were considered as being 
fundamentally true, and most Chinese people at that time did “live by” them. For instance, 
in one of Chairman Mao’s famous poems, he says 中华儿女多奇志，不爱红妆爱武装 
/zhong hua er nv duo qi zhi, bu ai hong zhuang ai wu zhuang/ ‘Chinese girls are so 
aspiring that they prefer army uniforms to red garments’. The main theme of that poem 
was to praise women soldiers in the army. However, because of the supreme influence 
and authority of Mao, nearly all Chinese people could recite it. As a result, the color 
green (the color of the uniform at that time) was more usually associated with “being 
aspiring”. Since the color grey was the uniform color of the former Red Army, it is also 
preferred by the authorities. This explains why, from the founding of the PRC to the end 
of the cultural revolution, the color grey and the color green (See Figure 4) are two 
prevailing colors in Chinese society. 
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Figure 4. Costumes in China during the Cultural Revolution 
Similarly, clothing was also metaphorized for the purpose of class struggle. At 
that time, people did not have much space in choosing colors for what they wore. For 
young people, the only popular color for them was green, and if someone dressed in 
fancy color to attend public events, he or she would be condemned by many for being 
corrupted by decadent bourgeois ideas. During that special era, the western lifestyle of 
dressing was a target of criticism. Thus, for most occasions, people’s choice on color of 
clothes was largely confined to green, grey, blue, and black. Even the leaders and their 
relatives had to abide by the very strict dressing code, and those who violated it would 
be condemned or even punished. For example, the former first lady, Wang Guangmei 
(See Figure 5) was humiliated during the cultural revolution for wearing cheongsam or 
Qipao during her visit abroad.  
 
Figure 5. The Picture of Wang Guangmei Being Humiliated during the Cultural Revolution 
173 
 
The mainstream view at that time was that people should not associate Qipao with beauty, 
hence the metaphorical association between Qipao and beauty in people’s conceptual 
world was nearly banned. On the contrary, Qipao was connected with the declined feudal 
Qing Dynasty. Metaphors or metaphorical associations are much easier to be 
manipulated because of the unstable relationship between tenor and vehicle. Since there 
are many semantic features for the cultural unit Qipao, we can either adopt the semantic 
feature “elegant traditional costume” or choose the “official costume of a feudal dynasty” 
to make a metaphor. Rulers of the Cultural Revolution chose the latter one while 
oppressing the former one. Up to that point, Qipao had been seen to represent an elegant 
traditional costume. However, the government reinterpreted the symbol Qipao by adding 
a derogatory sense to it. In this way, Qipao was negatively metaphorized for the purpose 
of class struggle. 
In Habermas’ framework of intersubjective communication, a sound mechanism 
of cultural reproduction can secure a continuity and coherence in culture and tradition. 
We should hear what Habermas has to say on this respect: 
D – The cultural reproduction of the lifeworld ensures that newly arising situations 
are connected up with existing conditions in the world in the semantic dimension: it 
secures a continuity of tradition and coherence of knowledge sufficient for daily 
practice. Continuity and coherence are measured by the rationality of the knowledge 
accepted ad valid. This can be seen in disturbances of cultural reproduction that get 
manifested in a loss of meaning and lead to corresponding legitimation and 
orientation crisis. In such cases, the actors’ cultural stock of knowledge can no 
longer cover the need for mutual understanding that arises with new situations. The 
interpretive schemes accepted as valid fail, and the resource “meaning” becomes 
scarce. (Habermas 1987a: 140) 
Just as what Habermas has argued, the cultural revolution is a disturbance of cultural 
production. Indeed, the manipulation of metaphor together with the overwhelming 
oppression in the cultural field during the cultural revolution had drastically reduced the 
Chinese nation’s competence in cultural reproduction, which accordingly led to 
orientation crisis in the whole society. Consequently, the Chinese nation had lived for 
decades on very limited stereotyped patterns with little creation. Thus, what Roland 
Barthes witnessed in the year 1974 was a distorted culture in a special time where 
metaphor and meaning production was severely manipulated by rulers to achieve 
political dominance. If Roland Barthes had the chance to visit China today instead of 
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1970s, it is quite possible that he would be fascinated by the carnival of signs in society 
just as what he had experienced in Japan, because, today, the Chinese nation has regained 
the right to use signs more freely, especially in relation to metaphor, and, as a result, 
traditional Chinese culture is also reviving. All these reveal the dynamic tension between 
ideology and metaphor. 
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Conclusion 
Based on the global anatomy presented in this study, I wish to first reiterate several points 
on Lakoff/Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory. To begin with, the conceptual 
metaphor theory as a form of metaphorical essentialism is in contradiction with the 
polysemous nature of the sign. The relation between metaphorical tenor and vehicle is 
dynamic rather than static. To be more specific, vehicular diversity and multivalency are 
two important features of metaphor that cast serious doubts on the hypothesis of 
‘conceptual metaphors’ which, being meta-metaphorical or meta-linguistic constructs, 
can tell us nothing but a dry and empty formula “A is B”. Moreover, there are no 
universal categories that determine our way of speaking and writing: Conceptual 
metaphors are shown to be superfluous by abundant variations at all levels of 
categorization and conceptualization which lies at the heart of human cognition. Last but 
not least, it should be pointed out that metaphor or metaphorical thinking is neither based 
on the so-called cross-domain mappings nor determined by some unconscious 
neurological structures presumed by Lakoff/Johnson. 
As to Lakoff/Johnson’s embodied philosophy or experientialism, they really have 
not offered anything new to the philosophy of meaning. All they have done is to repeat 
a common sense that humans understand the world around them through their bodily 
experience with it and therefore no human cognition can correspond to the world as it is. 
It is true that humans share certain very basic physiological characteristics such as having 
two eyes, two legs, one nose, and so on, but the environments they live in are so diverse 
and different that they react to their surroundings in vastly different ways. 
Lakoff/Johnson are right about our way of knowing the world being largely metaphorical 
(Vico made this point a long time ago), but our metaphors can be very different from one 
another. The problem is how individual experiences and meaning can be shared by a 
group of people. The embodied philosophy cannot solve this problem through the rather 
restricted mechanism of bodily experience. The missing link in their philosophy is a 
space for interpersonal communication and negotiation. 
As a promising alternative, cognitive linguists may find in Peirce’s theory of the 
sign a sound solution to this theoretical impasse. Indeed, the Peircean epistemology of 
metaphor offers a much better perspective than Lakoff/Johnson’s. As a logician, Peirce 
sees metaphor as a result of logical processes that create new meaning. Indeed, metaphor 
is important to Peirce not as a rhetoric adornment but as a way of abductive thinking, i.e., 
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iconic reasoning which is defined as one of the two types of abduction. This is also one 
important contribution Peirce has made for metaphor study, i.e., depicting its underlying 
logic. In this sense, Peirce has emphasized a long time before Lakoff/Johnson (2003 
[1980]) that metaphor means a lot more than rhetoric. Both Umberto Eco’s 
metaphorology and Ersu Ding’s metaphor theory are in line with Peirce’s theoretical 
framework where the meaning of a metaphor depends on an interpreter in a particular 
socio-historical context. They both realize that our metaphors can be very different from 
one another, and that is why we need encyclopedic knowledge about the world and the 
user to understand his or her metaphors. In other words, we need to reconnect metaphors 
with the specific cultural and historical contexts in which they appear. They are definitely 
not determined by some unconscious neurological structures presumed by 
Lakoff/Johnson which bring us back to his small number of conceptual metaphors that 
they think we live by. On the contrary, metaphor is situated in a cultural space for 
dynamic interpretation on the part of metaphor users where innumerable semantic 
features of objects or life situations are rhizomaticly linked on the basis of encyclopedic 
knowledge shared by members of a particular culture. From this perspective, 
metaphorical meanings are intersubjectively established, and our task is to trace the 
cultural patterns in metaphor, hence the need of an archeology of metaphor in different 
cultures. In the cultural framework, the success of metaphorical representation is 
dependent upon the correct interpretation of its meaning, that is, they are understood as 
they are meant to be. In that sense, we can say that nothing is a metaphor unless it is 
interpreted as a metaphor. By going beyond the ontological aspect of metaphorical 
concepts, the Peircean epistemology of metaphor can remedy Lakoff/Johnson’s 
cognitive theory so as to elucidate the actual processes of metaphorization and 
symbolization through a broader view of sign evolution. This is, perhaps, the most 
important legacy the great American philosopher and semiotician has bequeathed to us 
on the study of metaphor. 
Now that the present study has elaborated a sound epistemology of metaphor 
from the perspective of Peircean semiotic tradition and proposed a cultural framework 
for metaphor study, there is an urgent need for future studies to reconnect and elucidate 
the relation between metaphor and culture through examining cultural specific metaphors. 
We have found out that, more often than not, the same life situation is metaphorically 
semiotized in different ways across languages and cultures, and there is a fair portion of 
metaphors where the connection between the vehicle and the tenor is made not on the 
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basis of a common background to life shared by people across different languages but 
via a special knowledge about some unique aspects of the culture in which they appear. 
This may perfectly serve as the general philosophy for our future exploration on 
metaphor study. To end this thesis, therefore, I will enumerate several key areas for future 
research on metaphor studies, which may also form a brief research outline for an 
archeology of metaphor: 
1. Many culture-specific metaphors originate from the unique social customs of their 
users. One typical case in point is the long tradition of Taoism, also known as Daoism, 
and its practice of monastic life in China. The roots of Taoism go back at least to the 
4th century BCE. Early Taoism drew its cosmological notions from the School of 
Yinyang (Naturalists), and was deeply influenced by one of the oldest texts of 
Chinese culture, the Yijing, which expounds a philosophical system about how to 
keep human behavior in accordance with the alternating cycles of nature. Taoism 
differs from Confucianism by not emphasizing rigid rituals and social order, rather, 
it emphasizes the harmony between nature and life and pursues immortality. To date, 
Taoism has become an integral part of Chinese life. It is no surprise that some aspects 
of the monastic life have been employed to shed light on its secular counterpart as 
can be seen in the following examples: 
1) 八仙过海，各显神通。/ba xian guo hai, ge xian shen tong/ — ‘Eight immortals 
crossing the sea, each shows magic power.’ 
2) 脱胎换骨 /tuo tai huan gu/ — ‘remould oneself thoroughly and become a new man’ 
3) 返老还童 /fan lao huan tong/ — ‘being rejuvenated’ or ‘becoming young again in 
one’s old age’ 
4) 不食人间烟火 /bu shi ren jian yan huo/ — ‘To be otherworldly’ or ‘refuse to eat 
food cooked in the world’ 
5) 霞举飞升 /xia ju fei sheng/ — ‘be raised by rosy clouds and fly to the heaven’ 
Obviously, all the metaphorical vehicles here are related to the monastic life of Taoist 
priests that has become familiar to most Chinese people but not to people in another 
culture. To be able to make sense of the expressions, foreigners have to learn about 
Taoism and its practice either in person or from reading. 
2. Culture-specific metaphors are generated not only out of the unique behavioral 
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patterns and material objects of their users but also from the users’ written records of 
real or fictional events and characters that are not shared with other nations. In the 
latter case, the motivating link between a current life situation and a metaphorical 
expression is provided by knowledge about a particular linguistic or pictorial text, be 
it from history books, ancient myths, folklore, literature, popular media, and what not. 
We may have a glimpse of the inseparability between metaphor and culture from the 
examples listed below: 
1) 闻鸡起舞 /wen ji qi wu/ — ‘rise up upon hearing the crow of a rooster and practise 
with the sword’ 
2) 图穷匕见 /tu qiong bi xian/ — ‘the dagger shows itself when the map unrolls 
completely’ or ‘the real intention is revealed in the end’ 
3) to open Pandora’s box 
4) 叶公好龙 /ye gong hao long/ — ‘Lord Ye professed to love dragons’ 
5) 金玉良缘 /jin yu liang yuan/ — ‘predestined match between gold and jade’ 
6) 木石前盟 /mu shi qian meng/ — ‘a pledge between wood and stone’ 
2.1   The first two examples are allusions to real historical figures and 
events which are used as metaphorical vehicles for similar life situations. 
The phrase “闻鸡起舞” /wen ji qi wu/ (rise up upon hearing the crow of a 
rooster and practise with the sword) is related to a Chinese historical figure 
Zu Ti in the Jin Dynasty. As a young boy, Zu Ti was full of aspirations. He 
expressed his ambition and determination to serve the country whenever 
talking with his friends. He was also a man of action. In order to achieve 
his goal, he rose up upon hearing the roosters crow to practice with the 
sword every day. He finally grew up to be a very famous general of his 
time. This story was well documented in The History of the Jin Dynasty. 
The phrase is now used to refer to anyone who has aspiration to serve the 
country and works diligently to achieve the goal. It is for this reason that 
the word “舞” /wu/ is translated into “practicing with the sword” rather 
than “dancing”. Thus, without the knowledge on the background story 
behind the metaphor, it would be very difficult for people from other 
cultures to grasp the true meaning of it. 
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Likewise, “图穷匕见” /tu qiong bi xian/ (the dagger shows itself 
when the map unrolls completely) was originally related to a figure in 
Chinese history, Jing Ke, and a famous event was a guest residing in the 
estates of the prince of Yan state and renowned for his failed assassination 
attempt of Ying Zheng, King of Qin state, who later became first emperor 
in Chinese history (reign from 221 BC to 210 BC). Jing Ke was sent by 
Dan, the crown prince of Yan state, to assassinate Ying Zheng, King of Qin 
state. In order to approach the King, they decide to present as gifts the map 
of Dukang, the first part of Yan state that the Qin wanted. Concealing the 
dagger inside the map scroll, Jing Ke represented the Yan and met with the 
King. When the King gradually unrolled the map, Jing Ke immediately 
seized the revealed dagger and attacked the King. Although the 
assassination was unsuccessful and Jing Ke was killed, the story was 
handed down by people ever since. In modern Chinese, “the revealed 
dagger in the unrolling map” is metaphorized by people to refer to 
someone’s real intention (usually negative ones) uncovered in the end. To 
understand its full import, however, one has to be familiar with the 
historical anecdote that gave rise to the metaphor. 
2.2   Metaphorical allusions, however, do not have to be related to real 
historical figures and events all the time. In fact, many metaphorical 
expressions can be traced back to unreal or fictive worlds that vary from 
one culture to another. However, “pre-scientific” or superstitious some of 
those texts may seem, they provide an important foundation for the 
understanding of a large number of metaphors that are very much in force 
today. For instance, the third metaphor above, “to open Pandora’s box”, is 
related to a famous story in the Greek mythology. Pandora’s box is an 
artifact taken from the myth of Pandora’s creation in Hesiod’s Works and 
Days. The “box” was actually a large jar that Zeus gave to Pandora, which 
contained all the evils of the world. Breaching Zeus’ instructions of never 
opening it, Pandora opened the jar and all the miseries and evils flew out 
to afflict mankind, leaving only “Hope” inside once she had closed it again. 
The story cannot be scientifically proven, of course, but it does provide a 
metaphorical vehicle whose present meaning is “to perform an action that 
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may seem small or innocent, but that turns out to have severely detrimental 
and far-reaching negative consequences”.  
The fourth example given above originates from an old legendary 
in the Han Dynasty. A Lord Ye of ancient times who was very fond of 
dragons adorned his whole palace – beams, pillars, doors, windows and 
walls – with drawings and carvings of them. When a real dragon in heaven 
heard of this it was deeply moved by his infatuation and paid him a visit. 
When Lord Ye saw the real dragon thrusting in its head through the 
window of his study and its tail moving in his palace, he was frightened 
out of the house for his life. Clearly, what Lord Ye loved was not real 
dragons. One can safely claim that nobody in China actually believes in the 
existence of dragons, but that does not prevent people from using the 
expression to mean metaphorically “the professed love of what one actually 
fears”. 
2.3   Examples 5) and 6) represent another important source for culturally 
unique metaphors, that is, the so-called belle-letters which is often 
nationally-based. The Chinese phrase “金玉良缘” /jin yu liang yuan/ 
(predestined match between gold and jade) originates from the great 
Chinese novel A Dream of Red Mansions, in which the hero Baoyu who 
was born with a jade finally married his cousin Baochai who always wore 
a golden necklace. Their marriage was not only happily agreed by their 
parents, but also was blessed by almost all their relatives and friends. The 
phrase is now used by many Chinese to refer to “a perfect couple” or “a 
happy marriage”. Likewise, another metaphor “木石前盟” /mu shi qian 
meng/ (a pledge between wood and stone) taken from the same novel is 
connected to the pledge Baoyu and Daiyu made in their past life (wood 
refers to Daiyu and stone represents Baoyu). The phrase is now used by 
many to refer to “the fruitless but poignant love” or even “the doomed 
love”. Obviously, a certain degree of familiarity with the literary text 
alluded to is essential to the understanding of the above metaphors. 
As is obvious from the examples presented above, many metaphors are closely related to 
the culture in which they are produced. To understand them or to learn to use them in 
new situations, we have to delve into the original cultural contexts from which they are 
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derived. Such an effort contributes to what I call an “archeology of metaphor” to which 
I plan to devote myself in the near future. 
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